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I. INTRODUCTION
The estimable Larson treatise is, by tradition, the critical
reference to which to turn for analysis of workers’ compensation
issues. One of the book’s many essential declarations is addressed to
adjudication within the system. The late Professor Larson’s book
perceptively declares, as it always has, “in the spectrum of
administrative agencies . . . the compensation commission . . . while
deciding controverted claims . . . is as far towards the judicial end of
the spectrum as it is possible to go without being an outright court.”1
This enduring, correct observation is critical to the understanding of
the workers’ compensation adjudicative process. The hearing officer,
in this regard, is adjudicating a dispute between two private parties.2
Though interpreting and enforcing a law of public importance, he or
she is not implementing agency policy.3

National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ)
Fellowship Paper (2011). A preliminary version of this article was presented at the
annual meeting of the NAALJ at Santa Fe, NM, on September 18, 2011.
*

A.B., 1982, West Virginia University; J.D., 1985, Duquesne University
School of Law. Workers’ Compensation Judge, Pennsylvania Department of Labor
& Industry, Pittsburgh, PA; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. Thanks to Timothy P. Schmidle, Ph.D. and to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Pitt Law 2011); and also to Mr. Andrew Horowitz, Esq. (Pitt Law 2011), and Ms.
Jennifer Fink (Pitt Law 2012), for their invaluable legal research assistance. Any
opinions expressed are strictly those of the Author and not of the Department of
Labor & Industry. Contact: DTorrey@pa.gov.
ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, § 79:90 (Desk ed. 2000).
Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. 1990) (“[W]orker’s
compensation is a matter of great public interest and is subject to extensive
governmental regulation as to the nature and extent of the remedy. However, while
the Legislature in the field of worker’s compensation defined relationships, rights
and duties that the parties are not free to derogate by contract, the litigation
nevertheless adjudicates a dispute between private parties and results in a money
judgment affecting only those parties.”).
3
See generally Thomas E. Wing, Oregon’s Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J.
NATL. ASSN. ADMIN. LAW. JUDICIARY 57, 69 (2003) (drawing general distinction
between “one party” and “two party” cases entertained by administrative law
judges); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN.
L. REV. 271, 282 (1994) (describing the role of federal administrative law judges).
1
2
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The Larson treatise also addresses the issue of the fact-finding
status of the hearing officer in workers’ compensation adjudication as
he or she resolves such disputes. The treatise has always identified
as the majority and “orthodox” rule one having the commission – not
the first-level hearing officer or referee – the arbiter of credibility and
final fact-finder. Notably, early courts occasionally analyzed this
relationship by analogy to the equity offices of “special master” (a
subordinate), and “chancellor” (the trial court and fact-finder).4
The treatise, indeed, considers as aberrant a system which
maintains the hearing officer as final fact-finder. “A small group of
states and the Longshore Act,” Larson complains, “have deliberately
separated themselves from the majority on this point.”5 The
December 2007 version of the text identifies nine states as
subscribing to this purported aberration, setting forth in discrete
subsections the “minority rule” as maintained by Florida, Arizona,6
4

United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla.
1951) (“The chancellor … should give due consideration to the findings of facts
made by a special master and should consider the many advantages which the
master had in personally hearing and observing the witnesses. . . . However,
although the Chancellor may use the services of a special master. . . and receive
from him his advisory findings and recommendations, the fact remains that it is the
Chancellor who under the law is charged with the duty and responsibility of
making findings of facts and entering the final decree.”); Rodriguez v. Indus.
Comm’n, 21 N.E.2d 741,743 (Ill. 1939) (“[t]he arbitrator in his consideration of the
case is but the agent of the commission, similar in character to that of a master in
chancery. . .”). Compare Hamby v. Everett, 627 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ark. Ct. App.
1982) (“Most any law school graduate is aware that our Court reviews chancery
cases de novo. However, where credibility issues arise, we will not reverse the
findings of the chancellor unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). This
approach is familiar to administrative law specialists as the standard that prevails
under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)
(2006) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, that decision then
becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an
appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule. On
appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice
or by rule.”).
See generally WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.09 (Lexis Pub., 4th ed. 2000).
5
LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[4].
6
The Larson treatise states that this rule was created in 1967 with the
decision in Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). LARSON,
supra note 1, § 130.03[4]. That decision, however, was unambiguously reversed
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Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Michigan, Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska,
and the Longshore Act.7
This Author’s research has not, however, found this analysis
to be particularly convincing in the present day. The survey of states
upon which he reports in this article does not, in this regard, support
the proposition that having the hearing officer as final fact-finder
currently reflects an aberration. The “typical compensation system”
of the 1950’s, when Larson first penned his book, is not the
overwhelming contemporary model. (This article will hereafter use
the title Workers’ Compensation Judge or WCJ to refer to this
office.)
Indeed, this Author’s research demonstrates that a sizeable
minority of states now maintains systems where the WCJ is
statutorily the final fact-finder. The tendency over the years is for
legislatures to prefer the first level hearing officer in such role. Of
course, this preference echoes the common law, which generally calls
for deference to the fact-findings of the individual who saw and
heard the witnesses and assessed their demeanor.8 This policy may
be seen at work in the trend to make the first-level hearing officer the
final fact-finder. Still, this legislative preference, manifested during a
by the Arizona Supreme Court. Powell v. Indus. Comm’n,, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz.
1967) (“The Commission of course was not bound by the finding of its referee.”).
A subsequent decision, Ohlmaier v. Indus. Comm’n, 776 P.2d 791 (Ariz. 1989),
explains that the legislature changed the law in 1973 to have it comport with the
holding of the appeals court. See infra Section V(C).
7
LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[4]. The book also recognizes that this
rule is followed in the District of Columbia. Id.; § 130.03[4], n.8.1 (citing Potomac
Elec. Power Co., v. Dep’t of Emp’t Serv., 835 A.2d 527 (D.C. 2003)). At another
section, the treatise recognizes a change to the Minnesota Act to make the ALJ the
fact-finder. Id. at § 130.03[8] (citing Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831 (Minn.
1984)).
8
Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949) (“Trial on oral
testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in open
court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent, distinctive, and most
valuable features of the common-law system. For only in such a trial can the trier
of the facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses’ demeanor; and that
demeanor – absent, of course, when trial is by affidavit or deposition – is
recognized as an important clue to witness’ credibility.”). See James P. Timony,
Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000). See also Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1951) (indicating that an agency,
though not bound by ALJ decision, should not ignore the findings of fact and
credibility determinations contained in initial federal ALJ order).
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long period of reform, exists mainly because finality at the first level
of adjudication is thought to enhance efficiency in the litigation of
contested cases.9 In a number of jurisdictions, meanwhile, including
Pennsylvania and the Longshore Act, establishing the judge as factfinder was part of a general restructuring of the administrative agency
responsible for enforcing the law.10 In still others, the change was
effected as part of the most fundamental institutional reform:
changing the forum for contested cases from civil court to an
administrative forum.11
The appendixed tables show that, of fifty-two critical
jurisdictions – fifty states, the Longshore Act (LHWCA), and the
District of Columbia (D.C.) – twenty-six state programs hew to the
majority rule. A full twenty-two states, plus the LHWCA and D.C.,
subscribe to the minority rule. This Author places Alabama and
Tennessee, which entertain the litigation of contested cases in civil
court, in their own category.12 Even here, however, a plain
distinction exists. In Alabama, the trial judge is the final fact-finder,
whereas in Tennessee the appellate courts reserve the right to
reassess credibility and change the facts.13
The contents of the tables are distilled below. The Author
sets forth this distillation with a caveat: a great deal of variety and
nuance attends the issue of WCJ adjudicative finality. An ironclad
taxonomy is thus impossible. This phenomenon has been noted from
the very earliest days of the program. The early treatise writer
Bradbury declared, “The administration and procedure under no two
of the compensation acts of the American states are exactly alike.
The revolution wrought by the adoption of the compensation
principle is nowhere more strongly emphasized than in the manner in
which controversies growing out of claims for compensation are

9

See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS
COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 40 (1991) (critics
complaining that “. . . . costs are likely to be greater and the role of attorneys
enhanced when appellate review, whether administrative or judicial, is not limited
to questions of law but rather can include reconsideration of the questions of fact
determined at the initial hearing.”). See also Section V (B).
10
See infra Section V(D).
11
See infra Section V(F).
12
See infra Section III.
13
See infra Section III.
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determined.”14 This Author nevertheless offers the following general
delineation:15
Majority and “Orthodox” Rule:
Board, Commission, or judicial branch
is final fact-finder
Minority Rule:
WCJ is final fact-finder;
Board, Commission, or judicial branch
exercises appellate review or the like
States where workers’ compensation
cases
are litigated in civil court
States where appeal from agency
adjudication may involve jury trial
States where appellate court reserves
right to reassess credibility
States where workers’ compensation
disputes are addressed in a judicial
branch workers’ compensation court

AR, CA, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IO, KS,
MD, MS, MO, NV, NH, NY, ND, NC,
OH, OR, SC, SD, UT, VT, VA, WA,
WI
AK, AZ, CO, CN, DE, FL, KY, LO,
ME, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NJ, NM,
OK, PA, RI, TX, WV, WY, DC,
LHWCA
AL, TN

MD, OH, TX, VT, WA
SD, TN
NE, RI, OK

The issue of WCJ adjudicative finality is not, of course,
unique to workers’ compensation. The issue has been current,
indeed, in the debate over “central panels” of ALJs. Some states
have created central panels that feature the ALJ as the final factfinder, a development that has been described as a dramatic shift
away from the model provided by the federal Administrative
Procedure Act.16 Virtually all of the literature that addresses finality
in the administrative law context is found in discussions of central

HARRY F. BRADBURY, BRADBURY’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND
STATE INSURANCE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 960 (3rd ed. 1917).
15
More nuanced characterizations of most state systems are provided
throughout the text of this article, and also in footnotes to the tables.
16
James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State ALJ: Central Panels
and their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1356-60 (2002) (referring to an “emerging trend of
restricting or eliminating agency review of state administrative law judges’ (ALJ)
decisions, thereby making them actually or effectively final and subject only to
judicial review,” and positing that such change “represents a fundamental change in
state administrative adjudication.”).
14
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panels.17 This Author has not encountered the issue discussed in the
discrete realm of workers’ compensation.
This article, addressing this issue in the workers’
compensation field, reports in detail on the basic findings
summarized above. This article explains the nature of WCJ and
commission adjudication, and seeks to determine why the original
commission-as-fact-finder model, though it endures as the majority
rule, has seemingly eroded. This article also provides an introduction
to the manner in which workers’ compensation adjudication is
organized among the states.
This article then seeks to ascertain the current state of the law
– and the practice as well – among the states on the issue of WCJ
adjudicative finality. This article also treats the related issue of
whether an appeal or request for review of the WCJ’s adjudication
operates as an automatic stay on the award. It seems impossible to
ponder the practical import of fact-finding finality without taking into
account this crucial procedural issue. The tables at the conclusion of
this article set forth an accounting of the laws of the various
jurisdictions on these issues of WCJ finality and stays of
adjudication. They also identify the procedural schemes of each state
and the precise standard of review that applies once a compensation
case, however finalized, is ready for true judicial review.
It may be noted that to speak of WCJ adjudicative finality on
the facts is to at once speak of the standard of review that is
employed by the Board, commission, or court to which the appeal
has been taken.18 Indeed, in many state laws the final fact-finding

17

Wing, supra note 3, at 57 n.2 (collecting multiple citations to articles
treating the history of and issues surrounding central hearing panels). But see
Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the
Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2009) (author expressing
disapproval of mandatory arbitration clauses, and positing that empirical evidence
shows that district court judges are reversed 12% of the time – much more than
mandated arbitrators).
18
Some studies, when addressing standards of review, divide states into
those where review is for “law and fact” and those that review for “law” only. See,
e.g., DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, DISPUTE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A NATIONAL INVENTORY, 1997-1998 (Workers
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1998). This use of terms may also be found
on occasion in statutes.
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power of the WCJ is defined not by some bold declaration of the
same, but by a proviso that defines the review power of the appellate
entity. An example of the former can be found in the Kentucky
statute, which states, in part, “(1) An award . . . of the [ALJ] . . . shall
be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact . . . .” 19 An
example of the latter, meanwhile, is that of Pennsylvania, where the
statute provides, “The board shall hear the appeal on the record
certified by the [WCJ] office. The board shall affirm the [WCJ]
adjudication, unless it shall find that the adjudication is not in
compliance with section 422(a) and the other provisions of this
act.”20 The lawyer or other analyst, to derive the Pennsylvania
WCJ’s power, must resort to statutory cross-reference and the
precedents before he or she may discover that such finality is
precisely the same as in Kentucky.21
In this writer’s view, this analysis and ascertainment of the
current law of WCJ finality is important because of two policy
questions. First, in an environment where we seek to ensure the
efficiency of litigating disputed claims, is making the WCJ the
ultimate fact-finder the superior approach? A critical issue here is
whether the parties are more or less likely to appeal, hence extending
In this article, the Author will not use this terminology. Generally, those
that apply these terms mean that a commission or court that reviews for “law and
fact” will reassess credibility and potentially substitute new fact-findings. In
contrast, a commission or court that reviews only for law will not do so. Nothing is
offensive about this language, but lawyers and judges simply do not speak in this
fashion. An appellate law clerk who tells his boss that, in a workers’ compensation
appeal, the standard of review is “law only” would be taken as a poseur. The legal
formulation would likely be, instead, something like (1) “error of law,” and (2) a
determination of “whether essential findings of fact are based on substantial
evidence.” It may well be that a judge or commission that has issued a finding of
fact based on legally insufficient evidence has committed an error of law. See
generally Revello v. Acme Mkts, Inc., 1986 Del. LEXIS 1064, at *9 (Del. Jan. 31,
1986). This does not, however, change the reality that appellate review in a “law
only” state always takes into account review of facts. No system tolerates an
arbitrary and capricious WCJ.
19
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.285 (West 2011).
20
77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 854.2 (West 2011).
21
The landmark case in Pennsylvania that defines the WCJ as the final
fact finder is Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 305
A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). Most Pennsylvania lawyers, even specialists,
could not identify the statute which by inference defines the WCJ as final factfinder, but all know and hold close to their heart the case name, “Cyclops.”
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the litigation, when a “second bite of the apple” may be obtained at
the commission level.22 This has been an issue talked about for over a
half-century.23 Second, in an environment where we seek to afford
due process to the parties, is making the WCJ the ultimate fact-finder
the superior approach? A critical issue here is whether the parties
perceive such a system to be affording them an equitable process
before a competent, impartial, and accountable judge.24
This article concludes with the assertion that the WCJ as
ultimate fact-finder constitutes the superior method of administrative
adjudication. In submitting that this is so, this article evaluates the
issue, as foreshadowed above, in the context of the familiar
administrative adjudication values of efficiency, impartiality, and
accountability.
II. THE UTILITY OF COMPARISONS
The trend towards making the WCJ the final fact-finder in the
system has not been widely noted or commented upon. While the
Larson treatise, as suggested above, identifies the trend,25 it does not
try to identify its source (though it does note miscellaneously that an
“increasing remoteness of the reviewing administrative body from
the real fact-finding process” exists.)26 The Workers’ Compensation

See, e.g., PETER S. BARTH, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN
CONNECTICUT: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 24 (1987) (“Few appeals are
successful . . . Many denials of appeals have been based on the CRD’s [viz.,
Compensation Review Division’s] consistent position that a commissioner’s
conclusion cannot be reviewed when it rests on the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. This view, perhaps in conjunction with the low rate of
success, largely explains the small number of appeals to the CRD.”).
23
HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION 158 (1954).
24
See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 88-97 (1983) (identifying and discussing the
importance of “process values”).
25
See LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[8] (“The issue of extent of
administrative review is closely related to the question of to whose findings the
presumption of finality attaches, and there is discernible here also some beginnings
of a trend to limit the scope of administrative review.”).
26
LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[6]. For an Arkansas opinion in which a
concurring judge recognized the trend and suggested modification of the Arkansas
22
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Research Institute (WCRI), meanwhile, in 1999 published an
authoritative catalog inventorying the adjudicatory approaches of the
various states.27 This notable text raises the important policy
questions as to which arrangement might be best, but it does not
remark on the genesis of the trend or hazard any analysis.
It is submitted that the trend, and the issues implicated, merit
a critical analysis. As WCRI points out, policymakers can benefit
from understanding how the adjudication systems of other states
operate as they endeavor to update and improve their own
jurisdictions’ laws and processes. When it comes to coverage and
benefits, comparative analyses can be found in a number of excellent
resources.28 However, for more nuanced, “back-end” issues29 such as
adjudication, resources are scarce.
Leading researchers notably posited in 1998 that “[v]ery little
is known about the optimal design of dispute procedures.”30 The

system, see Webb v. Workers’ Compensation Commission, 733 S.W.2d 726, 728
(Ark. 1987) (Newbern, J., concurring).
27
See BALLANTYNE, supra note 18. See also UNITED STATES CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS, Chart XV –
Appeal Provisions (2011).
28
For many years, the U.S. Department of Labor undertook a survey of all
fifty state workers’ compensation systems, comparing laws and benefit levels. This
effort ended in 2006 because of budget cuts, but two entities have now taken up the
task: the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions
(IAIABC) and the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI). The result
is the book WCRI, Workers’ Compensation Laws as of January 2010 (Ramona P.
Tanabe, ed., 2010). Much of the text is devoted to comparing the issue of benefits
and their delivery. The editor, Ms. Ramona Tanabe of WCRI, includes an accurate
caveat in her introduction: “It is easy to misunderstand subtle differences between
jurisdictional laws and regulations. The differences in law are magnified by
agency interpretive bulletins and traditional practices. Additionally, case law is
continually redefining interpretations and application and the laws are riddled with
exceptions to the general rules . . . .” Id. at 5.
29
This term the Author borrows from Richard Victor, Director of WCRI.
See RICHARD A. VICTOR ET AL., COST DRIVERS IN SIX STATES, 102 (1992) (stating
that the “back end of the claim . . . is a major friction point in the system, one that
is quite complex and involves the interaction of a large number of factors.
Historically, it has been difficult for policymakers and study commissions to
untangle the nature of the beast.”).
30
Terry Thomason, Douglass E. Hyatt, & Karen Roberts, Disputes and
Dispute Resolution, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 291
(1998). WCRI researchers, writing in 1999, also despaired at the lack of studies on
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Author is unsure that this is really true, as many analyses of dispute
resolution systems exist. This writer hopes to contribute some
knowledge and opinion on the issue in the workers’ compensation
context.
Legislatures and administrators do, in fact, analyze other state
practices as they undertake reform. The Author, for example,
addressed the issue of the fact-finding power of the WCJ in
Pennsylvania in 1996 at the request of the Department of Labor &
Industry.31 At that time, an early version of proposed reforms
featured a provision that would have given enhanced review power to
the Appeal Board (intra-agency review) over the credibility
determinations of the WCJ (since 1972 the final fact-finder).32 The
proposed reform would do so by requiring more highly-refined
“reasoned decisions,” and obligating the Board on appeal to afford
”whole record” review, as undertaken by federal and other courts.33
The Department asked the Author for a report on how other
states approached the fact-finding function. Which states, the
Department asked, maintained a system like Pennsylvania, with WCJ
as fact-finder; and which maintained a system where the commission
could more broadly reassess credibility? This Author concluded
then, as he does now, that the Larson treatise position that WCJ as
final fact-finder is an aberration is misleading and that the WCJ as
final fact-finder is now fairly common.34

workers’ compensation adjudication systems. See DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE &
CHRISTOPHER J. MAZINGO, MEASURING DISPUTE RESOLUTION OUTCOMES: A
LITERATURE REVIEW WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION 83
(Workers Compensation Research Institute ed.,1999).
31
See David B. Torrey, Matters Regarding Proposed Amendment (H.B.
2216) to Section 422(a) of the Act (Reasoned Decisions),with Comparative
Analysis Among Jurisdictions, in PAPERS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
ADJUDICATION TASKFORCE (First Revision, Mar. 12, 1996) (on file with Author).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. In the end, as discussed below, the legislature required the WCJ to
issue a more refined, reasoned decision, but actually truncated further the Appeal
Board’s powers. See Section IX(C)(2).
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS
The focus of this article is on the fact-finding power of the
WCJ as opposed to the administration of systems per se. The
outlines of the systems within which WCJs undertake their work is,
however, important to appreciate the more detailed analysis that
follows.
By far the most predominate organizational model in the
present day is the WCJ serving as an employee of the department of
state government responsible for overall administration of the
workers’ compensation program. For example, this Author is an
employee of the State Department of Labor & Industry, in its
Workers’ Compensation Adjudication Office. Table 1 details the
precise title of all WCJs and their various administrative affiliations.
This is not, however, the universal model. Of note is that four
states — Colorado, Minnesota, Wyoming, and Michigan35 —
organize WCJs under the auspices of a “central hearing panel.” 36 In
Colorado, Minnesota, and Michigan, the ALJ, Compensation Judge,
and Magistrate, respectively, is a specialist in the field, while in
Wyoming, the hearing officer is a skilled generalist.37
In all
jurisdictions, notably, he or she is the final fact-finder. Florida,
meanwhile, maintains a central panel, the Division of Administrative
Hearings (DOAH),38 to which the Judges of Compensation Claims
(JCCs) belong. This is so, however, only for purposes of financing
and internal administration and JCCs are not “subject to the control,
supervision, or direction by any party or any department or

35

The Michigan development occurred in 2011. See Mich. Exec. Order
No. 2011-4, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/20114_346311_7.pdf (Feb. 23, 2011).
36
Id.
37
Memorandum from Hon. Deborah Baumer to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan.
9, 2012) (on file with the Author) (stating, inter alia, “We hear all types of
administrative cases in which we are the final decision makers, including but not
limited to, driver’s license suspensions and revocations for DUI’s, workers’
compensation, Department of Family Services child/adult abuse and neglect for
purposes of the central registry, and all state personnel hearings . . . .”).
38
See State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, DIVISION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, http://www.floridagovernmentonline.com/topic/5 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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commission of state government.”39 To the contrary, a separate
Office of Judges of Compensation Claims (OJCC) exists.40
Other states have considered including WCJs in their central
panels, but concerns over the complexity of the field, and its
significant political aspect have often precluded such action.41
When, in the 1990’s, a push was made for a central panel in
Pennsylvania, a number of lobbies, including Public Utility
Commission judges, the WCJs, and the state bar association workers’
compensation section, raised these concerns. (Certainly the inherent
tendency of organizations to resist change was also at work in this
episode.) Ultimately, this advocacy was unsuccessful.42
In three states — Rhode Island, Nebraska, and Oklahoma —
WCJs currently sit in a judicial branch workers’ compensation court.
In these states the WCJ is the final fact-finder as well. The 1990
creation of the Rhode Island court, notably, occurred in the wake of
the litigation crisis spawned by 1970’s liberalization of workers’
compensation laws discussed below.43 The heritage of compensation
Hon. Diane Beck, JCC, Nat’l Ass’n of Workers’ Comp. Judiciary Coll.,
Remarks at the Comparative Law Panel (Aug. 22, 2011) (on file with the Author).
40
Id. As is common among states, assessments on the workers’
compensation industry via the workers’ compensation Administrative Trust Fund
funds this agency.
41
See, e.g., Wing, supra note 3, at 69 n.63 (2003) (noting that “[a]gencies
[like workers’ compensation] . . . whose subject matter was regarded as . . . too
political . . . were exempted” from Oregon Hearing Officer Panel).
42
With regard to attempts to establish a central panel in Pennsylvania, see
generally Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps on the Road to Administrative Law
Reform in California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229 (1999); Gerald
E. Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerging
Framework to Increase “Judicialization” in Pennsylvania, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
297 (1996).
43
Rhode Island established the Workers’ Compensation Court in 1990,
after apparent inefficiencies and delays plagued the predecessor Commission. As
a result of the Rhode Island reform, according to one commentator, “consistency
has been brought to decisions, and appeals have been reduced.” Matthew Carey,
Workers’ Compensation in Rhode Island: Reform Through Business/Labor
Cooperation , in WORKPLACE INJURIES AND DISEASE: PREVENTION AND
COMPENSATION 277 (K. Roberts, J. Burton, M. Bodah, eds., 2005). See generally
Rhode Island Judiciary, Jurisdiction and Overview, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COURT,
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/workerscompensationcourt/PDF/JurisdictionandO
verview.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
39
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courts in Nebraska (1935)44 and Oklahoma (1959),45 on the other
hand, is quite ancient.
Two states, meanwhile, adhere to their initial approach of
facilitating dispute resolution in the county civil courts. These states
are Alabama46 and Tennessee.47 Adjudication in each state is
effected by a bench trial, that is, with the judge as fact-finder, as
opposed to a jury trial.48

For an account of the court’s history, see Nebraska Government,
History, Mission & Organization, NEBRASKA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT,
http://www.wcc.ne.gov/about/history_mission_organization.aspx
(last
visited
March 19, 2012). From 1913-1917, the courts administered the program. From
1917 until creation of the workers’ compensation court, the Department of Labor
administered the law.
45
For an account of the court’s history, see History of the Workers’
Compensation Court, OKLAHOMA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COURT,
http://www.owcc.state.ok.us/history.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). From 1915
until creation of the court, the State Industrial Commission administered the law.
46
With regard to the genesis of this arrangement, one historian states as
follows:
44

As elsewhere in the Deep South, Alabama reformers and even
labor leaders avoided labor legislation that might discourage
regional economic growth, leaving worker protection to
paternalistic industrialists. Hence, Alabama enacted a weak
workers’ compensation law in 1919 in which the courts, rather
than a commission, adjudicated claims, and in which the state
regulated insurance only to prevent rate discrimination.
DONALD W. ROGERS, MAKING CAPITALISM SAFE: WORK SAFETY & HEALTH
REGULATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940 88 (2009).
47
A National Commission consultant explained the origin of court
administration in Tennessee as follows: “The original statute, passed in 1919,
provided for court administration partially because of the erroneous belief that the
program would be primarily self-administering, and in part because of the overreaction of the bar association who feared that the advent of workmen’s
compensation would eliminate litigation.” Bruce R. Boals, Administration of
Workmen’s Compensation in Tennessee, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS III 67
(1973). A thorough review of the Tennessee dispute resolution process is found in
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN TENNESSEE:
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY, 43-53 (Workers Compensation Research Institute
ed., 2003).
48
ALA. CODE § 25-5-81(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-203 (1999).
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In Alabama, the trial judge is the ultimate arbiter of
credibility, and the appellate court undertakes substantial evidence
review.49 In Tennessee, however, the appellate court’s “standard of
review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court
accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless
the preponderance of evidence is otherwise.”50 Tennessee appeals
courts generally would not presume to change a trial judge’s
credibility judgment about a live witness, but review de novo,
without hesitation, expert testimony given by deposition.51
This approach, though at this point a living artifact, is not as
remarkable as it may seem. The workers’ compensation system in
England, which served as the initial U.S. model, entertained disputes
in civil court. Many jurisdictions emulated this model. In fact,
according to mid-century analysts, “[a]s many as 14 States attempted
court administration before 1920, but the results were uniformly bad,
and the majority soon switched to the commission form.” 52 Critics
over the decades have disparaged this approach,53 and it was
49

See Chadwick Timber Company v. Charles Philon, 10 So. 3d 1022 (Ala.
2008). Under the Alabama practice, the trial judge may or may not be well-versed
in the compensation law. Expertise will depend on the venue: “Judges have
different responsibilities depending on the county. In many counties, judges handle
a little bit of everything. The larger counties divide the judges up between civil and
criminal. Some counties even assign all or most of the workers’ compensation
cases to a single judge.” Memorandum from Mike Fish, Esq., to the Author (Nov.
10, 2011) (on file with Author).
50
Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc., No. M2009-01773-WC-R3-WC,
2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn., Special Workers’ Comp. App. Panel Sept. 15,
2010).
51
Memorandum from Cully Ward, Esq., to Mark D. Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6,
2012) (on file with Author). See also infra Section IX.
52
SOMERS, supra note 23, at 149 (1954).
53
See id. at 148-50. See also WALTER F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION, 62-99 (1936) (declaring that court administration of
workers’ compensation programs had been a failure). The Somers & Somers text
features a subchapter entitled, “The Anachronism of Court Administration.”
SOMERS, supra note 23, at 148. As of 1954, Alabama, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Tennessee and Wyoming facilitated adjudication of contested cases in the civil
court system. SOMERS, supra note 23, at 148-49. The National Commission still
counted five as of 1972. NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS,
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION
LAWS
23
(1972),
available
at
http://www.workerscompresources.com/National_Commission_Report/national_co
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disfavored by the National Commission. The Commission, at
Recommendation 6.1, admonished that “each State utilize a
workmen’s compensation agency to fulfill the administrative
obligations of a modern workmen’s compensation program.”54 It is
critical to note that, presently, the Alabama and Tennessee systems
are characterized by extensive pre-trial administrative structures that
undertake oversight and seek to achieve the resolution of cases
without the need for a trial.55 No evidence seems to exist that
Alabama is interested in moving jurisdiction of disputed cases to an
agency,56 but some in Tennessee advocate for such a move. 57
The adjudications of WCJs are, in most systems, subject to
intra-agency review – a major theme of this article – typically by a
Board or Commission of several members.
Meanwhile, all
jurisdictions allow for appellate review of WCJ decisions by the
judicial branch. These arrangements can also be gleaned from Table
1.
A number of unusual arrangements, however, exist. In
smaller states like Montana, there may be only one WCJ, and any
appeal is prosecuted directly to the state supreme court.58 In several
states with multiple WCJs, such as Florida, no intra-agency review
exists, and an appeal is taken directly to the courts.59 In Iowa, no
multiple-member board or commission exists. Instead the intrammission_report.htm (“claims in five States are assigned immediately to the
general courts. Adjudicators who handle workmen's compensation cases
exclusively have the primary duty to resolve disputes in 45 States”).
54
NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at
101.
55
For a description of the functions of the Alabama Department of
Industrial Relations Workers’ Compensation Division, see Workers’
Compensation, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://dir.alabama.gov/wc/. For a description of the functions of the Tennessee
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Workers’ Compensation
Division, see Worker’s Compensation, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.state.tn.us/labor-wfd/wcomp.html.
56
Memorandum from Mike Fish, Esq. to the Author (Nov. 10, 2011) (on
file with Author).
57
Michael Adams, Tennessee to Study Workers’ Compensation System,
INSURANCE
JOURNAL
(Jan.
13,
2012),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/01/13/230979.htm.
58
See infra Section V.
59
See infra Section V.
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agency review is handled by the Commissioner,60 who may, in
practice, delegate to a Deputy Commissioner the task of
recommending a decision.61
There are five states wherein a jury trial is still possible after
the completion of administrative adjudication, including; Maryland,
Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.62 In no state is the trial
completely de novo.63 In the present day, it is an exception for a jury
to be empanelled and a verdict rendered in a workers’ compensation
case.64 The existence of this potential right in any state can,
however, have material repercussions for both administration and
lawyerly strategizing.
It is worth mentioning another aspect of the fact-finding
process. There is an effort underway to make the resolution of
contested cases turn more on objective findings, as opposed to
subjective factors. In several systems, the WCJ may have the option
or obligation of according significant weight to a special medical
examiner or other expert when making an adjudication.65 The
ultimate form of such a provision appears in the Wyoming Act.
There, if a dispute develops over the degree of physical impairment
suffered by a claimant, the issue is adjudicated by a “medical hearing
panel acting as hearing examiner . . . .”66 Ultimately, this is an issue

60
61

IOWA CODE § 86.24 (addressing appeals within the agency).
See, e.g., Beef Products, Inc. v. Rizvic, 806 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa Ct. App.

2011).
62

See infra Section VI.
See infra Section VI.
64
Washington is the exception to the exception and regularly empanels a
jury to render a verdict in a workers’ compensation case.
65
See generally LESLIE I. BODEN, DANIEL E. KERN & JOHN A. GARDNER,
REDUCING LITIGATION: USING DISABILITY GUIDELINES AND STATE EVALUATORS
IN OREGON (1991); Sean T. Carnathan, Due Process and the Independent Medical
Examiner in the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act, 45 ME. L. REV. 123 (1993).
See also RICHARD A. VICTOR, CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S 20 (1990). The author
in this book posits, among other things, “Another design issue facing policymakers
is whether or not to make the findings of independent experts binding on the
adjudicator . . .” Id. He further posits, correctly, that were a legislature to
experiment with such an innovation, the experts employed should be of the highest
caliber. Id.
66
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-405(m) (2012). See Lyles v. State ex rel
Div. of Workers’ Comp., 957 P.2d 843 (Wyo. 1998).
63
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beyond the scope of this article, but it can be critical in the
understanding of workers’ compensation adjudication.
IV. NATURE AND HISTORY OF ADJUDICATION AND OF THE ORTHODOX
RULE
As submitted above, the orthodox adjudication rule, with
commission as final fact-finder and original hearing officer as a
conspicuously subordinate officer, is still dominant. For example,
under the Illinois system, the “Commission exercises original
jurisdiction” upon request for review by a party “and is not bound by
an arbitrator’s findings.”67 Likewise, under the Mississippi Act, “the
Commission is the fact-finder and the judge of the credibility of
witnesses.”68 The Mississippi ALJ’s determination is reviewed de
novo.69
Despite this state of affairs, it is rare for any commission to
take further evidence,70 and, in most instances, the reassessment of
the facts is undertaken by review of the record made before the WCJ.
It is also extremely rare for a trial or appellate court to reassess the
facts on appeal from the final adjudication of the administrative
agency. Though formulas vary, most states currently establish that
review of the facts by the appellate judiciary is limited to a
determination of whether substantial evidence supports the factfinder’s adjudication, whoever that may be.71 Also displaced in most
states is the intermediate appeal – between the agency and the

R&D Thiel v. Illinois Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 923 N.E.2d 870, 877
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
68
Short v. Wilson Meat House, 36 So. 3d 1247, 1251 (Miss. 2010).
69
Id.
70
Illinois, for example, abolished the practice in 1989. See infra Part VI.
The ability of the Pennsylvania Board to do so (never exercised) was abolished in
the 1996 amendments. See DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E. GREENBERG, 6
WEST’S PA. PRAC., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 14:176 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp.
2011). The Indiana statute nominally allows the process. 631 IND. ADMIN. CODE §
1-1-15 (entitled “Facts upon review; additional evidence; oral arguments,” and
providing, inter alia, “The facts upon review by the full board will be determined
upon the evidence introduced in the original hearing, without hearing new or
additional evidence, at the discretion of the industrial board . . . .”).
71
See Table 1.
67
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appellate court – to the county court. Many of these intermediate
appeals were de novo, just like the review by the commission.
The law and practice encountered among these orthodox rule
jurisdictions and that of the states that maintain the WCJ as factfinder is treated below.72 As a predicate to those analyses, an
acknowledgement of the nature and history of workers’
compensation adjudication is valuable.
A. No Right (Most States) to a Jury Trial
Critical to analyzing WCJ fact-finding power is the
importance of the tradition of trial by jury. The U.S. Supreme Court
declared in the second decade of the last century that parties do not
have a right, under the Constitution, to a trial by jury in a contested
workers’ compensation case because trial by jury is not a right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.73
The Seventh
Amendment, meanwhile, only provides for jury trials in cases
brought in federal court.74
72

See infra Sections V, VI.
Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 255 (1917) (“Objection is made that the
act dispenses with trial by jury. But it is settled that this is not embraced in the
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); New York Central R.R. v. White,
37 S. Ct. 247 (1917) (ruling on case where employer was trying to have the New
York Act declared unconstitutional for depriving the employer of property in
violation of employer’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process).
74
See, e.g., Bio-Tech Pharmacal, Inc. v. Blouin, 2010 Ark. App. 714, 762
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010).
73

The only constitutional argument Bio-Tech made to the
Commission, and upon which the Commission ruled, was that
[the Act] . . . violates its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
This argument . . . is easily decided. “[T]he 7th Amendment
applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and
does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury
in state courts, or the standards which must be applied
concerning the same.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Amendment provides as follows: “In
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.” U.S Const. amend. VII.
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The question remained, however, with regard to whether state
constitutions guaranteed – and may continue to guarantee – such a
right. Some legislatures, like that of Pennsylvania, sought to avoid
the problem altogether by codifying the fiction that the law was
elective, so that the parties were perceived as having waived the right
to any jury trial.75 Other states, like California, addressed the
problem via constitutional amendment by providing “[t]he legislature
may provide for the settlement of any disputes arising under the
legislation . . . by arbitration, or by an industrial accident board, by
the courts, or by either any or all of these agencies, anything in this
constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.”76 The Montana
Supreme Court, meanwhile, dismissed the argument by
conceptualizing “adjustment of claims” as “an administrative
function and not a judicial proceeding, and it is only in certain cases
falling under the latter designation that trial by jury is guaranteed by
the Constitution. ‘Due process of law’ does not necessarily require a
jury trial.”77
Notably, the current day reasoning of Pennsylvania courts is
that, while the state constitution preserves “[t]rial by jury as
heretofore,” such guarantee “does not . . . prevent the legislature from
creating and providing modes or tribunals other than the jury trial for
the determination or adjustment of rights and liabilities which were
not in existence prior to the adoption of the state constitution . . . .”78
Still, an early version of the Maryland Act was declared
unconstitutional, seemingly because it failed to provide for a jury
trial.79 As an apparent result, the legislature was sure to allow for
75

Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 99 A. 215 (Pa. 1916).
Western Indemnity Co. v. A.J. Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 400 (Cal.
1915)(internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Cunningham v. Nw. Improvement Co., 119 P. 554 (Mont. 1911).
78
Grant v. GAF, 608 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“The legislature
may withhold trial by jury from new judicial proceedings created by statute and
clothed with no common law jurisdiction.”).
79
In 1902, Maryland was the first state to pass a workers’ compensation
law, although it was later (1904) declared unconstitutional. According to one
source, “Baltimore City Judge Henry Stockbridge based this judgment on the hurt
employee’s inability to follow a jury trial.” Brianne Zarkan, The development of
workers compensation laws and how you are defended from injury on the job,
ABOUTCAREERS.NET
(Oct.
11,
2011),
http://www.aboutcareers.net/index.php/archives/2005. See also JOHN FABIAN
76
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jury trials in its subsequent enactment.80 Consequently, under current
Maryland law and practice, the potential for a jury trial still exists,
though the findings of the Commissioner are entitled to a
“presumption of correctness.”81 Likewise, a right to a jury trial under
the Texas Act (now “modified”), has always existed, because of
constitutional concerns.82 The same concerns led the Ohio83 and

WITT, CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAW, 137 (2004) (citing contemporary accounts).
80
An expansive discussion of trial by jury under the Maryland Act is
found in Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 144 A. 696 (Md. 1929). The court’s
ultimate conclusion on the issue is rather ironic. In the court’s view, inclusion of
trial by jury was not required to support the law’s constitutionality:
It having been determined . . . that the abrogation by the act of
common law causes of action . . . [and substitution of workers’
compensation rights and remedies] was a competent exercise of
legislative authority, there would be apparent inconsistency in
holding, nevertheless, that a right of jury trial according to the
course of the common law must in such cases be recognized and
unqualifiedly enforced. The valid use of the police power for the
remedial objects of the act placed it beyond the purview of the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution and the equivalent
provision of the organic law of Maryland.
Id. at 697.
81
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b), (c) (“Conduct of appeal
proceedings”).
82
Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504,
527 (Tex. 1991):
The Act provides for a trial by jury on the principal
compensation issues: compensability of the injury; eligibility for
income and death benefits; and, within limits, the amount of
those benefits…. The question presented, therefore, is whether
the Legislature has so restricted the jury’s role in deciding these
issues that it has transgressed the inviolate right to jury trial . . . .
The Act does specify certain limiting procedures not found in a
pure trial de novo. First, the jury is informed of the Commission's
decision. Because the jury is not required to accord that decision
any particular weight, however, this procedure does not impinge
on the jury's discretion in deciding the relevant factual issues. We
hold that this procedure does not violate a claimant's right to trial
by jury.
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Vermont84 legislatures, among others, to allow for a jury trial after
the adjudications of the workers’ compensation commission. It is in
these states, along with Washington, that eventual right to a jury trial
endures today. Importantly, in all instances, such a right attaches
only after consideration of the dispute by the administrative agency.85
B. The Decision: Judicial, Not “Institutional”
An objection that may be lodged against the WCJ as final
fact-finder is that it defeats the administrative law idea that the
agency adjudication should be “institutional.” At first glance, this
objection may seem to have weight, because granting a single WCJ
fact-finding authority means depriving the multiple-member
commission of presumed experts of the fact-finding power. Scholars
of administrative law, in their treatise, remark:

Id.
83
See State v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602 (Ohio 1912). In response to
argument that the Ohio Act was unconstitutional because it deprived parties of right
to trial by jury, the court reminded the parties that “if the board denies the
claimant's right to participate in the fund on any ground going to the basis of his
claim, he may by filing an appeal and petition in the ordinary form be entitled to
trial by jury, the case proceeding as any other suit.” State, 97 N.E. at 608. But see
Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1004, 1011 (Ohio 2006) (“We
have never held that a worker seeking to participate in the fund is entitled to a trial
by jury because of . . . any . . . constitutional provision. Rather, we consistently
have held that the rights associated with the act are solely those conferred by the
General Assembly.”).
84
An expansive discussion of trial by jury under the Vermont Act
(regarding procedure) is found in Pitts v. Howe Scale Co., 1 A.2d 695 (Vt. 1938).
It seems likely that provision for jury trial in the Vermont Act was influenced by
the state constitution’s still-extant proviso “that when any issue of fact, proper for
the cognizance of a jury, is joined in a court of law, the parties have a right to trial
by jury, which ought to be held sacred.” Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283, 5 (Vt.
1860). It may be that jury trial for a work-related injury is still obligatory under the
Vermont Constitution. See generally Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., Inc., 624
A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1992) (explaining Plimpton and state constitution and holding that
claimant had right to trial by jury in her state Fair Employment Practices Act case).
85
Critics have long argued that the persistence of revisitation of the case
via jury trial is redundant and wasteful. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 53, at 358
(1936) (“Most of what we now have of trial by jury . . . is a relic of the earlier days
when the constitutional issue as to jury trial was regarded as one of serious
consequence . . . .”).
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The decisionmaking process in an administrative
agency resembles the function of the judiciary in that
facts and law are examined to reach the appropriate
resolution of issues. Unlike the courts, however,
which limit the cast of characters in the process to a
judge and his law clerk(s), an agency decision reflects
the thought processes of numerous persons. The
decision becomes one of the institution, rather than a
particular individual.86
This “institutional decision-making” is a process whereby “no
one person, but a collection of skilled persons, would be involved in
the ultimate determination of the case.”87
This is all unassailable, of course, but it does not describe the
workers’ compensation process. When workers’ compensation
systems were created in the second decade of the twentieth century,
the fact-finding in contested cases was undertaken in a fashion which
suggests the institutional decision-making described above. In this
regard, most legislatures enacting workers’ compensation laws were
influenced by the example of early entities like the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). So influenced, they eliminated court
jurisdiction over contested cases and vested them in a similar multiperson board or commission.88 One of the earliest writers stated,
“[i]nasmuch as the functions of the compensation authority are
judicial as well as administrative, the board or commission type of

86

JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL, & BASIL J. MEZINES,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 38.01 (Lexis Nexis 2011).
87
Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings:
Establishing Independent Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 119, 145 (2005).
88
See generally Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in
Historical Perspective, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 25 (1999). As
discussed above, however, many jurisdictions (said to be fourteen) followed the
example of England, and vested jurisdiction over contested cases in civil court. See
supra Part III. Indeed, Alabama and Tennessee still entertain the litigation of such
cases in court. Id.
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organization, already familiar in American practice, would seem to
be most appropriate.”89
Given the nascency of the workers’ compensation program,
and its supposedly scientific principles, this is not surprising.
Administration by commission had, after all, traditionally “been
championed by those who believe that administrative regulation
requires a high degree of expert[ise], a master[ing] of technical
detail[s], and continuity and stability of policy.”90 “Doubtless,” an
early critic noted, “it is necessary, or at least advisable, that any
compensation law should be supervised by some public body.”91 A
historian of the pioneer Wisconsin Commission further explains that
the intellectuals of the Progressive Era who were behind the creation
of compensation programs “sanctioned administrative labor law on
the grounds of representativeness.” They endorsed, for example,
such things as “safety code advisory committees that gave ‘due
weight’ to [both] employer and worker viewpoints.”92
Thus, the multiple-person commissions, entities often
comprised of politically-appointed representatives of labor and

E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 72 (1924).
M.H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 4 (1955).
91
BRADBURY, supra note 14, at 960.
92
ROGERS, supra note 46, at 48. Rogers, notably, identifies a subtle
distinction between the early (and enduring) workers’ compensation boards and
those created two decades later, in the 1930’s, by the New Deal. According to
Rogers, the New Dealers contended “that administrators needed relief from threebranch American government to apply independent technical judgment to modern
problems.” Id. This thinking had nothing to do with the origins of workers’
compensation. This distinction is important, as it contrasts workers’ compensation
adjudication from other aspects of the “administrative law state.” Contested
workers’ compensation cases in most states find their forum in an administrative
law setting, but the system, as noted in the accompanying text, finds it genesis in a
reform occurring well before the New Deal and the “rise” of administrative law
agencies. Remembering the distinction is helpful, as on occasion, critics of the
growth of agency power uncritically include workers’ compensation adjudication.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Schuckers & Kyle Applegate, The Rise of Pennsylvania’s
Administrative Agencies and Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Constrain Them,
81 PA. BAR ASS’N QUARTERLY 124 (July 2010). While room for criticism of
workers’ compensation adjudication may exist, the system is not part of the agency
growth that some consider a menace to separation of powers principles.
89
90
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employer groups,93 and/or others presumed to have some special
expertise or insight into issues surrounding the program, were the
original workers’ compensation fact-finders.
This did not mean, however, that this multiple member group
was producing the type of “institutional decision” characterized
above. Compensation commissions well understood – or learned –
from the very beginning that when adjudicating disputes between two
parties (i.e., employer/insurance carrier and employee) over
compensability, they were undertaking what had theretofore been
handled as a judicial function in civil court.94 While commissions
had many other responsibilities in terms of executing and enforcing
policy (many still do), when adjudicating contested cases, they were
not dealing with issues of regulation, but were instead sitting as
impartial adjudicators, just as trial judges had in the displaced
industrial accident tort cases.95 Workers’ compensation cases have
always been recognized as adversarial.96
This was certainly made clear in Pennsylvania, where the
Supreme Court, immediately upon enactment of the law, reversed a
referee decision and held that in disputed cases objected-to hearsay
was legally incompetent evidence, just as it was in civil court, and
could not support an agency adjudication on workers’ compensation
93

See, e.g., Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct.
App.1995) (court explaining original formation, and evolution of, Missouri
commission). A discussion of the early commissions and boards may be found in
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen’s
Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REV.119, 131 (1951-1952).
94
See David B. Torrey, The Rules of Evidence Under the Pennsylvania
Workmen’s Compensation Act: Sources and Theoretical Considerations, 29 DUQ.
L. REV. 447, 451-53 (1991).
95
See DODD, supra note 53, at 101 (“We may classify as quasi-judicial
the action of administrative bodies in passing upon contested claims, . . .”); id. at
320 (“Such a Board has the dignity and the form of many of our courts, the only
distinction being that of name.”). See also DOUGLAS ARGYLE CAMPBELL,
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION: INSURANCE, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE (1935).
This early California treatise author drew a distinction between “judicial factfindings,” such as those generated by the Industrial Accident Commission (IAC),
and “administrative findings” such as those produced by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Campbell also noted that California courts had immediately held that
the findings of fact of the IAC were final and had the same import as those of a jury
in a civil case. Id.
96
DODD, supra note 53, at 53.
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entitlement.97 Cross-examination, another early court decision
admonished, constituted “a fundamental right, without which the
prime essentials of a fair trial, according to Anglo-American
standards of justice, are not preserved. The [B]oard [and referees],
not less than the courts, must obey the indispensable basic mandates
of our jurisprudence.”98 The experience in Connecticut was the
same. “Our courts have,” declared one of the state’s original
commissioners, “by their own actions, made it clear that, however
informal the methods, the real essentials of justice inherent in any
proper effort to determine property rights, must be found.” The
“Commissioner is not a judge,” he admonished, but “proceedings …
have the same practical results as ordinary judicial actions.” He is
“to act in the enforcement of contract rights and not to be an almoner
of bounty . . . .”99 This universal understanding led to Larson’s
assertion quoted above: “[T]he compensation commission[,] while
deciding controverted claims[,] is as far towards the judicial end of
the spectrum as it is possible to go without being an outright
court.”100
The upshot of all this is that, while the final fact-finding was
undertaken collectively, as if the “institutional model” of
adjudication was being undertaken, in effect the commission adhered
to what has been termed the “judicial” model of administrative
adjudication. In contrast to the institutional model, this model
dictates that “the administrative process should resemble judicial
process as closely as possible. The administrative judge should
personally listen to the evidence and argument, have no
preconceptions about the case, receive no information about the case
except through on-the-record submissions, and be completely
independent of investigators and prosecutors.”101

97

McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 104 A. 617 (Pa. 1918).
Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 49 A.2d 270, 271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).
99
Remarks of Commissioner George H. Beers, in BRADBURY, supra note
14, at 965-67.
100
LARSON, supra note 1, § 79:90.
101
See Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central
Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 500 (2001) (quoting Michael Asimow et al., State and
Federal Administrative Law § 2.0 (2d ed. 1998)). For another discussion of the
basic difference between agency rulemaking and agency adjudication, see Toni M.
98

48

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

This is the model that has prevailed from the outset and exists
today. Still, on occasion, the distinction can escape a court. In a
Longshore case, for example, the ALJ (the final fact-finder), had
credited the claimant’s expert and found that claimant’s stroke was
caused by work conditions. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board
(BRB), undertaking substantial evidence “whole record” review,
criticized the claimant’s expert opinion, reassessed credibility, and
reversed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
however, reversed, concluding that substantial evidence supported
the ALJ’s decision, and reinstated his award. The dissent, however,
complained as follows:
Under [our precedents], reviewing courts have looked
independently at the record before the ALJ to
determine if the ALJ’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. This
scope of review effectively removes the BRB from the
hierarchy
established
to
administer
the
workman’s[sic] compensation programs.
Yet the BRB, a body with significant accumulated
experience, competence and memory with the run of
workman’s [sic] compensation cases, found [the
ALJ’s] theory of causation of Burns’ stroke not
plausible. For us to be obliged to dismiss this
judgment – essentially the product of superior
institutional competence – out of hand appears
anomalous. I am, however, uncertain whether any
other course, any different scope or review, is even
theoretically available to a court of appeals under this
statute; review of the BRB's finding for substantial
evidence is apparently foreclosed by the statutorilydictated relationship between BRB and ALJ. . . . If no
other scope of review of the BRB than the present one

Fine, Appellate Practice on Review of Agency Action: A Guide for Practitioners, 28
U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990).
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is feasible, though, the statutory structure makes little
sense to me.102
These complaints miss the point, however, that neither the
ALJ nor the BRB were supposed to be employing institutional skills.
Both were, instead, charged with being unbiased and impartial.
Having said all this, an arguable irony exists. In practice,
aspects of the institutional model existed, and endure, in most
workers’ compensation jurisdictions, regardless of whether the WCJ
or commission is ultimate fact-finder. The judge (or commission),
for example, may well have considerable powers of investigation to
advance an inquiry into issues beyond those presented by the parties,
and may enlist the power and resources of the agency to assist him.103
He may, further, have the option, or even obligation, of seeking the
opinion of a staff or contract physician to provide an impartial
medical opinion as to causation, disability, and impairment.104 In the
end, however, the commission or judge, despite these investigatory
powers, has always been an independent decision-maker, not an
advocate for any side, and he or she was not and is not
conceptualized as implementing agency policy via institutional
decision.
C. The Orthodox Rule: Commission and Subordinate Officer
The orthodox model, which still predominates,105 originated
in the first place because of the need for commissions to delegate the
102

Burns v. Dir., OWCP Programs, 41 F.3d 1555 (D.C. Cir.1994)
(Silberman, J., concurring).
103
See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 831 (West 2011) (WCJ may “appoint
one or more impartial physicians or surgeons to examine the injuries of the plaintiff
and report thereon.”).
104
See generally Alex Swedlow, Social Policies of Disability Evaluation,
in WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM? WHERE ARE WE
GOING? (Richard A. Victor & Linda Carrubba, eds., 2010) (noting that “[i]n many
states, industrial accident boards create rating bureaus to interpret the disability
schedule and to make recommendations to judges and administrators as to the
extent of disability based on medical evidence.”).
105
While the predominate approach is for the Commission to retain final
adjudication powers, most states have abandoned the process of appeal de novo
from the decision of the Commission to the trial or other courts. For an early
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evidence-collection and proposed fact-finding to hearing officers. In
a few states, notably, including Connecticut, Maine, and under the
Longshore Act, no delegation existed, as volume was apparently such
that the commissioner himself could hear and see the witnesses and
then make his decision.106
The preeminent analyst of the day, Walter F. Dodd, studied
compensation systems in the early 1930’s, and observed: “[I]n the
organization for the administration of workmen’s compensation,
there must be provision for the hearing of contested issues by officers
designated for this purpose or by individual members of the board . . .
.”107 Indeed, in a jurisdiction with “a large number of contested
[cases] and a small compensation board or in which the
administration is [trusted] to a single officer, the use of referees,
examiners or arbitrators for such hearings thus becomes
necessary.”108
One will recall that the original theory was that the
Commission was supposed to be a professional body composed of
experts.109 Under this original thinking, the Commission, and not its
recounting of this process, and a critique of the same, see Dodd, supra note 53, at
338-407. Dodd criticized this process because of delay in finality and defeat of the
idea that a commission could more expertly adjudicate the cases with regard to
which they were supposed to be expert. Id.
Further, in the present day commissions operating under the original
model do not usually hear evidence. See, e.g., Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n,
733 S.W.2d 726, 726 (Ark. 1987) (describing Arkansas system, court remarks,
“[t]here may have been a time when the commission actually heard witnesses give
live testimony when its members wished to redo the work of the ALJ. Given the
numbers of claims today, however, that would be impractical if not impossible.”).
106
All have, notably, evolved over the decades so that intra-agency review
exists. In all, the Commissioner, Hearing Officer, and Deputy Commissioner
(respectively) are currently the final fact-finders. See infra Section V.
107
DODD, supra note 53, at 785.
108
Id.
109
Whether this goal was always met seems to be in question. Harvardtrained Massachusetts lawyer, Samuel Horovitz, for example, complained in his
1946 treatise:
In the courts, judges are usually limited to lawyers and persons
skilled in the law. Commissioners or referees or board members
(whatever their local title) are chosen from all walks of life.
Though lawyers predominate, a board may consist, as one did, of
an “undertaker, a farmer and a printer.”
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subordinate, was considered to be in the best position to find the
facts. Dodd, likely articulating the unanimous view, spoke to this
issue in the seminal 1936 study, Administration of Workmen’s
Compensation:
And an efficient administration requires an
administrative review of both fact and law by a body
or officer whose judgment will not be controlled or
primarily influenced by the decision of the referee,
examiner, or arbitrator in the original administrative
hearing. . . . [T]here should be an opportunity for an
administrative review by an impartial body which has
not theretofore passed upon the issues, and which may
hear evidence in addition to that presented at the
original hearing. Such review is desirable, not only
for the protection of the parties, but also for the
prompt disposition of the cases and in order to relieve
the courts of a duty which may be more satisfactorily
performed by a body devoting its primary attention to
workmen’s compensation.110
As foreshadowed above, Dodd actually favored systems
where the Commission could take more evidence in the event of a
party’s appeal or request for review:
For the supervision of administrative work a single
officer has been regarded as better than a board, but a
board or commission has normally been regarded as
more satisfactory than a single officer for purposes of
review.
The reviewing body under workmen’s
compensation bears a close analogy to a court of
review, and consideration of the merits by several
persons has its advantages. But, to obtain this

SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION LAWS 384 (1944).
110
DODD, supra note 53, at 785. When Dodd was writing this work in
1936, a sizeable number of states allowed de novo review in the trial courts.
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advantage, the members of a board must hear,
consider, and determine the issues.111
It was not only organizational theory that led such a skilled
observer to favor intra-agency de novo review. Importantly, by
“protection of the parties,”112 Dodd was also referring to the
perceived need for correction of the initial decision of a subordinate
who could not necessarily be trusted in all cases to make a reliable, or
even competent, decision.
Doubtless the quality of such early hearing officers varied
markedly among the states in the early decades.113 Dodd’s
examination of the adjudication scene in the early 1930s, however,
left him appalled at the quality of referees in many important states.
Dodd seemed satisfied with the Wisconsin examiners,114 but he found
the New York referees poorly trained and the Pennsylvania referees
short-term patronage hires.115 His harshest words, however, were
saved for Illinois arbitrators:
With few exceptions the arbitrators in Illinois have
been selected and have held their positions because of
political connections and by no means because of their
fitness for the work. As a result, most of them have
no background in the compensation field, are not
interested in it, and have no initial comprehension of
its importance and difficulty. 116

111

Id. at 795. The early treatise writer, Downey, also took for granted that
the commission would be the final fact-finder. “The board,” he declared, “should
have plenary power to review the decisions of a referee or a single commissioner
both as to the law and facts and in the form either of a hearing de novo or of a
review of the findings upon the record.” DOWNEY, supra note 89, at 73.
112
DODD, supra note 53, at 785.
113
The author of an early California treatise, Campbell, identified himself
on the title page of his book as a California Workmen’s Compensation Referee and
a teacher of the field at the University of California. See generally CAMPBELL,
supra note 95.
114
DODD, supra note 53, at 258 (noting that the commission would ratify
the examiner’s decision in 99% of the cases).
115
See id. at 269-77.
116
Id. at 285.
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Indeed, “[s]ome of the arbitrators have been almost
illiterate.”117 An individual, he continued, “without
experience or capacity who by political influence is
able to obtain an appointment as a referee or arbitrator
in Illinois, Pennsylvania or New York will provide a
handicap rather than an aid . . . .”118 The idea that
such marginal, subordinate individuals would be the
fact-finders in a compensation system would have
been absurd to Dodd.119
D. Critique of Trial De Novo and Other Multi-tiered Fact-finding
To read the historical critical analyses of workers’
compensation is to expose oneself to an alarming narrative of a noble
idea run amuck at the very outset. There was no Belle Époque for
the system.
Many, for example, complained that several states initially
refused to create supportive administrative agencies, leaving it to
courts – ill-equipped for the task – to preside over the new law.120
Others have asserted that common law judges derailed workers’
compensation within the first few decades by imposing excessive
legalities on its administrative structures.121 Starting in the 1940s,
and extending until the early 1970s, a frequent complaint heard was

117

Id.
Id.
119
Id. A New York workers’ compensation referee was depicted as a
hack in the autobiographical novel, Christ in Concrete. See PIETRO DI DONATO,
CHRIST IN CONCRETE (1939). In that case, the worker, an Italian immigrant,
suffered a work-related death from a fall into liquid concrete. His widow’s claim
was opposed by the insurance company because the employer had allegedly failed
to reveal all of its work locations. At a tumultuous hearing, presumably convened
in 1923, the aloof “Referee Parker” chums around with the defense lawyer and
ignores the pro se dependents. The novel was later turned into a movie, Give Us
This Day.
120
DODD, supra note 53, at 98-99.
121
SOMERS, supra note 23, at 157 (“[M]ost commissions, under severe
pressure from many sources, are being pushed, or are retreating, into an everincreasing legalistic atmosphere.”).
118
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that coverage and benefits were woefully inadequate.122 In the
present day, the persistent stance of business is that benefits are now
so generous, and procedures so lax, that costs are out of control and
many employees malinger or otherwise take advantage of the
system.123
These are all macro-level critiques. A micro-level critique,
on the other hand, has been that, for those cases that are contested,
the adjudicatory scheme set up to handle such disputes is too
unwieldy and time-consuming. The complaint is intuitively valid –
after all, the entire purpose of displacing negligence liability and
contests in court was to provide prompt recovery via the operative
principle of no-fault. Granted, all realized at the outset that contested
cases would exist (they did, after all, in England), but to construct a
dispute resolution system that did not expedite cases was antithetical
to the whole purpose of the law.
Yet this is what many states did. As summarized by Dodd, as
of the 1930s (and extending well after), the typical compensation
program was set up so that the facts of a contested case could be
visited up to three times:
(1) A hearing by a referee, examiner, arbitrator, or by
a member of the administering body;
(2) A review, with the possibility of introducing new
testimony, before a board of several persons, or before
an officer superior to the one who held the original
hearing;
(3) An appeal to a trial court or to an intermediate
court of review, with the issues in most cases heard by
the court on the basis of the record made in the
administrative review noted under (2) above[.]124
In many instances, the third-level consideration was de novo
review. This multi-tiered review, particularly de novo review in the
trial courts, was assailed for decades. As discussed above, Dodd
distrusted the referee and favored the commission as fact-finder, but
See, e.g., Arthur Larson, “Model-T” Compensation Acts in the Atomic
Age, 18 NAT’L ASS’N CLAIMANTS COUNS. OF AM. L.J. 39 (1956).
123
See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 9, at 5-6.
124
DODD, supra note 53, at 114.
122
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he also denounced trial de novo (reassessment of the facts) in the
courts:
Judicial review by trial de novo is open to all the
objections that apply to court administration, and if
trial de novo is with a jury, an even greater lack of
uniformity of administration is introduced. Not only
this, but a cumbersome and expensive procedure is
established if evidence is to be introduced on an
administrative hearing, and then is to be introduced
again on judicial review, if such review is sought.
Another objection to trial de novo is that it affords an
opportunity to withhold testimony in the
administrative hearing and present it in the judicial
proceeding, if either party thinks this to his interest.
In the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis, the
administrative proceeding thus becomes “an inquiry
preliminary to a contest in the courts,” rather than a
less cumbersome and less expensive means of
determining the controversy.125
The critics, Somers & Somers, writing in 1954, joined Dodd
in decrying this multi-tiered system of adjudication. They counted
twenty-two states, as of that year, still allowing the court, upon a
party’s appeal, to “pass on questions of fact.”126 “There are all
degrees of fact review,” they added, “among this group. In most, the
review is on the record made by the Commission, but a few permit
reopening the entire case from scratch.”127
The authors reproduced a portion of a 1951 IAIABCendorsed report on this issue: “Trial de novo in the trial courts, often
with trial by jury, is the worst possible mode of judicial review, since
it transfers to the courts the Commission’s full power of decision and

125

Id. at 369-70.
SOMERS, supra note 23, at 157.
127
Id. See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the
Administration of Workmen’s Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REV. 119, 132 (1952)
(“It is . . . more than doubtful whether such duplication serves any useful
purpose.”).
126
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introduces slower and more expensive judicial procedure in the
compensation case . . . . ”128 That year, the IAIABC took the position
that judicial review “in all cases”129 should be on the record
developed by the commission, “and upon questions of law alone –
including the question of whether there is evidence to support the
finding complained of – but without power in the court to
redetermine the weight of the evidence.”130
The type of havoc that multi-tiered fact-finding could cause in
the trenches of litigation is well illustrated by the complaints of a
Florida lawyer in the late 1940s.131 Under the law and practice at that
time, the findings of the Florida Deputy Commissioner were said to
be upheld routinely by the Industrial Commission.132 But, rather
oddly, the district court had the power to reassess credibility, with the
state supreme court undertaking “clearly erroneous” appellate
review.133 The lawyer expressed his frustration in frank terms:
[T]he risk and expense of an appeal make it
impossible for the claimant to obtain relief, and . . .
many cases . . . are dropped when the Circuit Court
has ruled adversely. . . .
For one thing, an appeal takes time and money.
The attorney represents a client who, as a general rule,
can pay him only in the event of final victory. He
runs the risk of spending a year in litigation, making
two trips to Tallahassee to argue the case, and
expending his own monies in railroad fares, hotel
bills, stenographic costs, and meals away from home,
all on a mere contingency.134
128

SOMERS, supra note 23, at 159.
Id.
130
Id. (quoting COMM. ON ADMIN. & PROC., REP. OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ADMIN. AND PROC. OF 1951 IAIABC CONVENTION, reproduced in U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STANDARDS, BULLETIN NO. 15696-97).
131
Lester Harris, Appeals in Workmen’s Compensation Cases, 2 MIAMI L.
Q. 215 (1948).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 223.
129
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“Nor[,]” he added, “do the burdens of an appeal rest equally
on both parties.”135 Defense counsel, he posited, would prosper by
this multi-tiered process: “[T]he only way [for him] to hold a good
retainer is to show a record of constant litigation successfully
handled, even at the expense of the poor devil of a workman.”136
One of the writer’s solutions was to make the Deputy
Commissioner the final fact-finder.137 In this recommendation, he
was perhaps prophetic, for, as discussed below, this is precisely how
the state supreme court ruled three years later, in 1951.
V. THE TREND AWAY FROM THE ORTHODOX MODEL
A. The National Commission
The modern history of workers’ compensation commences
with the formation of the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws. The Commission was established by Congress
as part of the landmark passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1969.138 The commission was charged with evaluating
state workers’ compensation laws and with making recommendations
for improvements of the same.139 The Commission, in 1972,
promulgated nineteen “essential recommendations” for an adequate
state workers’ compensation law.140 The federal government,
meanwhile, communicated to states the idea that failure to improve
135

Id.
Harris, supra note 131, at 223.
137
Id. at 224.
138
The definitive up-to-date discussions of the National Commission are
found in John F. Burton, Jr., The National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws: Some Reflections by the Former Chairman, 40 INT’L ASS’N
OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS J. 15 (Fall 2003); John F. Burton,
Jr., The National Commission 33 Years Later: What Have We Learned? (Part I),
42 INT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS J. 21 (Fall 2005);
John F. Burton, Jr., The National Commission 33 Years Later: What Have We
Learned? (Part II), 43 INT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS
J. 21(Spring 2006).
139
See id.
140
NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at
26.
136
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their systems accordingly could result in federal action.141 The
adjudicatory scene described above, with board or commission in
most states serving as final fact-finder, still prevailed when the
Commission issued its report.142
The Commission called for expeditious litigation and
adjudication, and, like the critics noted above, disapproved of de
novo review of compensation awards in the trial court. The
Commission, however, found it acceptable that the commission was
to be the final fact-finder (it did, however, encourage commissions to
presume its hearing officers’ decisions were correct on the facts).
Recommendation 6.14 provides, “We recommend that where there is
an appellate level within the workmen’s compensation agency, the
decisions of the workmen’s compensation agency be reviewed by the
courts only on questions of law.”143 The Report thereupon states:
“The decision of the hearing examiner could be appealed to the
appeals board, which could overrule the hearing examiner on
questions of fact and of law. The decision of the hearing examiner,
however, should be presumed correct and the appeal should not stay
the examiner’s award.”144
A review of the Commission’s multi-volume supportive
studies (a treasure-trove of information) demonstrates that reforming
the adjudicative process of compensation acts was not a priority for
the Commission. Indeed, not one of the supportive studies discretely
addresses adjudication. One of the Commission’s consultants did
recommend expediting controverted cases, having noted that “[i]t has
been estimated that a period of 15 months to two or three years is
occasionally required for a case to run the gamut of hearings,
reviews, and court appeals.”145 In the end, however, the consultant
ultimately concurred with a like-minded reform advocacy, that of the

141

Id. The National Commission did not, however, advocate
federalization.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 108.
144
Id.
145
See Milton Brooke, Administering Workmen’s Compensation Cases in
California, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, & Wisconsin, in 3
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION LAWS 77, 91 (1973).
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Council of State Governments (CSG).146
The CSG in its
recommendations took for granted reassessment of the facts by the
commission.147
Indeed, Section 34 of the Council of State Government’s
Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (“Appeals
to the Board”), provides:
[T]he [Appeals] Board shall have the power to review
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and exercise of
discretion by the . . . hearing officer in hearing,
determining or otherwise handling of any
compensation case and may affirm, reverse or modify
any compensation case upon review or remand such
case to the Director for further proceedings and
action.148
The Commentary to this section clarifies:
From the order of the hearing officer . . . an appeal lies
to the . . . AppealBoard, which has the power to
review both finding of facts and conclusions of law,
but not to take new evidence. If further development
of the facts is found necessary, the case may be
remanded for appropriate action.149
The Interdepartmental Workers’ Compensation Taskforce
that continued the work of the Commission likewise did not have
reform of adjudicative process as a priority. Its 1977 Report to the
President and Congress makes no reference to the subject. The only
item that approaches the subject is the recommendation that “[if] a
hearing is requested or necessary, it should be held within [forty-five]

146

Id.
Id.
148
The Council of State Governments, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION LAW WITH SECTION BY SECTION COMMENTARY 145-46 (1973).
Thanks to John F. Burton, Jr., Esq., for providing the Author with a copy of this
commentary.
149
Id.
147
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days from the time of the accident, unless the State agency grants an
extension.”150
This lack of priority given to adjudication reform by both the
National Commission and the CSG is not surprising. The leaders of
the National Commission desired a system where only a few
contested cases would ever require litigation.
They hoped,
specifically, that improved agency responses to workers’ injury
reports, incentives on employers to pay claims, and informal dispute
resolution procedures would quell disputes before the parties ever got
near the judge’s hearing room.
Indeed, these bold reformers declared that a workers’
compensation system that featured significant litigation, and hence
adjudication, was dysfunctional. The Commission’s report states,
“Workmen’s Compensation can be undermined by excessive
litigation . . . . [A properly functioning] agency must adjudicate
claims which cannot be resolved voluntarily. Adjudication, however,
should be a secondary task. If the agency is performing well in
fulfilling . . . [its pro-active] obligations [like oversight and claims
counseling], there will be little need for adjudication.”151 With this
type of orientation, it is not surprising that adjudication system
design – beyond favoring the abolition of the long-maligned trial de
novo – was not a priority.152
While the National Commission did find acceptable the commission
as final fact finder, it advocated that the administrative aspects of a
UNITED STATES INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
TASK FORCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: IS THERE A BETTER WAY? A REPORT ON
THE NEED FOR REFORM OF STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 52 (Commerce
Clearing House 1977). The Task Force, notably, mailed a survey to all 50 state
workers’ compensation agencies, asking for descriptions of various administrative
aspects of state programs. The actual questionnaire that was utilized, addressing
“Contested Cases,” is reproduced in a volume of Taskforce studies that reported on
the results of the survey. Oddly, no table was created to show the results of the
contested cases inquiry. The explanation: “The tabulations on the ‘contested cases’
portion of the survey were omitted because the responses were meager and did not
merit publication.” JOHN LEWIS, A SURVEY OF STATE AGENCIES 301
(Interdepartmental Taskforce Studies, 1975).
151
NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at
100.
152
Richard Victor has noted that the “1972 national commission . . . dealt
with a wide range of issues, but few recommendations addressed the back end of
claims.” Victor, supra note 29, at 102.
150
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commission’s work should be separate from its adjudicatory
functions and that employees of the commission should be
professionalized – that is, become entitled to civil service protections.
This emphasis influenced Pennsylvania and the Longshore Act to
enact organizational reform. In Pennsylvania, notably, the WCJ
became the final fact-finder as part of these reforms, and the judge
under the Longshore Act maintained this traditional role (though his
title was changed from Deputy Commissioner to “hearing
examiner.”)153
B. Reaction to the National Commission
The force that has, in critical aspect, fueled the trend towards
making the WCJ the final fact-finder can also be traced to the
National Commission – but in a different way. The more recent
(1980s-1990s) impetus has been a response to the increase in
litigation in workers’ compensation systems. That increase unfolded
in the wake of National Commission-inspired liberalizations in terms
of coverage and benefits and their attendant system costs. Litigation
crises in many states prompted counter-reforms that have featured
both retractions in coverage and benefits154 and attempts at reducing
or streamlining litigation and dispute resolution.155
The most remarkable developments in the realm of dispute
resolution reform have been the surge in mediation programs 156 and
the trend of states allowing compromise settlements with full
release.157
However, legislatures have also tried to adjust
153

See infra Section V(D).
See generally WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME
FROM? WHERE ARE WE GOING?, supra note 104.
155
See generally Thomason, supra note 30, at 291-92.
156
See generally Howard W. Cummins, From Conflict to Conflict
Resolution: Establishing ALJ Driven Mediation Programs in Workers’
Compensation Cases, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 391 (2010); David
B. Torrey, Mediation of Workers’ Compensation Cases Under the Pennsylvania
Act, IAIABC Annual Convention, Philadelphia, PA (September 2005) (monograph
on file with the Author); Lex Larson, Mediation of Industrial Commission Cases,
17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 395 (1995).
157
David B. Torrey, Compromise Settlements Under State Workers’
Compensation Acts: Law, Policy, Practice and Ten Years of the Pennsylvania
Experience, 16 WIDENER L.J. 199 (2007).
154
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adjudication systems so that those cases that cannot be mediated
and/or settled can proceed to a more prompt and final adjudication.
One device to effect such change is to make the adjudication of the
WCJ final as to the fact-findings.
The elimination of multiple levels of factual review has been
desired by employers and the insurance industry – the proponents of
the counter-reform – who find such multiple reviews to be costly. In
1991, writers for the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.), a carrier
lobby, authored a short, representative book in which they set forth
an extensive agenda for change in response to the costs and litigation
crises noted above.158 Among other things, these commentators
declared:
The arrangements for reviewing initial determinations
in cases involving disputed claims vary significantly
among the states, but the nature and scope of appellate
review can directly affect system costs . . . . [C]osts
are likely to be greater and the role of attorneys
enhanced
when
appellate
review,
whether
administrative or judicial, is not limited to questions
of law but rather can include reconsideration of the
questions of fact determined at the initial hearing.159
Another reform group, the Blue Ribbon Panel of the National
Conference of State Legislatures, was explicit in its call for the WCJ
to be the final fact-finder:
In disputed cases the parties are entitled to a full and
fair hearing of the factual issues . . . . Some
jurisdictions have allowed a retrial of factual issues at
an administrative or judicial appellate level. Most of
the Panel members believe that the system should be
designed to limit the resolution of factual issues to the
158

KRAMER, supra note 9, at 40.
Id. The authors added, “An extreme case of inefficient dispute
resolution was the trial ‘de novo’ procedure employed in Texas prior to the
enactment of recent reform legislation, in which information developed during the
administrative process could not even be admitted at the jury trial on a workers’
compensation claim.” Id.
159
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hearing officer, with review only of legal issues
(including the question of whether the hearing
officer’s findings of fact were supported by the
evidence) by the administrative review body and the
courts. A variation of this approach is to permit the
administrative review body to consider the factual
decisions made below, but reverse them only when
they are clearly extreme when compared to the
findings made by other hearing officers in cases
involving similar factual situations.160
Researcher Terry Thomason, along with his colleagues in
their 1998 essay, identified the same concern over cumbersome
adjudication procedures. Employers and carriers, they pointed out,
have appreciated that contested cases constitute a large portion of
workers’ compensation administration costs, and they have lobbied
policymakers and legislatures to eliminate system features that
increase such costs. “Streamlining appeal procedures” is one aspect
of this lobby.161
C. Jurisdictions Ahead of the Trend
This Author identifies multiple states that have broken with
the orthodox rule in response to post-National Commission crisis and
counter-reform.
This article, however, seeks to identify all
160

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 13 (1994). The Report further remarks, “At least one
member of the Panel believes that the review body should have the absolute right to
make its own findings of fact, to prevent wide variations in the results of cases
involving similar facts.” Still, “[o]ther Panel members are concerned that this
approach encourages the losing party in every case to seek administrative review in
order to get ‘another bite at the apple.’” Id.
161
Thomason, supra note 30, at 292 (“Recent reform proposals have
sought to lower transaction costs by eliminating adversarial processes – such as
substitution of independent medical examiners for “dueling doctors[”] – or by
eliminating or streamlining appeal procedures, including alternative dispute
resolution procedures like final offer selection arbitration. However, theory and
research reviewed in this chapter suggest that a reduction in the quantum of due
process could result in a greater probability of judicial error.”). For an explanation
of the “final offer selection process” in workers’ compensation cases, see LESLIE I.
BODEN, REDUCING LITIGATION: EVIDENCE FROM WISCONSIN 32 (1988).
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jurisdictions in which the WCJ is, or has been, the final fact-finder.
Accordingly, it is important to note that some programs have always
had the first-level hearing officer as the final fact-finder. These states
can be regarded as being ahead of the trend.
Longshore Act. The Longshore Act has long been in this
category. In fact, the Deputy Commissioner was the fact-finder at
the time the law was enacted in 1927. One early authority ventured
that “no doubt because of the great distances sometimes involved[,]
no provision was made for any administrative review by the
Commission prior to the review . . . by United States district courts
on questions of law.”162
Appeals went to federal district courts, which exercised
substantial evidence review. This process prevailed from 1927 until
the reorganization of the law and the creation of the Benefits Review
Board in 1972.163 The changes of that year left the hearing officer
the fact-finder, though the Deputy Commissioner title was changed to
“hearing examiner” (and back, notably, to “ALJ” in 1978). Of some
note is that this novel status came to the attention of the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held that the law definitively established the
Deputy Commissioner as the finder of facts (though facts
“jurisdictional” in nature could be reviewed).164 Justice Hughes,
authoring the opinion, noted in general that “the obvious purpose of
the legislation [is] to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact

162

DODD, supra note 53, at 326-27 (quoting a 1934 report of the United
States Employees’ Compensation Commission).
163
See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 334 (1953) (“findings of the
Deputy Commissioner are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole”). See also Wheeling
Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1930) (“it is clear that
[the statute] does not contemplate a hearing de novo in the District Court or
authorize that court to weigh the evidence taken before the Deputy Commissioner
or review the facts as found by him. The compensation order may be set aside only
if it is found to be ‘not in accordance with law,’ i.e. if it is based upon error of law,
or is not supported by any substantial evidence, or is so manifestly arbitrary and
unreasonable as to transcend the authority vested in the Deputy Commissioner. His
findings of fact, however, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.”).
164
See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 130.07 (2007).
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which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task.”165
District of Columbia. Prior to 1980, privately-employed
workers of the District of Columbia found their workers’
compensation remedy under the provisions of the Longshore Act.
This process dated from 1928, when Congress enacted a workers’
compensation law for the District, “which extended the provisions of
the federal statute to cover the private employment sector.”166 Part of
that extension included, accordingly, establishment of the Deputy
Commissioner as final fact-finder.167 Thus, the district court, in a
1966 case declared:
The evidence . . . was far from satisfactory, especially
because the claimant’s credibility was seriously
impeached. The scope of judicial review, however, in
cases such as this is restricted and limited. The Court
may not review the evidence and reach an independent
conclusion as though the review is a trial de novo. So,
too, the Court may not review the weight of evidence
and set aside the findings of fact of the Deputy
Commissioner, if it deems them to be contrary to the
weight of evidence.168
In 1980, the District, having gained limited self-government
powers, enacted its own law.169 Perhaps in respect of the Longshore
165

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1942).
The genesis of the law is discussed in District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Cent. Labor. Council, 442 A.2d 110 (D.C. 1982).
167
See D.C. Transit System v. Massey, 260 F. Supp. 310, 311-12 (D.D.C.
1966).
168
Id. (deputy commissioner had determined that bus driver’s neurosis
arose out of his employment, because coming in the wake of trauma, despite
employer’s psychiatrists’ testimony that depression was “involutional” and
“related to a ‘change of life.’”), rev’d, on other grounds, 388 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1967). See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) (deputy commissioner had determined that grocery worker’s injury,
fractured jaw from co-employee assault, had arisen in the course of employment,
and such determination was “supported by substantial evidence.”).
169
See Dell v. Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 499 A.2d 102, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
166
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Act’s heritage of having the hearing officer as fact-finder, the newlyenacted regime provided for the same. A regulation provided that on
administrative appeal, the hearing examiner’s decision was to be
upheld “if it [was] supported by substantial evidence in the record,”
and a court in 1985 ratified this standard of review.170 This rule is
now in the statute.171
Maine. Maine is another jurisdiction where the individual
commissioner traditionally heard the contested case. Since 1981,
intra-agency review has existed,172 but prior to that time, the
commissioner’s findings were final and not subject to reassessment
by any intra-agency panel. Any appeal went directly to the state
supreme court. A 1974 decision, for example, provided that the
court’s responsibility was to determine whether “competent evidence
supports the commission’s decision and whether its decree is based
either upon a misapprehension of fact or a misapplication of law to
the facts.”173 In that case, a remand was ordered because the
commissioner failed to provide findings that would facilitate
review.174
In 1981, the statute was amended to create the Workers’
Compensation Commission Appellate Division, which undertook the
same review as had the Supreme Court; the division’s standard of
review was “neither broader nor narrower than appellate review by
the Law Court.”175 In 1992, meanwhile, amid a cost and litigation
170

Id.
D.C. Code § 32-1521.01 (titled, “Establishment of Compensation
Order Review Board” (2004)). See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v.
D.C.Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 926 A.2d 140 (D.C. Ct. Appeals 2007) (recounting
review standards).
172
See Kuvaja v. Bethel Savs. Bank, 495 A.2d 804 (Me. 1985) (discussing
amendment to law).
173
Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., 380 A.2d 200, 203 (Me.
1977).
174
Id.
175
Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Moyse, 466 A.2d 1257, 1260 (Me. 1983).
In another case, the court noted that:
171

The purpose of the amendment was threefold: (1) to relieve the
appellate burden on the Law Court; (2) to provide an
intermediate appellate body with expertise in workers’
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crisis, the system was again altered. According to a commentator,
the reform displaced the Commission with “a Workers’
Compensation Board consisting of four labor and four business
representatives.” The intent was to “replace what was ‘a quasijudicial adversarial approach’ to workers’ compensation with ‘a
cooperative approach between employers and employees to reduce
utilization of the workers' compensation system and its costs.’”176
Under this reform, which endures to the present date, the
hearing officer’s findings of fact are final,177 and the Supreme Court
takes appeals only in its discretion. The Maine law has a unique
proviso, however, in that “[a] hearing officer may request that the full
board review a decision of the hearing officer if the decision involves
an issue that is of significance to the operation of the workers’
compensation system.”178 However, this same proviso admonishes,
“There may be no such review of findings of fact made by a hearing
officer.”179
Connecticut. Connecticut is another state ahead of the trend.
As with Maine, intra-agency review is relatively new to the
administrative procedure. Prior to 1979, the findings of the
individual commissioner were final. Any appeal was taken directly

compensation; and (3) to have ”consistent policy positions
announced within the administrative agency itself before the
issues are presented in litigated appeals to the Law Court.”
Mathieu v. Bath Iron Works, 667 A.2d 862, 865 (Me. 1995).
Norma Harris & Kathleen Kisner, Maine Reforms Workers’
Compensation
–
State
Report,
BUSINESSLIBRARY
(Nov.
1992),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0903/is_n13_v10/ai_13359848/ (noting that
“[i]n recent years, the workers' compensation system in Maine has deteriorated to
the extent that insurer after insurer has pulled out of the market and larger
businesses have chosen to self-insure.”). The legislative intent behind this reform
is also discussed in Hanover Ins. Co. v. WCB, 695 A.2d 556 (Me. 1997); Mathieu,
667 A.2d at 865 (Me. 1995) (“The record of floor debates suggests that the
purposes for the changes in appellate procedure were to reduce litigation and to
promote efficiency and cost-savings in the system.”).
177
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 318 (2012).
178
Id. at § 320.
179
Id.
176

68

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

to the trial court, with review thereafter in the state supreme court.180
This arrangement was addressed very early in the Connecticut
experience, in a case where an employer’s argument that the trial
court should have exercised de novo review was rejected.181 The
court’s reasoning shows that it was very much ahead of the trend, and
for all the right reasons:
The certainty of the receipt of compensation for injury
follows the act. Its procedure contemplates a speedy
investigation and hearing by a commissioner, without
the formalities of a court and without, as a general
rule, the employment of an attorney. It attempts to
improve the condition of the workman under modern
methods of industry by giving him partial recompense
for an injury, with a result more certain and speedy
and less expensive than under the former method in
tort litigation.
If the Act permits each cause to be appealed and tried
de novo in the superior court, its objects will be
defeated, and more delay, less certainty, and more
expense will ensue to the claimant than with the single
trial
of
the
old
method.
We may not lightly presume that the Legislature
intended to set up a new system, the result of long
agitation, much study and the fullest publicity, and
then deliberately, in the very act creating its new
system, pull down the work of its hands.182
In 1979, legislation was passed, which for the first time,
allowed for intra-agency review. Appeals from compensation
commissioners were to be taken to the “Compensation Review

Grady v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 427 A.2d 842 (Conn. 1980) (in case where
the trial court set aside commissioner’s findings and made his own instead,
supreme court reversed).
181
Powers v. The Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245 (Conn. 1915).
182
Id. at 248.
180
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Division.”183 These fundamental changes were intended, in part, to
create a more authoritative commission head, who in turn would
better “facilitate the timely and efficient processing of cases.” 184 In
1991, meanwhile, the CRD “was replaced, largely semantically, with
the modern workers’ compensation review board.”185
The
commissioner, however, remained “the trier of fact . . . . [T]he
commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses . . . .”186
Reconsideration of the adjudicatory structure came about in
the midst of what some characterized as a management crisis in the
handling of contested cases. A January 1991 legislative report,
Workers’ Compensation in Connecticut, determined:
that the system’s current administrative structure is
not responsive to the concerns of either employers . . .
or employees . . . . Management is weak and
accountability is lacking. . . . Administrative resources
. . . are inadequate, particularly given the dramatic
growth in workload . . . and [the fact that] backlogs
and delays in case processing are widespread.187
The report also identified burgeoning employer costs as a factor in
the overall reform.188

Fair v. People’s Savs. Bank, 542 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Conn. 1988) (court,
holding that CRD impermissibly engaged in fact-finding, remarks, “It is clear that
under . . . § 31-3019(a) and § 31-301-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies the review division's hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a
de novo hearing of the facts. Although the . . . division may take additional
material evidence, this is proper only if it is shown to its satisfaction that good
reasons exist as to why the evidence was not presented to the commissioner.
Otherwise, it is obliged to hear the appeal on the record and not ‘retry the facts.’”).
184
Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 657 A.2d 601, 608 (Conn. 1995).
185
Stec v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 2009 Conn. App. LEXIS 220, *90 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2009), rev‘d on other grounds, 10 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2010).
186
Healey v. Hawkeye Const., 4 A.3d 858, 861 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)
(quotation omitted).
187
Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 657 A.2d 601, 608 (Conn. 1995).
188
Id. at 608 n.7 (“The Report also focused on, and made
recommendations regarding, ‘a more equitable structure, and better control over
rising benefit costs.’”).
183
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Delaware. Prior to 1997, the Delaware Industrial Accident
Board (IAB) (a multi-individual panel) heard the testimony of the
parties in contested cases. The appellate courts have long deferred to
the IAB’s fact-finding powers.189 In modern days, appeal has been
to the superior court, which reviews the decision on a substantial
evidence basis.190 As to the findings of fact, a tradition has long
existed of deference to the first-level hearing officers who actually
saw and heard the witnesses.
Since 1997, the Board has had the power to hire hearing
officers who, with the consent of the parties, may sit in place of the
Board. When this process unfolds, the appeal to the superior court is
governed by the same substantial evidence standard. The 1997
amendment was intended “to assist the Department and Board in
expediting
.
.
.
cases.”191
Alaska. The Alaska experience is perhaps in its own
category. Contested cases in Alaska are heard by the Workers’
Compensation Board of the Department of Labor & Workforce
Development.192 Since 2005, decisions of the Board have been
appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals

189

Children’s Bureau of Del. v. Nissen, 29 A.2d 603, 609 (Del. Super. Ct.

1942):
This Court acts with a prudent caution in reversing a finding of
fact made by the Industrial Accident Board. It will not disturb
the Board’s findings if there was evidence from which its
conclusions could have been fairly and reasonably drawn
(citation omitted). The reason for the rule . . . is that the trial
court sees and hears the witnesses, and is better able to determine
the credit and weight to be given to their testimony. The reason
falls when the testimony is not presented orally.
Id.
190

General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 689 (Del.1960)
(“The position of the Superior Court and of this Court on appeal is to determine
only whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Board. If there was, these findings must be affirmed.”).
191
S.B. 147, 139th Gen. Assemb., Pub. Act. 84 (Del. 1997).
192
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.30.128 (West 2012). Two members of a
hearing panel of the Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed
benefits claim.
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Commission. The Board is the final fact-finder.193 Prior to 2005, a
somewhat different scheme existed. At that time (as it has been at
all times since statehood), the Board acted as fact-finder, but no
intra-agency review existed. Instead, an appeal was taken to the
superior court.194
According to the state supreme court:
Among the goals of the legislature in changing the . . .
Act were decreasing costs and speeding the processing
of claims. The Appeals Commission was created to
help achieve these goals: it was intended to provide
“consistent, legally precedential decisions in an
expeditious manner.” The legislature hoped that the
Appeals Commission would provide necessary
expertise and thereby improve the appeals process.195
D. The Pre-Crisis Trend Makers
Long before the cost and litigation crisis of the 1980s, a
number of states developed adjudication regimes under which the
WCJ became, in practice, the final fact-finder. In Florida, the
appellate court combined statutory interpretation with the commonlaw concern over assessing credibility, and held that appellate review
was restricted to substantial evidence. In Arizona and Rhode Island,
meanwhile, the courts seemed to have flatly disregarded the statute –
which voiced the orthodox rule – and insisted that there could be no
reassessment of demeanor credibility on appeal. (In Arizona, the
decision which so held was reversed as contrary to statute, but the
holding was later ratified by the legislature.) In New Jersey, the
statute was changed to eliminate trial de novo in the county courts.
193

Pietro v. Unocal Corp., 233 P.3d 604, 610 (Alaska 2010) (indicating
that the Board’s findings are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence).
194
See Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).
195
Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 39 (Alaska
2007). See also Knudsen to Chair Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission,
SIT
NEWS
(Nov.
25,
2005),
http://www.sitnews.us/1105news/112505/112505_workers_comp.html (quoting the
governor as complaining, “Too often in the past, workers’ compensation cases
encountered unreasonable delays and scatter-shot rulings that were inconsistent . . .
.”).
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Finally, in Oklahoma, amendments to the law in 1977 changed the
system so that the judge’s findings could only be altered when
against the “clear weight of the evidence.”196
Florida. Florida was the first jurisdiction to declare that the
WCJ (deputy commissioner), and not the Industrial Commission, was
the final fact-finder. The state supreme court, interpreting a 1941
change to the law, held in 1951 that the Commission could only
review the deputy commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence,
and it was not permitted to reassess credibility.197
The court, in so declaring, pointed out that the law initially
provided that the hearing “may” be conducted by the deputy
commissioner, instead of one of the members of the full commission,
and that upon application the full commission could once again hear
the witnesses.198 The case could then be heard de novo in the trial
court.199 The 1941 amendment, the court observed, eliminated the
word “may” and substituted the word “shall,” and at once limited the
full commission to review of “the matter upon the record as prepared
and certified by the deputy commissioner.”200 The court declared:
under the law the deputy commissioner is the only
person charged with the burden and responsibility of
hearing the witnesses and making findings of facts
[and he is hence appropriately deemed final fact-

196

See Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. 1984)
(superseded on other grounds).
197 U.S. Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951). The
court acknowledged that it had issued decisions overlooking the apparent change in
the decade since the amendment. Id. at 743. At least one critic had complained
about the regime during this period, remarking that review of the facts by
commission and trial court was “surprising, because the Circuit Court does not
enter upon a trial de novo, and must depend upon the record made before the
deputy commissioner.” Harris, supra note 131, at 215-16. The critic found the
adjudicatory structure unwieldy and a burden to injured workers. A critical
analysis of the United States Cas. Co. case is found in Malcom B. Parsons, The
Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 481
(1953).
198 See U.S. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d at 743.
199 See id.
200 Id.
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finder]. It is patent that the full Commission functions
much in the same manner as does an appellate court,
although it is quasi judicial rather than strictly so.201
The trial court, meanwhile, was limited to determining
whether the full commission “observed the ‘substantial evidence’
rule” in the course of its own review of the deputy commissioner’s
findings.202
The amendment, notably, did not in so many words declare
that the deputy commissioner was the final arbiter of credibility and
the finder of the facts. Rather, the court inferred that this must be the
case “in lieu of the provision that the full commission might hear the
witnesses and in effect conduct a hearing de novo . . . .”203 The court
added that “[t]he fact-finding arbiter is usually in a better position
than the reviewing body to judge the ability, experience and
reputation of the various so-called expert witnesses who appear
personally before him [and] to determine the weight which should be
given their testimony.”204 This issue was of some moment in the
case at hand, as the critical credibility determination did not turn on
lay testimony, but on the choice of which medical expert to
believe.205 With regard to this issue, the court declared, “doctors are
human. They may be appraised as witnesses and their testimony
evaluated, in much the same manner as other witnesses and their
testimony are judged and estimated.”206
The Florida rule endured. Indeed, by 1965 the court was
prompted to say that it was virtually “hackneyed” to declare that the
“deputy commissioners have the prerogative of determining
questions of fact,” to be sustained on appeal as long as the evidence
relied upon “is competent and substantial and comports with reason
and logic.”207 In the present day, the “Judge of Compensation
Claims” remains the final fact-finder, and upon appellate review in

201

Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
203 U.S. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d at 743.
204 Id. at 745.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Crowell v. Messana Contractors, 180 So. 2d 329, 329 (Fla. 1965).
202
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the First District Court of Appeals the “competent, substantial
evidence” standard of review prevails.208
Arizona. An Arizona court, in 1967, declared that the referee
of the system, and not the Industrial Commission, should be the
arbiter of credibility.209 The court in that case reasoned that it is the
referee who hears the testimony, observes the
demeanor of the petitioner, and is best able to judge
the reliability and credibility of the witnesses who
have testified at the hearing. Absent testimony before
them, the Industrial Commission in reviewing the
hearings before the referee, is in the same position as
an appellate court in that both the Commission and the
appellate court must evaluate the evidence from the
record presented.210
The court added this endorsement: “[T]he importance of the
referee to a fair and just determination of the issues cannot [be] overemphasized. It is the referee who hears the witnesses, rules on the
admission of evidence, and forms the impressions from the demeanor
of the witnesses which the cold record on review cannot indicate.”211
This decision articulates the renowned common-law principle
of fact-finding, and it is often cited as definitely placing Arizona into
the minority camp. In point of fact, however, the state supreme court
promptly reversed, declaring that “[t]he [c]ommission of course was
not bound by the finding of its referee.”212 The commission could
delegate the gathering of evidence to an agent, but could not delegate
the actual decision-making.213

208 FLA. STAT. § 440.271. See James W. Windham Builders, Inc. v. Van
Overloop, 951 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
209 See Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966),
rev’d, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967).
210 Id. at 606.
211 Id. at 607.
212 Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 423 P.2d 348, 350 (Ariz. 1967).
213 Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967). That the Powell
appeals court ruling has been declared in treatise and court opinions as definitive is
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However, in the midst of broad-based 1973 reforms, the
legislature abolished review by the full commission. While the
amendment allowed administrative review of the ALJ’s decision,214
that review, similar to the “reconsideration” provided for in the Black
Lung program, is by the same ALJ who heard the contested claim.215
Following potential administrative review, however, the award is
final pending appellate review. A 1989 subsequent decision
explained that the legislature changed the law in 1973 in order to
comport with the holding of the appeals court.216
Since the change to the scheme, Arizona courts have
continued to produce language that supports the common-law view
of fact-finding. In one court of appeals decision, the court held:
If the administrative decision-maker and this court are
both reaching a decision upon the “cold record” the
integrity of the legal process not only falters, it fails.
In cases of conflicting evidence, meaningful appellate
review requires that the conflict be resolved by
something more personal than a sterile resort to pages
of hearing transcripts.217
Another court admonished, “Not only is credibility a larger
question than truthfulness, but also the quality of substantial justice
demands a higher standard . . . . When the administrative or
managerial procedure ceases and the process of judicial fact finding
occurs, then he who decides must hear.”218
Rhode Island. The modern history of Rhode Island workers’
compensation starts in 1990, with the dramatic creation of the Rhode
Island Workers’ Compensation Court. Under current law, the trial
judge is the final fact-finder. Under one critical reading of the law,
strange. Certainly the Court of Appeals knew that it had been reversed. See
Tolmachoff v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 P.2d 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
214 The current statute may be found at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-943
(2012).
215 Koval v. Indus. Comm’n, 532 P.2d 549 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
216 Ohlmaier v. Indus. Comm’n, 776 P.2d 791 (Ariz. 1989).
217 Adams v. Indus. Comm’n, 710 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
218 Ohlmaier, 776 P.2d at 793 (Ariz. 1989).
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perhaps counterintuitive at first, the full panel exercises de novo
review, except for the all-critical (for our discussion) issue of witness
credibility. The state supreme court held “that the statute provides
the Appellate Division with de novo review of such factual findings
except for credibility determinations made by the trial judge.”219
Prior to creation of the court, the Rhode Island adjudication
structure was one of the familiar trial commissioner, with appeal to
the full commission. Under the critical statute, the full commission
determined whether the preponderance of the evidence sustained the
burdened party’s case. This statute, which had its genesis in 1954
reforms, was held to mean that the full commission could weigh the
evidence and serve as the final fact-finder.220 Nevertheless, in a 1967
case, the court declined to enforce the statute when it came to the
issue of credibility findings.221 “In our judgment,” the court
declared, “it is not the business of the commission either to weigh the
evidence or to determine where its fair preponderance lies until it
first decides whether the trial commissioner, if he rejected testimony
as unworthy of belief, was clearly wrong . . . .”222
In this action, the court was animated by the familiar
common-law concern that deference should be paid to the findings of
the hearing officer who observed the demeanor of the witnesses:
Under generally accepted appellate procedures a
determination of credibility by the fact finder who saw
and heard the witness should be entitled to great
weight on review. . . . The appearance of the witness,
how he demeans himself and his manner of answering
questions, can only be observed by the trial
commissioner. They are observations which
necessarily enter into his determination of what he
believes and what he disbelieves. “The weight of
the evidence” . . . “is to be determined by the
touchstone of credibility . . . .” That touchstone,
219

Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 783 (R.I. 1999)
(second emphasis added). Judicial review of the Appellate Division, meanwhile, is
based upon the “any competent evidence” standard. See id. at 780.
220 Cairo v. Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc., 116 A.2d 188 (R.I. 1955).
221 Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co., 236 A.2d 256 (R.I. 1967).
222 Id. at 259.
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however, is not available to the full commission which
never sees the witness or hears him testify and which,
on review, looks only at a silent record.223
New Jersey. New Jersey undertook reform of its adjudicative
process in 1972, when the legislature abolished de novo review in the
county courts prior to appellate review.224 The state had long been
noted for its “cumbersome trial de novo system,” which Larson
famously highlighted in his treatise section, “The New Jersey Trial
De Novo Story.”225 According to Larson, under the state’s
longstanding law, “successive findings of fact could be made at four
levels, culminating in the Supreme Court . . . and under which the
reviewing court had not only the right but the duty to weigh the
evidence.”226 However, the statutory change was foreshadowed by a
renowned state supreme court holding in 1965.227 The court held that
only the county court, upon appellate review, was charged with
reassessing the weight of the evidence, and that neither the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court nor the state supreme court were
under such obligation.228 After the statutory change, the Appellate
Division immediately noted,
[T]he scope of our appellate review limits us to a
determination of whether the findings of the judge of
compensation could reasonably have been reached on
sufficient credible evidence present in the whole
record, after giving due weight to his expertise in the

223

Id. at 258-59 (quoting Rossi v. Ronci, 7 A.2d 773, 778 (R.I. 1939)).
See COMPILATION OF NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
APPELLATE DECISIONS WITH COMMENT FOR THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION, 1 n.2,
available at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/wc/pdf/wc_research.pdf
(stating that “[p]rior to March 2, 1972, the County Court was required ‘to bring a
new mind to the case and conscientiously reach its own independent
determination.’”) (remarks of Hon. Peter J. Calderon).
225 LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[7][e].
226 Id. (internal citation omitted).
227 Close v. Kordulak, 210 A.2d 753 (N.J. 1965).
228 Id. This opinion is said to remain the “seminal case” on the issue.
Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Newby, Esq to Author (Dec. 5, 2011) (on file with
the Author).
224
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field and his opportunity of hearing and seeing the
witnesses.229
The court also stated,
in reaching this conclusion, we [note] the fact that
hearings before the Division are adversary in nature;
are presided over and tried by a judge who must now
be an attorney-at-law of New Jersey . . . . Under such
circumstances, the judge of compensation’s
determination, when reviewed on appeal, is equivalent
to a trial by a judge without a jury.230

229 De Angelo v. Alsan Masons Inc., 299 A.2d 90, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1973).
230 Id. This case is still cited as a leading precedent for establishing the
power of the Judge of Compensation. See JON L. GELMAN, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE
SERIES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 31.1 (2011). See also Famularo Elec.,
LLC v. Lyndhurst Res. Comm., No. A-4218-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1977 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010):

We must defer to a trial court's credibility determinations, which
are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial
and credible evidence on the record (footnote omitted). This
deference is provided because the trial court “has the opportunity
to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who
appear on the stand; it has a feel of the case that can never be
realized by a review of the cold record.” (Footnote omitted) Our
role is not to reweigh the evidence; we determine only whether
the factual findings are supported.
Id. at *18-19. In another case, the court held that:
An appellate court may not “engage in an independent
assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first
instance.” (quotation omitted) Findings of fact made by a trial
judge “are considered binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial and credible evidence.” (quotation omitted)
Accordingly, if in reviewing an agency decision, an appellate
court finds sufficient credible evidence in the record to support
the agency’s conclusions, that court must uphold those findings,
even if the court believes that it would have reached a different
result.
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It appears as though one crucial motive for this change was to
expedite the process by removing one step of appeals.231
Montana. Prior to 1975, the Industrial Accident Board heard
contested workers’ compensation cases in Montana. An appeal from
an order of the same was taken to the district court (i.e., trial court),
where “the trial . . . was considered de novo,” with a “presumption of
correctness.”232 Under this arrangement, “[t]he district court on
appeal from the board is not justified in reversing a finding of the
board unless the evidence clearly preponderates against such
finding.”233
In 1975, however, the office of Workers’ Compensation
Judge (a single individual) was created.234 An appeal under the
current practice goes directly to the state supreme court.235 The court
is to affirm the WCJ’s ruling if supported by substantial evidence.236
According to the state’s website, “[t]he Legislature created the
Workers’ Compensation Court . . . to provide an efficient and

Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 A.2d 1119, 1124 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
231 Memorandum from Lora V. Northern, Esq. to the Author (Dec. 5,
2011) (on file with the Author),
232 Erhart v. Great W. Sugar Co., 546 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Mont. 1976).
233 Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 98 (Mont. 1966);
Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347 (Mont. 1933). This latter case
shows that in the early days of the Montana practice, additional evidence could be
presented to the district court, “for good cause shown.” Id. at 350.
234 The fact that a single individual has such significant power is
remarkable. This was apparently the thinking of the state’s Chamber of
Commerce, which in 2010 issued a report evaluating the judge. MONTANA
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE 2010 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MONTANA
WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
COURT
(2010),
available
at
http://www.montanachamber.com/files/2010%20Workers'%20Compensation%20C
ourt%20Review.pdf. After summarizing his rulings, the Chamber accorded him a
2008-2009 “Total Business Score” of 78%, noting further that his “Lifetime
Business Score” was 66%. Id. at 10.
235 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2904 (2011).
236 Michalak v. Liberty N.W. Ins. Corp., 175 P.3d 893 (Mont. 2008).
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effective forum for the resolution of [workers’ compensation]
disputes . . . .”237
Oklahoma. Workers’ compensation cases in Oklahoma are
litigated before the Workers’ Compensation Court, an entity created
in 1978. Under Oklahoma law, a case is first heard before a trial
judge of the court, followed by review within the court by a threejudge or en banc review panel. The panel “is not free to reverse at
will a trial judge’s findings,”238 but first must make a threshold
determination that the judge’s decision “was against the clear weight
of the evidence . . . .”239 Upon true judicial review, the test, in the
wake of a 2010 amendment, is the same.240 Under the pre-existing
scheme, meanwhile, review undertaken by the displaced “State
Industrial court en banc” was similar (though not identical) to trial de
novo.241
Under the Oklahoma statute, panel-substituted fact findings
can exist, but only when the panel makes the threshold determination
of error by the trial judge.242 Reported cases may be found where
this occurs,243 and one precedent indeed states that the three-judge
237

WEBSITE,
2012).

See Workers Compensation Court, MONTANA OFFICIAL STATE
http://courts.mt.gov/workers_comp/default.mcpx (last visited Jan. 3,

238

Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548, 551 (Okla. 1984)
(superseded on other grounds).
239 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.6 (West 2010) (current version at
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 340 (West 2011).
240 Mobile Mini, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 517, 522 (Ct. Civ.
App. Okla. 2011) (citing OKLA. STAT. § 3.6(c)). For the pre-2010 rule, see
Smalygo v. Green, 184 P.3d 554, 559 (Okla. 2008).
241 Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 684 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. 1984)
(referring to the 1977 amendments, court remarks, “fact findings of the trial judge
are now impervious to any alteration unless the panel finds them to be clearly
against the weight of the evidence.”).
242 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 340 (West 2011).
243 See, e.g., Foster’s Florist v. Jackson, 997 P.2d 843 (Okla. 2000). The
court
also
stated:
The claimant and the employer both presented competent
evidence to support their respective views of causation. However,
an appellate court will not disturb a fact-substituting panel order
that has the statutorily-mandated determination that the trial
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review panel is the “final arbiter of questions of fact.”244 Still, as the
usual definition of “against the clear weight of the evidence”245
gravely limits the fact-finding power of any review tribunal,
Oklahoma can be seen as one of the pre-crisis trend makers in
assigning marked fact-finding power to the WCJ. In fact, the genesis
of the 1978 reform was a conviction that:
[A] better system could be devised if one could
separate completely the role of administration from
the role of adjudication. It was argued that this would
increase accountability, reduce unnecessary litigation,
and provide a more effective mechanism for handling
such key new features . . . as physical and vocational
rehabilitation and job placement.246
E. Jurisdictions Influenced by the National Commission
Longshore Act. As noted above, the hearing officer under the
Longshore Act has long been the final fact-finder.247 However, in
1972, his or her decision became subject to intra-agency review as
part of a National Commission-inspired administrative
restructuring.248 The Benefits Review Board (BRB) undertakes
judge’s finding was “against the clear weight of the evidence,”
where, as in this cause, the record contains ample competent
evidence to support the panel's findings.
Id. at 848.
244

Dunkin v. Instaff Personnel, 164 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Okla. 2007). In this
case, both the trial judge and the three-member panel dismissed a claimant’s
original claim, but on judicial review the court held that both opinions were so unexplained that judicial review could not be accomplished. See id. at 1059
245
See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 848 n.1 (2010) (“a decision so
inadequately supported by the record as to be arbitrary and therefore objectively
unreasonable.”).
246
Chris Sturm, The Workers’ Compensation Act of 1977, 3 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
247
See supra Section V(C).
248
Francis J. Gorman, The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act – After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 2 (1974).
See also John Vittone, Practice Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, in
THE LONGSHORE TEXTBOOK 120 (2010) (stating that the BRB had remarked in a
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substantial evidence review of the ALJ’s decision based upon the
record considered as a whole.249 Thus, as one practitioner phrases it,
“Questions of witness credibility are particularly within the ALJ’s
province and reviewable only for the most extreme credulity or
skepticism without an apparently reasonable basis.”250
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania legislature, in 1972, enacted
sweeping amendments to the law.251 These amendments eliminated
the ability of the Appeal Board to reassess credibility. 252 The Board
changed the referee from a patronage hire of limited employment
duration to a professional possessing civil service protections.253 A
decision that the “legislation reflected legislative concerns that the administrative
and adjudicative functions had been too closely tied together prior to the 1972
amendments.”).
249
33 U.S.C. § 921 (2012).
250
Joshua T. Gillelan II, Appellate Procedure Under the Longshore Act, in
THE LONGSHORE TEXTBOOK 142 (2010). See, e.g., Norfolk Shipbuilding v. Faulk,
228 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2000):
The ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions of the
parties or their representatives, but must examine the logic of
their conclusions and evaluate the evidence upon which their
conclusions are based. . . . Despite this deference [to the ALJ],
the evidence must still be sufficient – more than a scintilla but
less than a preponderance.
Id. at 381, 386; Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Belcher Erectors, 770 F.2d
1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (in case where BRB reassessed credibility, court
declares, the “intent of Congress [was] that litigation of the facts of these matters
substantially terminate at the ALJ level.” See also Bath Iron Works Corp. v.
Fields, 599 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (shows court treating as an issue of law
whether employer rebutted the presumption of causation allowed by Longshore
Act, and revealing the operation of presumption – if ALJ finds the presumption
rebutted, parties are where they normally would be in a civil case, as the
“presumption ‘falls out of the case.’”); Greenwich Terminals, LLC v. Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 309 Fed. Appx. 658 (3rd Cir. 2009) (after ALJ refused
to reduce claimant’s benefits, employer appealed alleging that he applied the “true
doubt rule,” which had been rejected by Supreme Court in 1994; court also
explained that, within limits, ALJ may accept the expert medical opinion that he
chooses).
251
TORREY, supra note 70, § 1:46.
252
Id.
253
Id.
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Pennsylvania court immediately held that the referee was now the
final fact-finder.254
The Pennsylvania amendment was part of a major effort to
follow the National Commission recommendations that the
adjudicative and oversight functions of workers’ compensation
agencies be made separate, and that agency employees be given civil
service protections. The legislature, accordingly, sought to remove
overt political influences from adjudication and replace those
influences with a more professional ethic.255
Expedition of cases was also a motive. In this regard, the
amendments removed the county trial courts from the appellate
process, a procedure that had been in place since the enactment of the
law in 1915. According to a contemporary treatise writer, “It was the
1972 Legislature’s view that this intermediate appeal . . . served no
useful purpose, but only served to involve such appeal proceedings in
an additional major delay . . . .”256
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ascribed the change to
the legislature’s conviction that the judge who sees and hears the
witnesses should be the final fact-finder.257 This assertion, however,
Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 305
A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (landmark case defining WCJ as final fact finder;
court interpreted 1972 amendments that removed review powers from Board, and
which renamed the latter “Appeal Board”). The hearing officer’s title was finally
changed from referee to WCJ in 1993. See TORREY, supra note 70, § 1:99.
255
Comments of Stanley Siegel, Esq. to the Author (Feb. 4, 2011);
Comments of Raymond Keisling, Esq. to the Author (Feb. 7, 2011).
256
ALEXANDER F. BARBIERI & THOMAS R. BOND, 3 PENNSYLVANIA
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE § 6.25 (Bisel 1996).
One of the National Commission consultants, in an early effort to study reform
factors in Pennsylvania, interviewed a major insurer and was told, “Compensation
benefits are now paid too slowly in contested cases, and litigation is too protracted
when a contest occurs.” Arthur W. Motley, A Study of the Forces that Produce
Change in the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of Four States: Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 544 (1973).
257
Peak v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Of Rev., 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa.
1985) (“It may be wiser, more efficient or more expedient to entrust administrative
determinations of fact based on credibility to the person who hears the evidence. . .
.[J]ust such a judgment was made by our legislature when it amended Section 423
of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act to change those referees from
mere agents of the Board to independent factfinders whose credibility
determinations became binding on the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.
254
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does not find any contemporary documentation. The iconic court
precedent that first clarified the meaning of the 1972 amendment is
completely silent on intent.258
In the present day, the WCJ is firmly ensconced as the final
fact-finder and arbiter of credibility. Reforms of 1993 and 1996
brought the “reasoned decision” requirement, which obliged the
Pennsylvania WCJ to detail the reasons for his or her decisions and
some level of explanation for his fact-findings. Nevertheless, both
the Appeal Board and the appellate courts, upon true judicial review,
undertake a markedly deferential substantial evidence or “arbitrary
and capricious” review.259 These entities never substitute credibility
determinations. Indeed, in the nineteen years this Author has been a
WCJ, his determinations with regard to the facts have not been
overthrown on a single occasion.260

Before that amendment, the. . . . Board had had the same power of de novo review
over its referees as the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review retains
under. . . . the Unemployment Compensation Act. . . . ” (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted)).
258
See Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.,
305 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
259
With regard to use of these terms, see Republic Steel Corp. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd., 421 A.2d 1060, 1062-1063 (Pa. 1980) (court using “substantial
evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” in same discussion). For the law and
analysis of WCJ fact-finding under the Pennsylvania Act, see TORREY, supra note
70, §§ 13:96-13:139.
260
A resultant Pennsylvania phenomenon may be identified: the perennial
effort of disappointed parties to find ways to avoid such fact-finding finality and
find relief on appeal. In one case of this variety, a claimant on appeal to the
Commonwealth Court alleged that the WCJ had committed a “capricious
disregard” of evidence. He suggested that when only one party to the contested
litigation presents evidence, the WCJ’s decision to discredit the same should be
subject to special scrutiny, particularly under the “reasoned decision” requirement
of the Act noted above. Utilizing creative prose, the claimant submitted that this
proposed review was admittedly unique, to wit, “a form of review normally resisted
by appellate courts.” Claimant asserted, “Thus, notwithstanding the instinct of an
appellate tribunal to defer to the fact-finder, this is simply not what is mandated. . .
.” To this assertion the court responded, “We disagree with Claimant’s premise
that appellate court judges defer to the fact finder by employing ‘instinct;’ in truth,
it requires discipline.” Remaley v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Turner Dairy
Farms, Inc.), 861 A.2d 405 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
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F. Jurisdictions Influenced by Counterreform
Eight states, in direct response to concerns over litigation and
costs crises, have altered their adjudication systems to make the WCJ
the fact-finder. A number of orthodox rule states, meanwhile, have
undertaken other steps at streamlining the adjudication process. In
Oregon, for example, de novo review of the Board’s decision by the
Court of Appeals was abolished in 1987.261 In Illinois, the Industrial
Commission remains the final fact-finder, but the parties as of 1989
may no longer, on review, submit new evidence.262 In Georgia,
meanwhile, the Board endures as the final fact-finder, but review is
no longer de novo. Instead, the ALJ’s findings are to be accepted
when “supported by a preponderance of competent and credible
evidence . . . .”263
Minnesota (1983). The compensation judge in the Minnesota
system has been the final fact-finder since 1983.264 Prior thereto, an
appeal taken to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals was
reviewed on a de novo basis. That court now reviews for substantial
evidence.265 According to the first case to confirm the meaning and
261

See Erck v. Brown Oldsmobile, 815 P.2d 1251, 1254 (S. Ct. Oregon
1991). Jury trial de novo was not abolished in Oregon until 1965. For a case
critical of that development, see Hannan v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 471 P.2d 831,
833 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (“Under the pre-1965 system, an award was made by the
State Industrial Accident Commission to the claimant. . . . If he was not satisfied he
had a right to a jury trial . . . . At that trial he produced witnesses; the commission
produced witnesses, the court instructed the jury on the applicable law, the jury
returned its verdict which was reduced to judgment, and the scope of review on
appeal was no broader than that in any other action at law.”).
262
See infra Section VII.
263
See infra Section VII.
264
See MINN. STAT. § 176.421 (2009).
265
Stately v. Red Lake Builders et al., 2010 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 99
(2010) (“On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine
whether ‘the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted’ . . . Substantial
evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, ‘they are
supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’ . . .
‘Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed . . . ’ Similarly, findings of fact
should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them,
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import of the revised law, the intent was efficiency. The change, in
this regard, “should result in fewer appeals to the Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals, with resultant savings in time and
cost to the workers’ compensation system.”266 WCRI researchers,
meanwhile, reported that the 1983 “reform sought to lower costs
without reducing benefits and to reduce litigation and friction costs.”
Among the changes were “new paths for dispute resolution.”267
Michigan (1985). Up until 1985 in Michigan, a state which
has roiled with reform, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(WCAB) undertook de novo review on appeal from a referee
decision. In the wake of post-National Commission growth in costs
and claims, a litigation crisis unfolded.268 A major reform of that
year “completely revamped the appeal procedure,”269 abolished the
‘unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to
the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.’”)
(citations omitted). For a well-considered decision that parses the difference
between finding of fact and conclusion of law in the old injury/new injury context,
see Busch v. Advanced Maintenance, 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003).
266
Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1984).
The court continued, in this vein, “We think it may be of some significance that the
legislature added the appellate review amendments, not to its then pending bill for
general revision of the workers’ compensation law, but to House File No. 1290, an
appropriations bill dealing with budget considerations.” Id. WCRI researchers
found it ironic, in their 1990 study, that even after the abolition of de novo review,
almost 40 percent of compensation judge decisions were appealed. The researchers
heard many explanations for the high appeal rate, but perhaps the most ironic was
from one attorney, who stated that he “attributes the high appeal rate in part to the
unpredictability of WCCA decision, particularly with respect to the change in the
standard of review from de novo to substantial evidence. This new standard does
not allow WCCA judges to second-guess OAH judges, which may lead to a
perception of inconsistency.” DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL TELLES,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN MINNESOTA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 79
(Workers Compensation Research Institute ed., 1991).
267
BALLANTYNE, supra note 266, at 79.
268
EDWARD M. WELCH & DARYL C. ROYAL, WORKER’S COMPENSATION
IN MICHIGAN: LAW & PRACTICE § 18:10, at 18-11 (5th ed. 2010). See also H.
ALLAN HUNT & STACEY M. ECCLESTON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN MICHIGAN:
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 43 (1990) (referring to policymakers’ frustrations
that as of 1985 a “five-year backlog of cases” existed at the Appeal Board, an
aggravating effect of de novo review which meant that “the loser at the hearing
level could get another chance on appeal.”).
269
HUNT, supra note 268, at 43.
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position of referee, and created a Board of Magistrates. The WCAB
was likewise abolished and replaced by the Workers’ Compensation
Appellate Commission (WCAC). The Magistrate is now, for all
practical intents and purposes, the final fact-finder.270
According to the state supreme court: “The Legislature sought
thereby to reduce the delay in adjudicating workers’ compensation
claims, which had been attributed to a large backlog in the WCAB
resulting from the appeal of seventy-five to eighty-five percent of
referee awards.”271
In 1986, the supreme court, considering an extraordinary case
in which the displaced referees sought an injunction against their
removal, summarized the legislative intent. In so summarizing, the
court referred to a renowned report, authored by Professor Theodore
St. Antoine (a special counselor of the governor), which had
recommended reform:
De novo review, described in the report as an “open
invitation to disappointed litigants and their lawyers to
seek to retry the case from scratch,”. . . was seen as
the principal cause. Having in mind that there is now
a large body of precedent, that over the years referees
were affirmed on questions of law about sixty-six
percent of the time and on issues of fact about eightytwo percent of the time, and the backlog at the
appellate level, de novo review, Professor St. Antoine
said, is no longer “a luxury that can be afforded, or a
procedure that is needed” and should be eliminated. . .
. A referee should become a “true-decision maker,”
and the decision at that level “a much more dispositive
step in the administrative process.”272
St. Antoine also “recommended that the referees be required
to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Their findings of fact should be conclusive if supported by
270

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.206; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.861(a).
Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384 N.W.2d 728,
730 (Mich.. 1986), on remand, Matulewicz v. Governor, 435 N.W.2d 785 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989).
272
Id. at 733.
271
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competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . .
.”273 The appeal process, he added, “should be ‘streamlined,’ by
creating a new five- or possibly seven-member board, which should
be able to handle the anticipated reduced number of appeals, given
the substantially reduced record-reading and fact-finding
responsibilities, and the use of legal assistants . . . .”274
Under the 1985 amendment, the new Workers’ Compensation
Appellate Commission (WCAC)275 does indeed review the
magistrate’s decision for substantial evidence.276 This change led
Larson to say that Michigan had adopted the minority rule that the
WCJ was the final fact-finder. Some confusion, however, thereupon
unfolded, as a 1992 case of the supreme court interpreted the statute
to allow for limited WCAC fact-finding.277 In 1997, however, the
court ruled that no such power existed.278
Finally, in a landmark 2000 case,279 the court disavowed the
latter ruling and clarified that the WCAC can under limited
273

Id.
Id. at 734-35. For another account of the 1985 reforms, see Holden v.
Ford Motor Co., 484 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1992). The St. Antoine report, the
opinion notes, was actually foreshadowed by the 1980 “Lesinski Report,” which
“proposed that decisions of a magistrate be made conclusive ‘unless fraudulently
obtain[ed] or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.’” Id. at 228. No reform
was enacted at that time. St. Antoine, meanwhile, believed that giving the WCAC
whole record substantial evidence review would “allow the Appeal Board a bit
more latitude” than the Lesinski standard noted above. “St. Antoine said this
would enable the reviewing panel to ‘remedy any serious misstep by [a hearing
officer] in assessing the evidence and making factual findings.’” Id. at 229.
275
The WCAC is now (2012) the Michigan Compensation Appellate
Commission.
276
For a recent case, see Djelaj v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 2011 Mich
App. LEXIS 1771 (Mich Ct. App. 2011). (“The WCAC reviews the magistrate’s
decision under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard in accordance with MCL
418.861a(3) ….”).
277
Holden v. Ford Motor Co., 484 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1992). The Holden
case, which is very well written, is an excellent example of “whole record review”
as undertaken in a workers’ compensation case. The magistrate, notably, had
denied a cardiac claim, but the WCAC changed his findings and issued an award of
benefits.
278
Goff v. Bil-Mar Foods, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. 1997).
279
Mudel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 614 N.W.2d 607 (Mich.
2000).
274
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circumstances undertake fact-finding. The court did so by a
meticulous parsing of the law. The pivotal statute provides, in this
regard, for substantial evidence review. However, it also provides
for review of the “whole record,” to wit, “the entire record of the
hearing including all of the evidence in favor and all the evidence
against a certain determination.” Finally, the section admonishes:
(13) A review of the evidence pursuant to this section
shall include both a qualitative and quantitative
analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full,
thorough, and fair review.
(14) The findings of fact made by the commission
acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall
be conclusive . . . .280
According to the court, these sections provide for WCAC
“fact-finding powers, and permits it in some circumstances to
substitute its own findings of fact for those of the magistrate, if the
WCAC accords different weight to the quality or quantity of
evidence presented.” The court rejected the idea, however, that this
was de novo review of any kind:
[A]pplication of the clear and plain language of [these
sections] . . . does not connote a de novo review by the
WCAC of the magistrate’s decisions . . . . Clearly, it
would be improper for the WCAC to engage in its
own statutorily permitted independent fact finding if
“substantial evidence” on the whole record existed
supporting the decision of the magistrate.281
Of note is that the WCAC applauded the ruling for the clarity
it was presumed to bring to its own review tasks. In addition,
however, the Commission thought that having fact finding power
280

See id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.861(a) (13-14)).
Id. at 612. Judicial review thereafter is actually in the discretion of the
court, and when it does take a case, it is under an “any evidence” standard.
Importantly, when the court undertakes review, it reviews the WCAC decision, not
that of the magistrate.
281
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would promote expedition of cases. The new precedent, the
Commission stated, by allowing it to correct “faulty or incomplete
magistrate decisions[,] will streamline the decision-making in
worker’s compensation by eliminating wasteful remands and
expediting the resolution of disputes in the system.”282
In the present day, one Michigan expert reports that despite
possessing the power:
[T]he WCAC rarely disturbs the Magistrate’s finding
of fact on a factual issue. They can re-analyze the
facts as it applies to a legal issue. For example, if the
issue was credibility, it would never be overturned but
if the WCAC felt that the Magistrate incorrectly
applied the facts to the law, they may make an
adjustment.283
The treatise writer Welch is in accord, stating the
“commission has typically declined to push the limits of its power….
[I]n practice, the commission seems to impose on itself a rather high
standard, perhaps higher than required by Mudel, and tends to reverse
factual decisions only in exceptional cases.”284
Press Release, “‘CIS’ Appellate Commission Applauds Supreme Court
Clarification of its Review Standards” (July 26, 2000), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-10573_11472-50550--,00.html
(last
visited Jan. 3, 2012).
283
Memorandum from Denise Clemmons, Esquire, Farmington Hills, MI,
to Author (Nov. 21, 2011) (on file with Author). Ms. Clemmons represented
defendant Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. in the Mudel appeal.
284
WELCH & DARYL, supra note 268, at 18-12, 18-13. Still, the researcher
can find cases where the Commission has substituted its own fact-findings for those
of the magistrate. See, e.g., Romero v. Burt Moeke Hardwoods, Inc., 760 N.W.2d
586, 592-93 (Ct. App. Mich. 2008) (WCAC did not engage in illicit de novo
review, but instead legitimately found as fact reason that claimant left Michigan to
return to Mexico, as his visa had run out: “Here, the WCAC found sufficient
evidence on the record to make a finding and determined that plaintiff left the
United States because his visa expired. Because there is record evidence to support
the WCAC’s finding, we will not overturn it on appeal.”) (note: the magistrate had
not made a hard finding on why claimant departed); Daniel v. Dep’t of Corrs., 658
N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 2003) (magistrate determined that claimant had developed
depression because of employer’s disciplining of him, but WCAC, reversing
282
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Massachusetts (1985, 1991). The Administrative Judge (AJ)
under the Massachusetts Act has been the final fact-finder in earnest
since the state’s 1991 amendments.285 The system had undergone a
remarkable progressive reform in 1985, said to have been informed
by a tardy response to National Commission recommendations.286
Those changes first deprived the intra-agency review board of de
novo powers, but still left it authority to reweigh evidence. However,
it was only six years later, the pendulum having swung back towards
retractive reform, that the AJ was finally equipped with his or her
current power.
Before 1985 the hearing officer in the system was an
individual commissioner. Appeal was taken to a reviewing board of
“‘not less than three members’ or commissioners . . . . The
commissioners . . . presided over their own hearings and also, as
members of a reviewing board, reviewed the single member
decisions of their colleagues.”287 This board “could entirely
supersede the single member’s decision,” empowered as it was to
hear testimony, take evidence, and “revise the decision in whole or in
part . . . .”288 By one account, this arrangement had encountered

award, found that claimant had brought discipline upon himself by harassing coworker; court affirms over dissent).
285
M.G.L. c.152, § 11C. With regard to the 1991 amendments, see
Laurence Bengston’s Case, 609 N.E.2d 1229 (Ct. App. Mass. 1993). See generally
David Carpenter’s Case, 923 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Mass. 2010) (“credibility
determinations are within the sole province of an administrative judge and are to be
considered final by both the reviewing board and an appellate court.”).
286
Memorandum from Alan Peirce, Esquire, Salem, MA to Author (Dec.
16, 2011) (on file with Author).
287
LEONARD NASON, 29, 29A MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION § 14:27 (3d ed. West 2003).
288
Barbara Pospisil’s Case, 525 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 1988) (noting also that
change to single commissioner as fact-finder was procedural, and hence
permissibly retroactive; employer had no vested right in having the Board on
appeal be able to reassess claimant’s credibility). According to one expert, even
though the reviewing board had this power, it did not exercise the same very often.
The Review Board would usually operate as a “rubber stamp . . . [I] cannot ever
remember having a case revisited or having facts revised.” Memorandum from
Alan Peirce, supra note 286. Another expert has observed that the prior process
resulted in such rubber-stamping due to the personal/political dynamic involved,
stating that the “Sitting Review Board members would in turn have their own
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efficiency problems. Consequently, by the 1980s, the public could
read of acute delays in the litigation process: “An injured employee
faced months, if not years, of delays waiting for a decision regarding
benefits.” This unsatisfactory arrangement was superimposed on a
system that paid only modest benefits that “often left injured workers
impoverished over time.”289 It was out of this environment that the
1985 reform evolved.
Under the initial reform, the title “commissioner” was
abolished.290
The first-level hearing officer became the
Administrative Judge (AJ) and the intra-agency review board was
composed of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), an arrangement
which continues to the present.291 This effort was no doubt intended
to address the “effective delivery” goal of the system, but the statute
still allowed the reviewing board to “weigh evidence” and substitute
its decision if the AJ’s decision was “unwarranted by the facts.”292 In
a 1988 case, the court held that the law said what it meant, thus
allowing for the review board to make new fact-findings.293 The
exception was that the personal assessment of a live witness could
not be overthrown.294
According to the treatise writer Nason, “[r]eaction to the . . .
decision was swift,” with bills submitted prohibiting the reassessment
of credibility.295 According to Nason, this advocacy grew out of a
fear “that in the absence of legislative correction, the fact finding
ability of the reviewing board would undoubtedly result in an
hearing decisions be the subject of appeals to be heard by their fellow
Commissioners.” The present arrangement is more satisfactory. Memorandum
from Joseph Agnelli, Jr., Esquire, Boston, MA to Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file
with Author).
289
ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS FOUNDATION,
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS COMPENSATION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW & MOVING
FORWARD FROM THE 1991 REFORM 16 (2004),
available at
http://www.aimnet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Web_Site&CONTENTID=744
2&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
290
Id. at 12.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Robert Lettich’s Case, 530 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1988).
294
Id. at 163.
295
LEONARD Y. NASON, 29 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION § 16:27 (3d ed. 2003).
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increase in appeals from decisions of administrative judges.”296 In
the end, the statute was changed so as to remove any doubt regarding
where the power to assess credibility lay and now it is “clear that the
reviewing board has absolutely no fact finding authority.”297 Nason
also asserts that a legislative motive in making the AJ the final factfinder was “that it was felt that the hearing judge was in the best
position to find ‘credible’ facts based upon a live witness’ testimony,
i.e., assess a witness’ credibility. In the absence of hearing live
testimony it was felt that it was inappropriate for the reviewing board
to revisit the facts found, especially when based on credibility.”298
This 1991 change was, in fact, part of a broader reform,
which itself was a reaction to the 1985 amendments referenced
above.299 The latter had given rise to the “unintended consequence of
rapidly accelerating benefits to the point where they served as a
disincentive for many employees to return to work.” 300 This crisis in
costs and premiums was exacerbated by a bad economy and
insurance industry woes, leading to a “decidedly probusiness/insurer” reform,301 the outlines of which endure to the
present day.
According to the veteran attorney, Alan Pierce, the 1991
reform tended to improve the adjudication of cases, and has
significantly reduced the number of appeals:
Since the old practice [pre-1985] was almost always
an affirmation of the fact finder [anyway] the new
[Review Board] really has taken [itself] seriously as
an appellate body. Both the 1985 and 1991 changes
made a previously “simple and summary” process
(and statute) now chock full of procedural and
substantive nuances (i.e. different levels of causation
296

Id.
Id.
298
Memorandum from Leonard Y. Nason, Esquire, Bedford, MA, to
Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file with Author).
299
See ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS FOUNDATION,
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS COMPENSATION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW & MOVING
FORWARD FROM THE 1991 REFORM, supra note 237.
300
Id. at 20.
301
Memorandum from Alan Peirce, supra note 286.
297
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when there is a pre-existing condition, tighter
definitions of earning capacity and so on), [and] the
appeals that actually are briefed (and in rare cases
orally argued) usually have some substance to them.
If you read the Review Board decisions now there are
a great deal of reversals, or more commonly remands,
to correct the original AJ’s analysis.
Two other factors . . . dictate the volume of cases
appealed and ultimately heard. Under the old system,
despite the Review Board rubber stamping almost
everything, cases were nevertheless almost always
appealed . . . . [This was so because it] kept the case
alive for [a] possible lump sum. Since getting
anywhere at the old IAB took a long time, cases
usually settled when there was something coming up
on the docket. Also there was another appeal level
(eliminated in 1985) to the Superior Court (now cases
go from the Review Board to the Appeals Court).
[T]he other factor influencing the lower volume of
appeal decisions today is that prior to the filing of
briefs, the Review Board upon receipt of an appeal
will schedule an informal conference with counsel and
just one of the three Review Board judges to ask what
the “real” issues are and try to get the appealing party
to withdraw if it appears the filing of the appeal was
just a long shot or to appease the losing client. Also[,]
a certain number of those cases would settle[,] or if
there was an obvious error below the appellee might
in the interest of time agree to a remand to correct the
minor error below. About one-third of appeals today
to the Review Board “go away” after this informal
conference.302
Nason agrees: “I think overall that [the 1991 changes have]
reduced reviewing board appeals, and hearing judges have been very

302

Id.
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careful to make it clear that his/her findings of fact were based upon
their own credibility determinations, having in mind the witness’
demeanor, memory, testimony, corroborating evidence, and the
like.”303
Kentucky (1988). The ALJ has been the final fact-finder in the
Kentucky system since 1988.304 The motive for the change was to
create a more efficient process of adjudication.305 “[T]he primary
goal of the [1987] Special Session” of the legislature, one veteran
states, was:
[determining] how to shorten the time from filing of
claim to final decision. It was not unusual for a claim
to take two years to litigate. . . . Because all claims
were decided by the three-member Workers’
Compensation Board, there was a substantial backlog
of cases to be decided . . . . The result of the Special
Session was that the Board was replaced by twelve
ALJs, and a fast-track litigation scheme was
adopted.306
Under this scheme, the Board became an appellate entity,307
reviewing the ALJ decision on a substantial evidence basis.308

303

Memorandum from Leonard Y. Nason, Esquire, Bedford, MA, to
Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file with Author).
304
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.285 (West 2010).
305
Comments from Hon. Mike Alvey, Chair, Kentucky WCB, to Author
(Aug. 28, 2011) (indicating that under the displaced practice, cases would go into
an adjudication “pipeline,” with the end-point years away; amendment was
intended to “expedite” the process).
306
Memorandum of Stephanie Ross, Esquire, Florence, KY, to Author
(Sep. 1, 2011) (quoting James Fogle, Esq.) (on file with Author).
307
Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992).
According to the court:
The 1988 statutory restructuring . . . intended appeal to the WCB
to be the functional equivalent of appellate review in the Court of
Appeals. These statutes worked fundamental changes. The ALJs
were created and empowered to function the same as a trial court
trying a case without a jury. The WCB was divested of the fact-
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In a renowned case, the state supreme court stressed that the
amendment sought to “streamline the workers’ compensation
process,” and it encouraged parties to avoid appeals that simply
asked (in vain) that the appellate court reweigh the evidence and
reassess credibility.309 Supreme Court review should not, the court
admonished, be the end sought in every litigated workers’
compensation case. The court remarked memorably that “[t]he WCB
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals are not way stations, or rest
stops, along the road to the Kentucky Supreme Court.”310
Colorado (1987). The ALJ of the Colorado system gained
full fact-finding power in the course of the 1987 amendments.311 An
finding function and restructured to carry out the same functions
as an intermediate court reviewing the decisions of a court of
original jurisdiction, to perform the error correcting function
normally assigned to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, lacking
only the power of constitutional review.
Id. at 687 (citation omitted).
308 See, e.g., Couch v. Blevins Logging, 2011 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 69 (Ky.
2011) (“The courts have construed KRS 342.285 to require a party who appeals a
finding that favors the party with the burden of proof to show that no substantial
evidence supported the finding, i.e., that the finding was unreasonable under the
evidence.”) (footnote and citations omitted); Jefferson Cnty Public Schools v.
Stephens, 208 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2006) (ALJ’s findings that claimant did not suffer
idiopathic fall, and that she did not otherwise suffer a work-related injury, were not
arbitrary and capricious, court remarking that “[a]lthough KRS 342.285 designates
the ALJ as the finder of fact, a finding that is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
erroneous is subject to reversal on appeal. [We have previously explained] that a
finding may only be affirmed if it is reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.” (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)).
309

Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1992)
(emphasis omitted).
310 Id. The court continued: “The parties in cases such as the present one
must accept that, notwithstanding their right to demand further appellate review,
the body performing further review is there to address new problems, not to
redecide the same evidentiary questions.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
311 See C.R.S. § 8-43-301(8). The 1987 reform also had retractive aspects,
in particular the abolition of the injured worker’s right to vocational rehabilitation –
a benefit type that had become highly costly and, reportedly, abused. See also
Memorandum from Tom Kanan, Esq., Denver, CO to Author (Dec. 20, 2011) (on
file with Author).
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appeal is to be prosecuted to the Industrial Claims Appeals Office
(ICAP or “panel”), which undertakes substantial evidence review.312
The legislature at the time was dissatisfied with the performance of
the Industrial Commission, which at the time entertained disputes.
This was particularly so at a time of “widespread perception that the
costs of the system to employers were getting too high.”313
The Court of Appeals, in 1995, confirmed that efficiency in
the adjudication process was the legislature’s motive for eliminating
intra-agency reassessment of the facts. In that case, the claimant
argued that limiting the appeals panel to “substantial evidence”
review compromised his due process rights. The court rejected this
argument, replying that the “purpose of the Workers’ Compensation
Act . . . is to provide ‘an expeditious method of compensating
disabled workers with liability determined ‘with some degree of
certainty’ . . . . Since limited administrative review, such as provided
here, avoids duplication of effort at the agency level, it is rationally
related to the statutory goal . . . .”314
One veteran who experienced the change states that investing
the ALJ with fact-finding power, and making the Appeals Panel in
effect an appellate court, has been a positive development. The panel
“has in effect become the rule and statutory interpreter of most
influence in the current system, but no longer deciding the outcome
of cases on grounds of proximate cause or ‘arising out of or in the
course of’ employment, except supposedly as based on legal
standards.” The Panel has also:

312

May DF v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo. App.
1988) (court discerning a “conscious legislative intent to abolish the previous
distinction between ultimate and evidentiary findings and to make any findings of
fact by the ALJ binding on the Panel, if they are supported by substantial evidence,
leaving only conclusions of law to be fully reviewed.”). See also Panera Bread,
LLC v. Indus. Claims Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 970, 972 (Colo. App. 2006) (in
horseplay case, court remarks, “Because the issues are factual in nature, they must
be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard . . . The evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we, like the
Panel, must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility
determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record . . . .”).
313 Memorandum from Tom Kanan, Esquire, Denver, CO to Author (Dec.
20, 2011) (on file with Author).
314 Wecker v. TBL Excavating, 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995).
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[G]reatly reduced the pressure on the Colorado Court
of Appeals by, over time, interpreting and applying
the Act and administrative rules in a legally
sophisticated and consistent manner. . . . [This has
been] much unlike the old Industrial Commission,
which was composed of political appointees, with no
requirement for legal expertise among them,
influenced by common sense and “fairness” good and
simple.315
Texas (1989). The elimination of the Texas “jury trial de
novo” is perhaps the most illustrious phenomenon of the counterreform. The jury trial and the preexisting administrative process
were displaced in a dramatic 1989 amendment. Now, after a
mandatory benefit review conference, a disputed case can proceed to
a contested case hearing. In this forum, the hearing officer is, for all
practical intents and purposes, the final fact-finder. The law, in this
regard, states, “The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance
and materiality of the evidence offered and of the weight and
credibility to be given to the evidence.”316
The Appeals Panel, which was created by the reform, is no
“rubber stamp,” but instead reviews the sufficiency of the facts under
a “clearly wrong and manifestly unjust” standard. 317 Some Appeals
Panel decisions refer to appeals taken on this basis as “great weight”
challenges.318 As discussed below, a modified jury trial de novo, of
limited character, endures. Contemporary observers posited that
315

Memorandum from Tom Kanan, supra note 313.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.165; Interview with Hon. Jennifer
Hopens, Hearing Officer, Tex. Dept. of Ins. (Aug. 29, 2011).
317 Texas Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n,
124 S.W.813, 823 (Tex. App. 2003).
318 Appeals Panel, Appeal No. 110382, p.2 (filed May 5, 2011) (holding
that the evidence did not support a 15% impairment rating, but only a 5%, and
hence that hearing officer was “clearly wrong”; and stating, “In reviewing a ‘great
weight’ challenge, we must examine the entire record to determine if: (1) there is
only ‘slight’ evidence to support the finding; (2) the finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly
unjust; or (3) the great weight and preponderance of the evidence supports its
nonexistence.”),
available
at
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/appeals/2011cases/110382r.pdf.
316
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these 1989 changes “creat[ed] a strong administrative agency to
oversee and improve the efficiency of the compensation system,”
with a “multitiered system of dispute resolution designed to resolve
more disagreements at the agency level.”319 According to one system
participant, the Appeals Panel in practice rarely disturbs the hearing
officer’s fact-findings. The “modified” jury trials de novo that are
potentially available, meanwhile, in practice unfold only rarely.320
Of course, when such a trial actually unfolds, the jury is in the
position to find facts. The reform statutory scheme that makes this
possible has been summarized as follows:
The Commission’s final decision may be appealed to
the courts under what might best be described as
modified de novo review. For all issues regarding
compensability of the injury (for example, whether it
occurred in the course and scope of employment) and
eligibility for and the amount of income and death
benefits, there is a right to trial by jury . . . . The party
appealing bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . . The jury, although
informed of the Commission decision, is not required
to accord it any particular weight . . . . Further, the
opinion of the designated doctor regarding impairment
is accorded no special weight.

319 William O. Ashcraft & Anita M. Allesandra, A Review of the New
Texas Workers’ Compensation System, 21 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 609, 610 (1990)
(reviewing background of amendments).
320 Interview with Hon. Jennifer Hopens, Hearing Officer, Tex. Dept. of
Ins. (Aug. 29, 2011). For a case where such trial did unfold, see State Office of
Risk Management v. Trujillo, 267 S.W.3d 349, 352-54 (Tex. App. 2008) (trial
court committed error in refusing to allow jury to hear testimony of employer’s
medical expert, who was to opine that claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not
work-related; court agreed with employer’s argument that it was not obliged to
have announced this expert in proceedings before the Appeals Panel, as it was
“entitled to de novo review and [its] . . . appeal should not be considered a
continuation of the administrative hearing.”) The court also noted that the “final
decision of the TDI-DWC appeals panel may be appealed to the district court level
under a ‘modified de novo review.’”).
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In determining the extent of impairment, however, the
jury must adopt the specific rating of one of the
physicians in the case . . . . Evidence of the extent of
impairment is limited to that presented to the
Commission unless the court makes a threshold
finding that the claimant’s condition has substantially
changed, in which case new impairment evidence may
be introduced . . . . If the parties dispute whether the
claimant’s condition has substantially changed, the
court must hear from the designated doctor, whose
opinion is controlling on this issue “unless the
preponderance of the other medical evidence is to the
contrary.” . . . . The court’s finding of substantial
change of condition is not revealed to the jury. . . .
[I]ssues other than compensability of the injury and
eligibility for and the amount of income and death
benefits are reviewed by the court under the
substantial evidence rule.321
This restructuring unfolded in the wake of cost and litigation
crises.322 With regard to litigation, the availability of trial de novo
was said to be abused, presumably by regular claimant demands for
jury trials in weak cases that had met with defeat during
administrative review. The “Texas trial de novo . . . abuses,” a critic
aligned with business interests asserts, “frankly had [an] organized
crime dimension[] . . . .”323 Whether or not this churlish statement is
321

Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex.

1995).
According to Larson, “the waste generated by the trial de novo process
prompted the amendments.” LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[7][d].
323 Robert B. Steggert, Cost Trends and Cost Drivers: An Employer’s
Perspective, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM? WHERE
ARE WE GOING? 72 (WCRI 2010).
A different view about the leveraging effect of the jury trial can be found
in Sam B. Barton, A Study of Administrative Improvements in Workmen’s
Compensation in Texas, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, 571, 579 n.10 (1973). Writing in
the early 1970s, Barton complained that employers would deny benefits to
322
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true, the Texas system developed a crisis that provoked a harsh, antilawyer/anti-litigation backlash.324
The background of the 1989 amendments may be ascertained
by review of a committee report prepared for the legislature in the
midst of the crisis. It states, in pertinent part, “[d]ue to the delay and
costs of the system’s first factfinding (the court trial), disputes are
resolved by compromises rather than application of the law to facts
established through formal procedures . . . .”325 Among the
suggestions for adjudicatory reform were the following:
[1] Provide for evidentiary hearings in the agency with
appeals to an appeals board within the agency.
Appellate review within the agency should be on law
and facts and on the record of the administrative
hearing. (No change in the [then-existing] pre-hearing
system).
[2] . . . Provide for review of agency decisions on
liability and compensation issues by the courts on the
record of the agency under the substantial evidence
standard.326
The latter suggestion, which the committee recommended,
allowed only for substantial evidence review in (presumably) the
county trial courts, after consideration of disputed cases by
administrative officers.
The committee, in voicing this

deserving workers and try to leverage them to compromise-settle their cases for
less than they were worth. A worker who could survive the delay attendant to the
denial could turn the tables and use the threat of the trial de novo to leverage a
higher settlement. “Contrary to academic orthodoxy,” Barton observed, “trial de
novo served the interests of the injured worker under the Texas system. At times,
the threat of a jury trial was the only effective restraint on the tendency of some
insurance companies to pay workers less than the law intended.” Id.
324 See generally Phil Hardberger, Texas Workers’ Compensation: A TenYear Survey – Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J.
1, 42 (2000). See also Ashcraft & Allesandra, supra note 319 (reviewing
background of amendments).
325 JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE:
A REPORT TO THE 71ST TEXAS LEGISLATURE 5 (Dec. 9, 1988).
326 Id. at 15.
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recommendation, actually offered four different variations. Jury trial
de novo was not, notably, mentioned in any of these variations. One
variation, which allowed for revisitation of the facts, came close to
what was ultimately adopted. As foreshadowed above, however, the
enduring availability of a modified jury trial de novo was later added.
The variation provided as follows:
Provide for review of liability and compensation
decisions [by the trial court] on both law and fact;
make the agency records admissible; the burden of the
appealing party is to show the agency erred, based on
the information before it at the time of the decision.327
This eventual retention of the jury trial, even in modified
form, was controversial at the time.328 The choice to retain review by
a jury, however, had its genesis in constitutionality concerns.329
The reforms were accompanied by severe restrictions on the
fees that attorneys could charge injured workers. This aspect of the
1989 amendments has reportedly created a shortage of lawyers for
such claimants. This lack of legal representation, critics complain,
can become a real problem when the administrative fact-finding
process is complete and the modified jury trial is pending. “Even if
an injured worker overcomes denials through three administrative
levels within the division, the insurance carrier can appeal for judicial
review in state court . . . . The claimant can win every issue in the
[administrative process] ‘only to lose on a default judgment in district
court solely due to lack of representation . . . .’”330 This critique
raises the issue of whether the adjudication reform pendulum swung
too violently in favor of employers.331

327

Id. (Emphasis added).
Ashcraft & Allessandra, supra note 319, at 627 (1990).
329 See supra Section IV(A).
330 Terry Carter, Insult to Injury: Texas Workers’ Comp System Denies,
Delays Medical Help, A.B.A
J. 42, 48 (Oct. 1, 2011) available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/insult_to_injury_texas_workers_comp
_system_denies_delays_medical_help/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=weekly_email.
331 An irony, meanwhile, is that the specter of court review now more
commonly leverages the claimant and not the employer. Arguably, the situation
328
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Nebraska (1992). The single trial judge of the sevenmember Workers’ Compensation Court is the final fact-finder under
the Nebraska Act. This has been the law since 1992, when the prior
practice of allowing a rehearing de novo by a three-judge review
panel was abolished.332 Under the current practice, the findings of
the trial judge are final, and the three-judge panel of the court
undertakes review of the decision under the “clearly wrong”
standard,333 that is, as if the adjudication was a “jury verdict.”334
This change in the system unfolded in the wake of a litigation
crisis, with backlogs of cases that had plagued the court for some
time. The elimination of de novo review “was intended to streamline
the system to bring a resolution to disputed cases in a more timely
fashion . . . [and] provide for a better organization of the legal
process . . . . ”335

could be remedied by making the Hearing Officer the final fact-finder in every
respect.
332 See, e.g., Phipps v. Milton G. Waldbaum & Co., 477 N.W.2d 919
(Neb.1991) (three-member panel on rehearing reversed trial judge; court describing
then-existing review standard).
333 Haworth v. Compass Group, No. A-08-865, 2009 Neb. App. LEXIS
51, *5 (Neb. Ct. App., Mar. 17, 2009) (“On appellate review, the factual findings
made by the trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of a
jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong . . . . ”). With regard to
the meaning of “clearly wrong,” “findings of the Workers' Compensation Court
unsupported by credible evidence are clearly wrong and will be set aside on
appeal.” Granados v. IBP, Inc., No. A-96-927, 1997 Neb. App. LEXIS 86, *19
(Neb. Ct. App. May 27, 1997). For case where the court agreed with the review
panel that the trial judge had been clearly wrong in one aspect of his award, see
Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 407 (Neb. 2005).
334 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (addressing appeals from WCC Review
Panel, and stating, “the judgment made by the compensation court after review
shall have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case. A judgment . .
. of the . . . court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds”
that court acted ultra vires, that fraud had occurred, or that “there is not sufficient
competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the . . . judgment . . .”).
Importantly, the revised scheme, which was perceived to feature an inconsistency,
received a definitive interpretation by the state supreme court, to this effect, in
Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co., 513 N.W.2d 361 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994).
335 Floor Debate, 92d Leg., 2d Sess. 11, 324 (March 25, 1992) (on file
with Author).
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West Virginia (1995). In 1995 the legislature in West
Virginia enacted legislation that reformed the compensation law.
According to the state supreme court, “The purported goal of these
sweeping reforms envisioned ameliorating the workers’
compensation fund’s fiscal crisis and restoring its financial
integrity.”336
The definitive contemporary analysis of the
amendment certainly confirms this assessment.337
Among the changes was making the ALJ of the Office of
Judges the final fact-finder. In making this change, the legislature
sought to streamline the litigation process.338 In this regard, the
revised law provides that the Board of Review, as it is currently
called, may reverse, vacate or modify the ALJ’s decision if his or her
findings are “[c]learly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record” or “[a]rbitrary and
capricious ….”339 Importantly, another statute altogether governs the
state supreme court’s review power over the decision of the Board of
Review.340
G. States Experiencing Institutional Change
Since the trend towards making the WCJ the final fact-finder
began, three states have undertaken fundamental institutional change.
These states, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming, all moved the
adjudication of contested workers’ compensation cases from civil
court to an administrative forum. In all three states, the WCJ was
Repass v. Workers’ Comp’n Div., 569 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 2002). See
also Blankenship v. Richardson, 474 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1996).
337 Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers’ Compensation
Reform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Legislation, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 23 (1995).
338 Id. at 188 (“The Administration sought to streamline the adjudicative
system by placing more authority with the Commissioner, at both the initial and
final levels of review . . . .”). Spieler questioned the fairness of this change, as
initially manifested, as it gave the same individual who was responsible for
payments out of the state fund authority over the adjudication system.
339 W. VA. CODE § 23-5-12(B)(5)-(6) (2011). For a case in which the
Supreme Court held that the Board of Review exceeded its power, see Fenton Art
Glass Co. v. West Virginia Office of Insurance Commissioner, 664 S.E.2d 761 (W.
Va. 2008).
340 W. VA. CODE § 23-5-15 (2011).
336
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invested with final fact-finding powers, and in all three, notably, no
intra-agency review was created. Instead, appeals from the WCJ in
each state are prosecuted directly to judicial review.
Louisiana (1983/1988).
The Office of Workers’
Compensation, now located in the Louisiana Workforce
Commission, dates from 1983, but WCJs of the system date from
1988. Since 1989 the WCJ has been the final fact-finder, and review
is undertaken by appeal directly to the court of appeals.341 Under the
Act, “factual findings . . . are subject to the manifest error-clearly
wrong standard of appellate review . . . . In applying [this] standard,
the appellate court must determine whether the fact finder’s
conclusion was reasonable, not whether the trier of fact was right or
wrong . . . .”342
The Larson treatise remarks that in Louisiana “the standard is
actively applied,” and it collects many cases that have been “reversed
because the trial court’s findings on medical and factual causation or
other issue were clearly erroneous.”343 In the present day, courts
state that they accord deference to the judge.344 Still, cases may be
341

The 1988 amendment created an intra-agency review panel, but this
panel was abolished by a law passed in 1989. See John Devlin, Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 51 LA L. REV. 295, 314, n.91 (1990). The governing statute is
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1310.5.
342
Bell v. Mid-City Printers, Inc., 54 So. 3d 1226 (La. Ct. App. 2010)
(“factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are subject to the manifest errorclearly wrong standard of appellate review…. In applying the manifest errorclearly wrong standard, the appellate court must determine whether the fact finder’s
conclusion was reasonable, not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong….”).
See also Chaisson v. Philip Services Corp., 917 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
343
LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6][d]. See, e.g., Britton v. Morton
Thiokol, Inc., 604 So.2d 130 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (applying clearly erroneous
standard, court states, “the conclusion of the hearing officer, at best, rests primarily
upon the statements of the chiropractor, Dr. Aaron, whose diagnosis is directly
contradicted by other objective evidence, and totally inconsistent and implausible
when compared with all of the medical testimony. Hence, the record discloses no
reasonable basis for the rejection of the preponderate medical evidence and for a
decision that, instead, returns plaintiff to light duty work. Consequently,
determining that the hearing officer's finding is clearly wrong in that respect, we
reverse the award of weekly benefits ….”).
344
Herrerea v. Cajun Co., 960 So. 2d 1161, 1166 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (in
case where WCJ credited claimant based in on observations of non-English
speaking claimant’s “demeanor and testimony and to evaluate his level of
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found where the court applies the clearly wrong standard and
reverses fact-findings in situations where a commission or court
applying the substantial evidence rule would not. In one case, the
court stated, “‘where documents or objective evidence so contradict
the witness’s story, or the story itself is so inconsistent or implausible
on its face that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's
story,’ even a finding purportedly based upon a credibility
determination may be deemed manifestly erroneous or clearly
wrong.”345
Under the 1983 reform, administrative hearing agents of the
Director had limited power; they were essentially mediators
undertaking informal dispute resolution.
If one of the parties
disagreed with the Director’s recommendations, he or she could seek
consideration de novo in the district court.346 In 1988 the law was
amended to create hearing officers with true adjudicatory power.347
At first, notably, an appellate entity within the agency was provided
for, but this was abolished in 1989. The original title of the judge
was hearing officer, but in 1997 the title was changed to WCJ.348
A cause célèbre unfolded after the 1988 enactment, as the
court of appeals declared the law unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court affirmed, on the narrow grounds that the legislature had
impermissibly deprived the civil courts of jurisdiction.
The
constitution, in this regard, provided that all civil matters were to be
heard in the district courts and, in the court’s view, workers’

understanding first-hand,” award would be affirmed, court remarking, “When
findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the
manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's
finding.”).
345
See, e.g., Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 56 So. 3d 215 (La. 2011)
(hearing officer found as fact that claimant had not promptly reported his injury
because he feared discharge; court reverses as clearly wrong) (quoting Rosell v.
ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989)).
346
Turner v. Md. Cas. Co., 518 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1988).
347
Ross v. Highland Ins. Co., 590 So. 2d 1177 (La. 1991).
348
Able v. La. Workers’ Comp. Corp., 702 So. 2d 1388, 1389 (La. 1997)
(Johnson, J., dissenting). In this case, the majority held that a WCJ could not hold
unconstitutional a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The dissent noted
that compensation hearing officers were indeed “judges,” that the state constitution
specifically sanctioned a special tribunal for compensation disputes, and concluded
as result that a WCJ should have such power.
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compensation cases were indeed civil matters. 349 The next month,
however, the state constitution was amended to permit adjudication
of workers’ compensation cases outside the civil system.350
Prior to this 1988 reform, the trial court was the final factfinder, and on appeal the appellate court applied the “manifest error”
or “clearly wrong” standard of review.351 The early 1983 reform,
which displaced this system, and the more fundamental 1988 reform,
reflected the legislature “respond[ing] to longstanding criticism of the
Louisiana system and [it] brought [the] system into line with that of
the vast majority of other states.”352 The changes also unfolded,
notably, in the midst of an insurance cost crisis – employers
experienced a 477% increase in the cost of insurance during the
period 1980 to 1990.353
New Mexico (1986). The New Mexico constitution was
amended in 1986 to allow the adjudication of workers’ compensation
cases by an administrative agency. A law providing for the same was
passed that year. The WCJ from the outset was final fact-finder. In a
1988 case, however, the state supreme court, in an articulate decision,
held that on appeal the standard of review is “whole record”
substantial evidence review.354
349

Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990).
Long v. Ins. Co. of No. America, 595 So. 2d 636 (La. 1992).
351
See, e.g., Harris v. La. Pac. Corp., 420 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App.
350

1982).
352

John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 LA. L. REV. 295, 314,
n.90 (1990).
353
See History of LWCC, “The Historical Timeline of LWCC,” available
at http://www.lwcc.com/content.cfm?id=19 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (stating, inter
alia, that in October 1990 the “Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation
(LWCC), a private nonprofit mutual insurance company, is created by a
constitutional amendment and legislation to save the state’s failed workers’
compensation system by tackling the factors that led to its demise and stabilizing
costs.”).
354
Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (court citing,
among others, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 71 S. Ct. 456 (U.S. 1951)). For a
case where the court, having undertaken whole record review, reversed the decision
of the WCJ, see Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 228 P.2d 525 (N.M. Ct. App.
2009). In this case, the claimant/appellee argued that adjudications over physician
choice under the New Mexico Act should be within the WCJ’s discretion, to avoid
appeals and delay. The court observed that the review of WCJ decisions was
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This reflected more rigorous review, notably, than that
undertaken when a case was adjudicated before a trial court in the
years before reform. In those days, the standard of review was
simply substantial evidence.355 The court in its 1998 case noted that
the whole record review it was imposing has its basis in the post-New
Deal concern that administrative agencies will abuse their power. “In
most cases,” the court stated, “the administrative agency performs
more than one function. It may be the complainant, the prosecutor,
and the fact finder. It is those dual roles that prompts the reviewing
court to closely scrutinize agency decisions, rather than acting as a
rubber stamp.”356
The genesis of workers’ compensation adjudication in an
administrative agency was fraught with trouble. An initial attempt, in
1957, by the legislature to transfer jurisdiction from the courts to the
executive branch met with failure when the governor vetoed the
legislation. He did so out of the same sort of constitutional concerns
that existed in Louisiana. In a consequent lawsuit, the state supreme
court sustained his decision, ruling that the creation of a commission
to resolve disputes “was an unconstitutional intrusion into the domain
of the judicial branch . . . .”357 A second attempt, coupled with a

substantial evidence on the whole record, and that a change such as that proposed
by claimant must be undertaken by the legislature.
355
See, e.g., Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 697 P.2d 156 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1985) (“It is then through this small aperture called appellate review that we
examine the evidence.”).
356
Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363, 367 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). We may
note editorially, however, that this concern is not, or should not, be applicable in
the workers’ compensation context. The present-day professional WCJ in New
Mexico, Pennsylvania – and everywhere – is supposed to be a neutral fact-finder
entertaining a dispute between two private parties over money. See supra Section
IV(B). Whole record review could be valuable in the name of accountability, but
of the individual judge, not the agency and its institutional interests.
357
NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT (PAUL L. HIAN, CHRIS GARCIA, AND
GILBERT K. ST. CLAIR, EDS.), p.287 (1994) (discussing State ex rel. Hovey
Concrete Products v. Mechem, 316 P.2d 1069 (S. Ct. New Mexico 1957), book
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=uc4ahQfT3rsC&pg=PA288&lpg=PA288&dq=n
ew+mexico+workers+compensation+supreme+court+1986&source=bl&ots=aUL
WHoI6Rr&sig=f7k2-CF3U4B6vHXtn1nyiYLcsg&hl=en&ei=OGPlTrLrG8fL0QH57djlBQ&sa=X&oi=book_res
ult&ct=result&resnum=3&sqi=2&ved (last visited Jan. 7, 2012),
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change to the constitution, in 1986, was successful. Ironically, just
before the voters passed the proposed amendment, the court
overruled Mechem and held that a workers’ compensation law would
not have offended the constitution.358 As for the legislative motive,
by one account, the populous had “suffer[ed] through nearly thirty
years of court administration. . . . [M]any complaints arose over the
courts’ handling of … claims. Many workers believed the courts
were too slow and too expensive. Others believed their decisions
were too costly to business . . . .”359
Wyoming (1986). The Hearing Examiner has been the final
fact-finder under the Wyoming Act since 1986. Prior to that time,
contested compensation cases were entertained by judges in the
district courts. The legislature in 1986 moved “. . . the adjudicatory
function . . . from our state district courts to the ‘office of
independent hearing officers.’”360 Appeals are brought to the district
courts which, like the state supreme court thereafter, undertake
substantial evidence review.361
This significant change was
accompanied by substantive changes to the law, said to have been
necessary because of a fiscal crisis with the state fund.362
The Wyoming statute maintains an unusual proviso whereby
a dispute can be referred to a medical panel for fact-finding. In this
regard:
If the percentage of physical impairment is disputed,
the division shall obtain a second opinion and if the
ratings conflict, shall determine the physical
impairment award upon consideration of the initial
and second opinion. Any objection to a final

358

Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 726 P.2d 1381 (N.M. 1986).
NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT (PAUL L. HIAN, CHRIS GARCIA, AND
GILBERT K. ST. CLAIR, EDS.) 287 (1994).
360
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Hollister, 794 P.2d
886, 888 (Wyo. 1990).
361
Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo.
1989).
362
George Santini, The Breaking of a Compromise: An Analysis of
Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Legislation, 1986-1997, 33 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 489, 494 (1998).
359
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determination pursuant to this subsection shall be
referred to the medical commission for hearing by a
medical hearing panel acting as hearing examiner . . .
.363
VI. LAW AND PRACTICE: STATES MAINTAINING THE ORTHODOX RULE
Twenty-five states, in the present day, hew, at least
nominally, to the orthodox rule that the WCJ is a subordinate officer
whose credibility determinations and finding of fact can be
overthrown upon intra-agency review (i.e., the Commission, as in
Arkansas), or trial court (as in Maryland). Among these are four of
the five states where a jury trial is permitted once the administrative
adjudication has been completed.364 This article has addressed Texas
in a prior section.365
In some states, the orthodox rule has endured in seemingly
pristine shape. Thus, the review commissions in Arkansas, Kansas,
Mississippi, and New Hampshire, among others, are characterized as
undertaking de novo review. Perhaps the system of the latter state is
the most true to the original model of many decades ago. A
practitioner reports:
[As] a practical matter, the hearings before the New
Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board are purely
de novo. Neither the prior decision nor the transcript
of the hearing are allowed into evidence. (Transcripts
are used to impeach.) The evidence from the initial
hearing must be presented again, and the board makes
its own, independent rulings and decision. They do
not expressly reject prior findings or overturn the prior
decision. Frequently, the Board will reach factual
determinations that are different from the
department’s findings . . . .366
363

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-405(m) (West 2011). As for the
composition and duties of the medical panel, see id. § 27-14-616.
364
These states are Maryland, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington.
365
See supra Section V.
366
Memorandum from Edward W. Stewart, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 10,
2011) (on file with Author). Mr. Stewart adds that, given this process of review,
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In other states in this category, fact-finding power has been
limited, usually in the interest of streamlining litigation. As noted
previously in this article, in Illinois the Industrial Commission is the
fact-finder, but the parties as of 1989 may no longer, on review,
submit new evidence for consideration.367 In Georgia, the Board is
the fact-finder, but review is not de novo. Instead, the ALJ’s findings
are to be accepted when “. . . supported by a preponderance of
competent and credible evidence . . . .”368
In analyzing WCJ fact-finding power, an essential question is
the frequency with which the commission actually exercises its
powers, reassesses the facts, and materially changes the outcome.
Importantly, simply because a state statute provides that the
commission may reassess credibility, one cannot infer that routine
overthrow of the initial WCJ findings is the actual custom and
practice. In fact, in many states the practice is rare.
For example, California cases can be found where the
Appeals Board substitutes its judgment for that of the WCJ.369 Still,
lawyers report that such an act is a rare phenomenon,370 particularly
as the state supreme court had admonished the Board years ago that
credibility should be for the hearing officer:
Although the board is entitled to reject the referee’s
findings on credibility matters if substantial evidence
supports contrary findings, the degree of substantiality
required to sustain the board in such cases should be
“Since we previously tried the case, we can work with the evidence and our clients
to correct prior deficiencies.” Id.
367
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7040.40 (2012).
368
GA . CODE ANN. § 34-9-103 (West 2011).
369
See, e.g., Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(Palacio), 2005 Cal. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (WCJ, crediting
employer witnesses, ruled that claimant had not shown that he was employee of
putative employer; WCAB, however, reassessing evidence, legitimately granted
reconsideration and reversed, finding that claimant was in fact employee of
putative employer – court noting that “Appeals Board has the authority to reweigh
the evidence following … independent examination of the record to reach a
conclusion which differs from that of the WCJ.”).
370
Memorandum from Ms. Leslie S. Shaw, Esquire, to Mark Cowger,
Esquire (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).
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greater than that afforded by the evidence relied upon
herein. As stated [previously] by this court . . . with
respect to review of referee’s findings in habeas
corpus cases, “A referee’s findings of fact are, of
course, not binding on this court, and we may reach a
different conclusion on an independent examination of
the evidence produced at the hearing he conducts even
where the evidence is conflicting. However, where
the findings are supported by ‘ample, credible
evidence’ . . . or ‘substantial evidence’ . . . they are
entitled to great weight . . . because of the referee’s
'opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
and weigh their statements in connection with their
manner on the stand . . . .”371
As discussed below, on the other hand, states can be
identified where a commission does, on occasion, or even with some
frequency, utilize its fact-finding powers.
How often a commission reassesses credibility may also turn
on how “political” the current collection of members is behaving.
One will hear, on occasion, that “workers’ compensation is so
political.” This statement (or cliché) may have many dimensions, but
in the realm of fact-finding, it usually suggests that the process is
highly influenced by the proclivities of the commission members
who have most recently been appointed by the Governor. In recent
years, for example, some members of the claimants’ bar insist that
the Mississippi Commission, which is composed of political
appointees, is biased in favor of the employers’ side.372 Another such
assertion was made by an Arkansas claimants’ attorney, who filed a
legal ethics complaint against two Arkansas Commission members,
claiming that they and other commission officials were “. . .
excessively pro-employer and are trying to drive him out of workers
comp practice.”373 Participants in the Iowa system, meanwhile, told

371

Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 475 P.2d 451, 456 (Cal.

372

See infra Section VI(B).
Doug Smith & Max Brantley, Lawyer Files Ethics Complaint Against
Comp Commission, ARKANSAS TIMES (Apr. 7, 2005),

1970).
373

Workers
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WCRI researcher Ballantyne “. . . that the politically appointed
appellate person (the division commissioner) can influence the value
of cases depending on the leanings of the appointing governor.”374
The Author’s analysis in the next two sections is based on
interviews as opposed to a crunching of hard numbers.375 A more
definitive analysis would, of course, involve a study of reversal and
decision modification rates. This is a statistic that can be located in a
number of states, in resources such as annual reports as published on
state agency websites. A review of such data, however, can leave the
discrete question of substitution of credibility determinations
hanging. This is so as reversal and modification rates, even when
reported, do not usually set forth the reasons for such alteration.
A. Commissions/Courts That Rarely Reassess Credibility
Indiana. Workers’ compensation claims under the Indiana
Act are litigated before a single member of the Workers’
Compensation Board, with appeal thereafter to the full board. The
review before the Board is de novo; 376 and it may even accept further
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/lawyer-files-ethics-complaint-against-workerscomp-commission/Content?oid=868487
374
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN IOWA:
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 92 (Workers Compensation Research Institute ed.,
2004).
375
The Author and his assistant sought to interview or correspond with at
least two specialists in the field for each state. The same answer was not always
provided, but the findings set forth above suggest what seems to be the consensus
view. The Author welcomes corrections or differing views.
376 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-3 (LexisNexis 2011). See ACLS v. Bujaroski, 904
N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Eades v. Lucas, 23 N.E.2d 273,
276 (Ind. Ct. App.1939) (“If such an application is duly filed, any action of the
hearing member disposing of a controversy on its merits ceases to be effective for
any purpose and leaves the status of the parties unchanged . . . . [A]ll parties to the
proceeding are bound to know that a new finding and award to be made by the full
board is necessary; that said board neither affirms nor reverses an award made by
one member, but ‘shall review the evidence, or, if deemed advisable, hear the
parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses, and make an award and file the
same with the finding of the facts on which it is based . . .’ Where an application
for review of an award by one member is filed, the application . . . then stands for
hearing before the full board, and is to be heard de novo.”)). See also, e.g., Shultz
Timber v. Morrison, 751 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (court remarking, “.
. . the Board has an obligation to enter specific findings of basic facts to support its

114

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

evidence,377 but it rarely does so.378 The Board, further, would only
very rarely reverse the credibility determinations of one of its single
members.379
Maryland. Under the Maryland statute, the adjudication of
the Maryland Commissioner is subject to appeal to the trial court, and
a jury may even be empanelled to reassess witness credibility and the
facts.380 “With 75 years of extensive case law behind it,” one court
declared, “the plenary availability of trial de novo at the circuit court
level is not to be doubted, even if its statutory pedigree is more
implicit than explicit.”381 According to Chief Commissioner Karl
Aumann, however, only 6% of commissioner decisions are appealed,
and of these, 50% are settled prior to trial.382 Thus, the trial judge or

finding of ultimate fact and conclusion of law . . . . The Board's findings must be
stated with sufficient specificity upon contested issues so as to allow intelligent
review by a reviewing court.”).
377
631 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-1-15 (West 2011).
378
Memorandum from Sharon F. Murphy, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6,
2011) (on file with Author).
379
Memorandum from Sharon F. Murphy, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6,
2011) (on file with Author). Memorandum from G. Terence Coriden, Esquire, to
Author (Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with Author).
380
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b),(c) (West 2011). The
formal term in Maryland is not “appeal,” but, instead, “petition for judicial review.”
Comments of Mr. Richard Lafata, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with
Author).
381
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bark, 555 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. 1989).
382
Chief Commissioner R. Karl Aumann, Remarks while sitting on the
Comparative Law Panel Nat’l Ass’n of Workers’ Comp. Judiciary Coll. (Aug. 22,
2011) (on file with Author). For a tour de force case in which the trial court came
to a different factual conclusion from that of the Commission, see Bd. of Educ. v.
Spradlin, 867 A.2d 370 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). There, the Commissioner
determined that the claimant, who had been injured in an altercation with a coworker, did not suffer an injury arising in the course of employment. The trial
judge, after a bench trial, determined the opposite. In the course of a long opinion
affirming, the appeals court stated, among other things, “[s]ince both the initial fact
finder and the supervening fact finder enjoy the same prerogative independently to
assess credibility and independently to weigh evidence, they may with equal
validity reach different conclusions even upon the same record. A fortiori, they
may do so when the witnesses testify afresh at the trial de novo, quite possibly with
differences the second time around both in the substance of their testimony and in
their demeanors as they testify.” Id. at 378, n.4.
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jury, the ultimate fact-finder, in the vast majority of cases will never
have an opportunity to exercise its power.
Missouri. Under the Missouri Act, the Commission, not the
ALJ, is the “. . . sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the
weight and value to give to the evidence.”383 The same opinion
recounts the rules that the “. . . Commission, as the finder of fact, is
free to believe or disbelieve any evidence . . . . [I]n conducting our
review, this Court reviews the findings of the Commission; however,
‘[i]f the Commission incorporates the [ALJ’s] opinion and decision,
the reviewing court will consider the Commission’s decisions as
including those of the [ALJ].”384
Still, appellate court opinions have stressed for a number of
years the importance of deference to the hearing officer who actually
encountered the witness. “We agree . . . ,” a recent court opinion
announced, that the “. . . Commission should duly consider an ALJ’s
credibility determinations, and should articulate any reasons for
differing therefrom as an aid to judicial review;” and the Commission
cannot “. . . callously ignore, capriciously reject, or arbitrarily
disregard . . .” the fact-findings of the ALJ.385 The leading case that
informs this thinking dates from 1995:
However, to say that the Commission is not obligated
or bound to defer to the ALJ’s credibility
determinations is not to say they may be slighted or
ignored, either by the Commission or the appellate
court. Credibility is clearly a consideration for both
the ALJ and the Commission, and the Commission
should not make its credibility calls in a vacuum . . ..
Furthermore, in reviewing the award of the ALJ, the
Commission should properly consider that the ALJ

383

Vice v. Advantage Waste Servs., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2009).
384

Id. See MO. ANN. STAT § 287.495 (West 2011).
Garrett v. Treasurer of Missouri, 215 S.W.3d 244, 247, 250 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (quoting Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 570-71, 574
(Mo. Ct. App.1995)). Nevertheless, the “. . . Commission need not defer to ALJ
findings, credibility or otherwise, but is authorized to reach its own decisions.” Id.
at 247.
385
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“had the witnesses before him and was thus in a
position which gave him a great vantage ground over
the members of the Commission who afterwards had
[only] the opportunity of reading [a transcript of] the
testimony.”386
Veterans of Missouri practice report that it is rare for the
Commission to reassess credibility. “Seldom,” one defense lawyer
writes, “will you see the commission take issue with any credibility
findings the judge makes on the live witnesses, because, I believe,
they think the judge is in the superior position to make that call.”387
A claimant’s attorney, meanwhile, reports that the “Commission is
required to defer to the ALJ on credibility determinations of
witnesses that testify in-person. While this deference is not absolute,
I would say that it is ‘rare’ . . . for the Commission to reverse an ALJ
on the credibility determination of [such] a witness.”388
Treatise writer Korte remarked that the Commission in recent
years has “made it clear, in both public and private statements, that it
did not intend to go out of its way to reverse ALJ awards on any

386

Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 569 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995). The state supreme court, in a subsequent decision, modified the case
somewhat for the manner in which the appellate court reviews the Commission’s
final fact-findings. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23
(Mo. 2003) (“A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains
sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether
the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence . . . . Whether the
award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining
the evidence in the context of the whole record. An award that is contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent
and substantial evidence.”). In Hampton, the ALJ granted benefits, but limited
them to permanent partial disability. The Commission reassessed credibility,
including that of the claimant, and awarded permanent total disability. The
Commission was affirmed despite an employer argument that the award “. . . was
not supported by competent and substantial evidence and the award was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Id. at 221.
387
Memorandum from Kip Kubin, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on
file with Author).
388
Memorandum from Todd C. Werts, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire
(Dec. 2, 2011) (on file with Author).
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basis – it believed in the importance of letting the ALJs do their jobs
without fear of undue interference.”389 He continues:
[W]hen this Commission has reversed an ALJ’s
credibility findings, it has almost always been very
careful to point to specific inconsistencies between the
testimony of the witness and other evidence in the
record (usually medical evidence or the witness’s
deposition testimony) as the basis for its reversal. The
commission has consistently refrained from making
judgment calls based [on] such things as a witness’s
interest in the outcome of the claim, and . . . never on
the witness’s appearance, attitude or demeanor.390
Missouri experts stress, however, that both the Commission and
Appeals Court have a somewhat different rule when it comes to
assessing the credibility of experts, such as physicians who testify via
deposition. In this realm, they accord less deference to factfindings.391
New York. Under New York law, the Board “[is] not bound
by the WCLJ’s credibility determinations and [is] entitled to make its
own findings.”392 The Board possesses “broad authority to resolve
factual issues based on credibility of witnesses and draw any
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.”393
According to one WCLJ, “it is exceedingly rare [though not
unheard of] that [the Board] would disturb a well-supported
credibility finding.”394 An experienced defense lawyer posits, on the

389

Id.
Memorandum from Michael Korte, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 7, 2011)
(on file with Author).
391
See infra Section VII(B).
392
In re Ortiz v. Five Points Correctional Facility, 762 N.Y.S.2d 535
(2003). The statute that provides for the powers and duties of the New York
Board’s judges is found at N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 150 (McKinney 2006).
393
In re Myers v. Eldor Contracting Co., 705 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (N.Y.
2000).
394
Memorandum from Hon. John Farrell to the Author (Aug. 26, 2011)
(on file with Author).
390
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other hand, that “Board reversals of WCLJs on credibility questions
occur more than just occasionally.”395
One of the Board’s “guiding principles” since 2008 has been
to recall that the judge “is in the best position to review credibility,”
and hence that a “reversal on credibility should be based on (a) a
specific inconsistency, or (b) otherwise state why a witness is found
to be incredible, or (c) otherwise state why a witness is found to be
credible, which is supportable by the record. It should not be merely
conclusory.”396 This principle also provides that “[i]n reversing, the
writer or commissioner should state that basis clearly.”397
Oregon. Under the Oregon Act, “The board engages in that
same weighing [of evidence] in its own evaluation of the record on
de novo review.”398 Specialists in the field, however, report that
reassessments of credibility are relatively rare. According to a

395

Memorandum from Ronald A. Weiss, Esq., to the Author (Jan. 11,
2012) (on file with Author). For cases where the Board reassessed credibility and
reversed the WCLJ’s decision, see Pavone v. Advance Auto Parts, 912 N.Y.S.2d
771 (N.Y. 2010) (WCLJ found as fact that claimant injured his back while lifting
and loading auto parts, but Board reversed, stating, “Although there is conflicting
testimony in the record regarding the nature and frequency of the deliveries, lifting
and loading that claimant performed, we accord deference to the Board’s credibility
determinations and its resolution of conflicting evidence.”); Caballero v. Fabco
Enters., 909 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. 2010) (reversing WCLJ’s rejection of claimant’s
testimony that she was “injured when she failed to navigate between a shoe display
and a large box and she fell into the box,” Board found that she did suffer such
injury); Fortunato v. Opus III VII Corp., 867 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. 2008) (crediting
claimant, a salesman, WCLJ found that he “suffered injuries after he was struck by
a car as he attempted to cross a street while out on a sales call,” but the Board
found him not credible).
396
NEW YORK WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES
(as summarized in a Memorandum to the Author from Timothy P. Schmidle, Ph.D.
(Aug. 30, 2011) (on file with Author)).
397
Id.
398
Pietrzykowski v. Albertsons, Inc., 157 P.3d 1268 (Or. 2007). See OR.
REV. STAT. § 656.295(6) (2011). When the WCRI assessed the Oregon system in
1995, they considered the rate of appeals from ALJ decisions to the Board to be
high. According to the authors, “system participants have several explanations for
the appeal rate. First, the review is de novo based upon the written record ….”
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & JAMES F. DUNLEAVY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN
OREGON: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 101 (Workers Compensation Research
Institute ed., 1995).
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veteran practitioner, “If an ALJ has made a credibility determination,
the Board will give deference to it and reversal of such is rare. If the
ALJ did not make a specific credibility determination, the Board will
review the record and make its own determination.”399 Another
expert states, “The Board takes the role of the ALJs seriously when
they make credibility assessments . . .. That being said there are times
when the Board will look at contemporaneous records or other parts
of the transcript to make its own credibility determinations . . .. [T]he
Board rarely reverses an ALJ when that ALJ specifically makes a
credibility determination as part of the opinion, particularly based
upon demeanor.”400
South Carolina. Under the South Carolina Act, the
“Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact finder . . . and is not bound by
the Single Commissioner's findings of fact . . .. The final
determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded
evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel.”401 A veteran claimant’s
attorney, however, reports that “credibility findings made by the
original hearing commissioner are rarely overturned by the
commission’s appellate panel.”402 A defense attorney agrees, stating
that for the full commission to reverse “is very rare in South
Carolina. Our commission is relatively collegial and I think they give
great weight to the findings of the single commissioner on credibility

399

Memorandum from Chris Frost, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire
(Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).
400
Memorandum from Aaron Clingerman, Esquire, to Mark Cowger,
Esquire (Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author). Mr. Clingerman reports that the
Oregon Board often signals its deference to the ALJ by recognizing a leading
appellate case that emphasizes the importance of the ability of the judge to have
assessed demeanor. See Erck v. Brown Oldsmobile, 815 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Or.
1991) (remarking, “Claimant is correct in his argument that on de novo review, a
reviewing entity normally gives deference to findings made below, especially when
they relate to witness credibility.”).
401
Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (S.C. Ct. App.
2004). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3-20 (C) (2011).
402
Memorandum from Ken W. Harrell, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Nov. 14, 2011) (on file with Author).
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issues. On matters of law or non-credibility findings they are more
apt to reverse.”403
Another defense attorney advised this Author that the full
commission will indeed, on occasion, reverse on credibility.404 He
recounted a recent case in which the claimant testified that he had
injured his leg when he fell from a tree in the midst of his work. The
evidence of the employer (whom he represented) was that claimant
had been dared to jump twenty feet on a bet of $20.00. The single
commissioner credited the claimant, but the full commission, on a
“cold record,” believed the employer’s witnesses and disallowed the
claim.405
Utah. Under the Utah Act, the Appeals Board of the
Commission is the final fact-finder. “[T]he Commission,” indeed,
“need not hold further hearings, and in its review of the record made
before the Administrative Law Judge, may make its own findings on
the credibility of the evidence presented.”406
Still, workers’

403

Memorandum from O. Shayne Williams, Esquire, to Mark Cowger,
Esquire (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).
404
Interview with Mikell H. Wyman, Esquire (Aug. 22, 2011) (on file
with Author). Mr. Wyman ventured that reversals on the grounds of credibility
were “somewhere in between” the proffered choices of rare or occasional.
405
Zepeda-Cepeda v. Priority Landscaping and Lawn Care, No. 2011-UP229, 2011 S.C. App. LEXIS 266, *8 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) ( rejecting claimant’s
arguments that employers witnesses were not credible: “In workers’ compensation
cases, the Full Commission is the ultimate fact finder . . . .The final determination
of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Full
Commission.”) (quoting Shealy v. Aiken County, 532 S.E.2d 438 (S.C. 2000)).
406
Gates v. Labor Comm’n, No. 20010943-CA, 2002 Utah App. LEXIS
268 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 607 P.2d
807, 811 (Utah 1980)) (rejecting claimant’s argument that he was “substantially
prejudiced by the Commission's decision to substitute its own findings and
conclusions for those of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) . . . .”). In that case,
an ALJ found that the claimant, Anderson, was not an employee, but instead an
independent contractor of defendant, Gates Sr. The Commission reversed, finding
that Anderson was indeed an employee of that defendant. The court was of the
view that employer’s appeal was deficient, as it failed to acknowledge the evidence
that the Commission had relied upon. “In the absence of properly marshaled
evidence,” the court stated, “even though the evidence relied upon by Gates Sr.
might support a different finding, we must assume that the Commission's findings
are correct.” Id. at *3.
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compensation lawyers find that the Appeals Board substitutes its
findings only on a rare or occasional basis.407
Virginia.
The findings of the Deputy Commissioner in
Virginia may be overthrown by the full commission,408 but in
practice reassessment of credibility is said to be rare.409 Still, Deputy
Commissioners are typically cautious in this regard, and will often be
mindful to phrase findings of fact in explicit credibility terms to
avoid reversal. One of the Virginia Commissioners, in seeming
For a case that construed an earlier version of the law, to the same effect,
see U.S. Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (S. Ct. Utah 1980)
(“Our statutes do not mandate or indicate that the Commission is bound by the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge when the evidence is conflicting. On the
contrary, Section 35-1-82.54 provides that when a case is referred to the full
Commission, it shall review the entire record, and may make its own findings of
fact and enter its award thereon. In doing so it may, in its discretion, take further
evidence.”).
407
Memorandum from Philip B. Shell, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire
(Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author); Memorandum from K. Dawn Atkin,
Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author);
Memorandum from Richard R. Burke, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Nov. 10,
2011) (on file with Author).
408
Karban v. Universal Fiber Systems, No. 2094-09-3, 2010 Va. App.
LEXIS 274 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-201(2005) (entitled,
“General duties and powers of the Commission”).
409
Memorandum from Ms. Annie Williams to Author (Nov. 10, 2011) (on
file with Author) (quoting Dan Lynch, Esquire). According to Ms. Williams,
reassessment of credibility and the fact is
rare if non-existent . . . The three Commissioners almost always
rely on the facts as presented to the Deputy Commissioners. They
believe that the Deputy Commissioners are better able to judge
the credibility of the witnesses, claimant, etc. as they saw the
testimony in person and determined the facts below. Most of the
appeals that go to the full Commission are regarding
interpretation of the statutes and rules rather than facts. As an
addition, in Virginia, from the level of the full Commission,
cases can be appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals and they
absolutely never look at facts, only matters of law.
Id.; Memorandum from Robert Rapaport, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 22, 2011) (on
file with Author) (“The rule for the VWC is to give deference to the Deputy
Commissioner’s finding on credibility. I believe it is safe to say that the full
Commission rarely reverses a Deputy’s finding on credibility.”).
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acknowledgement of the Deputy Commissioner’s ability to better
judge credibility, will likely remand a case where the fact-finding
process seems incomplete or yielded a result that is somehow
unsatisfactory.410These behaviors are likely informed by the courts’
emphasis on the common law precept about the importance of
assessing demeanor:
Although the commission is not bound by the
credibility determination of a deputy commissioner,
the commission cannot reject the determination
arbitrarily . . . . “If the commission does not follow
the deputy commissioner’s findings when these
findings are based on a determination of a key
witness’s demeanor or appearance in relation to
credibility, the commission must offer a rationale for
its reversal and demonstrate on the record how the
commission found the evidence [in]credible.”411
B. Commissions That Reassess Credibility With Some Frequency
A number of states are better known as having commissions
or boards that are willing, with some regularity, to reassess WCJ
credibility determinations and alter awards as a consequence.
However, one should recognize that, simply because a commission
may potentially exercise its credibility reassessment powers, hardly
means that the judge and the parties do not approach trial with
seriousness. As one respected judge remarked to this Author, for
example, being reversed on credibility is a gravely considered matter.
“My response” in such situations, he quipped, is that “the decision
was right when it left my desk.”
It is likely that some WCJs in this position chafe at having
their findings reassessed, reversed, or changed by commission
members. This is so because, in the present day, the WCJ will likely
be a career professional. He or she will hence be an expert in both
the law and in the craft of decision-making. The commission
410

Interview with Hon. James Szablewicz, Virginia Chief Deputy
Commissioner (Aug. 23, 2011).
411
Karban, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 274. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-201
(2005) (entitled, “General duties and powers of the Commission”).
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member in charge of reviewing the case, in contrast, may not
necessarily bear these traits because of the political nature of the
office.
Arkansas. The Arkansas Commission is “the fact finder, and
as such has a duty and statutory obligation to make specific findings
of fact on de novo review based on the record as a whole . . . .”412
Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determinations and findings may be
overthrown upon review. Such an action is said to occur on
occasion, though as might be expected, the percentage varies among
the thirteen Arkansas ALJs.413 A change in the appellate structure
occurred in 1979, when appeals ceased going to county circuit courts.
Appeals from the Commission are now prosecuted directly to the
court of appeals.414
The ability of the Commission to overrule credibility
determinations has been treated in the state supreme court. In a 1987
opinion, a concurring justice objected to the redundancy of factfinding at two levels, particularly when the Commission did not see
or hear the witnesses, and because the Commission was a political
entity.415 Superimposed upon this unsatisfactory state of affairs was
412

Wilson v. Cargill, Inc., 873 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994)
(italics in original).
413
Memorandum of James A. Arnold, II, Esquire, to Mark Cowger,
Esquire. (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with the Author).
414
See Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enter’s, 816 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1991).
The court noted that its scope review consists of reviewing the Commission’s
decision and, in addition:
ignoring the findings of the ALJs . . . While we have gone so far
as to allow the Commission to rely on an ALJ’s stated
perceptions of the ”demeanor, conduct, appearance, or reaction at
the hearing,” it has not been held that a court may use an ALJ’s
remarks to reverse a credibility determination made by the
Commission.
Id. at 877.
Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 733 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1987)
(Newbern, J., concurring). With regard to the political make-up of the commission,
the concurring opinion stated:
415

Requiring management and labor representatives on such a
reviewing body, so analogous to a court, is like assuring that our
court of appeals or this court be composed of equal numbers of
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the fact that the judging of compensation cases had become
professionalized, with the title “referee” changed to ALJ, and with
the ALJ exclusively undertaking the actual personal exposure to the
parties’ witnesses.416 However, when the court again squared upon
this issue just four years later, it declined to overthrow the statute.417
The court relied upon stare decisis, but noted also that the U.S.
Supreme Court had ratified the idea that an administrative agency
may legitimately overthrow the findings of its subordinate agent.418

plaintiffs’ advocates and defendants’ advocates in tort cases. In
any body exercising the function of legal review, the public is
entitled to, and should, demand the putting aside of social
philosophies which are the stuff of legislation . . . .
Id. at 728.
416

Id. at 727-28. The justice stated, among other things:

It would surely be wasteful . . . to hold the hearing with the live
witnesses a second time, so the decision of the commission is
much like that of an appellate court; it operates from a cold, or at
best, warmed-over, record [created by the ALJ] . . . .
T]he ALJ position has been upgraded. The ALJ is no longer just
an aide to the commission or a referee . . . .
Despite the fact that it is the ALJ who hears the witnesses and
has the opportunity to see them face to face, we persist in
holding that his or her decision is meaningless when a decision
of the commission is on appeal . . . .
[W]e should be thinking of creating a system in which the
decisions of the ALJs are like those of juries, to the extent that
the factual determinations should be reviewed only to determine
if they are supported by substantial evidence . . . .
Id. See also Hamby v. Everett, 627 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ark. Ct. App 1982) (Glaze,
J., dissenting) (“How this rule on review has become so well established is a real
conundrum . . . . [A] Board or Commission which reviews a cold record on appeal
is in a poor position to weigh the credibility of any witness.”).
417
Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 816 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1991).
418
Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 71 S. Ct. 456 (U.S.
1951)).
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Georgia. The ALJ of the Georgia Board is not the final factfinder. Upon the losing party’s appeal, the three-member Board (the
Appellate Division), though not undertaking de novo review, may
reassess credibility. The statute provides that the “findings of fact
made by the administrative law judge . . . shall be accepted by the
appellate division where such findings are supported by a
preponderance of competent and credible evidence ….”419 The
change from de novo review to the present law occurred in 1994.
The well-respected Georgia Board is known to reassess the
facts on occasion.420 A veteran Atlanta attorney posits that the
“Board can, and does, act to reverse some ALJ decisions, but not
strictly because it simply interprets the evidence differently. Rather,
I think the Appellate Division takes very seriously the notion that the
ALJ is in the best position to view the evidence and make factual
determinations.”421 The Board will, he continues, “review the totality
of the evidence to determine if it supports the particular legal issues
and burdens of proof involved and, on occasion, will find the
evidence lacking. In my experience, that is not a common
occurrence, and is not done unless there is a fairly obvious and
legally significant flaw in the underlying evidence.”422
With regard to the change from de novo review, the likely
intent “was to reduce to some degree the appeals of ALJ decisions
which, under a true ‘de novo’ system, virtually assured an appeal in

419

GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-103 (2009). For a case in which the Board
reversed the ALJ’s finding with regard to the occurrence of a traumatic back injury,
see Georgia Mountain Excavation, Inc. v. Dobbins, 710 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2011) (noting, “‘the Appellate Division is authorized to assess witness
credibility, weigh conflicting evidence, and draw factual conclusions different from
those reached by the [administrative law judge] who initially heard the dispute.’”
(citation omitted)).
420
Memorandum of Gary M. Kazin, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire
(Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author); Memorandum of Kelley Benedict, Esquire, to
Mark Cowger, Esquire (Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author).
421
Memorandum of Dan Kniffen, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on
file with Author). The Chair of the Georgia Board concurred with Mr. Kniffen’s
assessment. Memorandum of Hon. Rick Thompson, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on
file with Author).
422
Id.
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every case.”423 WCRI researchers, reflecting on the change in 1995,
observed that it came in the wake of a cost and litigation crisis—in
the 1980s “[b]oth indemnity and medical costs spiraled upward,
attorney involvement and hearing requests increased significantly,
and lump sum settlements occurred even more frequently.”424 An
earlier, pre-reform WCRI study commenting upon de novo review,
found that “[m]ost public and private respondents characterize this as
‘a second bite of the apple.’” Still, “Although many public and
private respondents express some dissatisfaction with de novo
review, they do not consider it a significant problem.”425
Illinois. Reassessment of the facts is said to occur with some
regularity under the Illinois practice. In that state, cases are litigated
before an Arbitrator of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.
After the Arbitrator issues his decision, review (not “appeal”) may be
undertaken by the Commission, which has “original jurisdiction” and
is not bound by credibility determinations of the Arbitrator.426 The
Act does provide that, “Whenever the Commission adopts part of the
Arbitrator’s decision, but not all, it shall include in the order the
reasons for not adopting all of the Arbitrator’s decision.”427 An
appeal thereafter may be taken to the district court, and then to the
appellate courts.428 The Commission is the final fact-finder. The

423

Memorandum of Dan Kniffen, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on
file with Author).
424
JOHN A. GARDNER, CAROL A. TELLES & GRETCHEN A. MOSS, COST
DRIVERS AND SYSTEM CHANGE IN GEORGIA, 1984-1994 32 (1995).
425
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & STACEY M. ECCLESTON, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION IN GEORGIA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 72 (Workers
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1992).
426
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/19. See R&D Thiel v. Illinois Workers’
Comp. Comm’n (Robledo), 923 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. 2010) (noting that the
“Commission exercises original jurisdiction and is not bound by an arbitrator’s
findings,” and that “when, as in this case, the Commission gives its reasons for
making credibility findings contrary to those made by the arbitrator, our inquiry on
review is whether the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”).
427

Id.
For a broad overview, see Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation
Reviews and Appeals: A Review and Suggestions for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
493 (2002).
428
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court, on appeal from the Commission decision, accords deference to
the Commission decision and rarely reverses.429
Prior to 1989, the Commission could accept certain additional
evidence not presented to the Arbitrator. In that year, the law was
amended to disallow such post hoc submissions.430 A 1984
amendment, notably for the first time, disallowed the practice of
freely submitting any evidence to the Commission.431 One reason for
these changes was expediting litigation in the midst of a litigation
crisis;432 a related concern was that the ability to submit evidence
upon review led to lawyers intentionally withholding vital evidence
until the case reached the Commission stage.433
According to a number of attorney reports, from to twenty to
thirty-three percent of Arbitrator decisions are modified on review by
the Commission.434
An attorney summarizing the Industrial
Commission’s 2008 statistics stated as follows:
Interestingly, when an injured worker filed an appeal
to the Review level before the Commissioners,
benefits were increased only 15% of the time. In
appeals by the worker, benefits were actually reversed
or decreased in 13% of the cases. The great majority
of appeals by the worker resulted in no change of the
Arbitration Decision in 72% of decisions in appeals
filed by the employee.
429

Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on
file with Author). For composition of the Commission, see § 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/13.
430
Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation Reviews and Appeals: A
Review and Suggestions for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 493 (2002).
431
See Adams Truck Lines v. Indus. Comm’n , 550 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill App.
Ct. 1990) (Barry, P.J., concurring).
432
Id. (concurring) (stating, in reference to 1984 amendment, “Against
this backdrop of an increasing caseload and a lengthening delay between the filing
of cases and their final resolution, the legislature amended” the law).
433
Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (on
file with Author).
434
Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on
file with Author); Comments of David Menchetti, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28,
2011) (on file with Author); Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esquire, to Author (Nov.
28, 2011) (on file with Author).
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In employer appeals to the Review stage, benefits
were affirmed almost 66% of the time. However, the
employer was successful in obtaining a reduction or a
decrease in benefits awarded from the Arbitration
Decision in 21% of the appeals filed by an employer.
Outright reversals were obtained in only 6% of the
Review Decisions filed and benefits were actually
increased in 6% of the decisions appealed from.435
As might be expected, some Arbitrators have their decisions
changed more than others. The decision can and may well be
changed in whole or in part. Most frequently, the change in findings
of fact will surround expert medical testimony. For example, the
Arbitrator will have said that the testimony of one particular medical
expert establishes that “by a preponderance of the evidence, some
fact exists,” but the Commission will reverse and find as fact that the
burden was not met and that no such fact exists. Less frequently, the
Commission will change findings of fact surrounding such things as
the claimant’s statement that an accident did indeed occur when the
employer had questioned the allegation.436
Lawyers are, of course, keenly aware that the Illinois
Arbitrator does not make the final and binding factual
determinations. If a lawyer believes that the Arbitrator to decide the
case is unlikely to find facts in his favor, he may well “try the case
for review,” i.e., litigating before the Arbitrator but fully expecting to
be rearguing credibility upon review by the Commission.437
The rule that the Commission exercises de novo review has
long been established, as leading cases over many decades firmly

435

Brad Bleakney, 2008 Annual Report Illinois Workers Compensation
Commission, Larson’s Emerging Issues & Trends (Blog) (July 8, 2009) available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/workerscompensationlaw/blogs/workersco
mpensationlawblog/archive/2009/07/08/2008-annual-report-illinois-workerscompensation-commission.aspx.
436

Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on
file with Author).
437
Id.
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established the principle.438 Illinois courts have not, however, always
shown fidelity to the precept.439 In a 1988 case, the state supreme
court produced language to the effect that where the Commission
changes the Arbitrator’s credibility-based fact-findings, the
reviewing court will apply “an extra degree of scrutiny” to see if such
action was justified.440 This was so held in the controversial case,
Cook v. Industrial Commission.441 Thereafter, for a period, a number

Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm’n, 21 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. 1939) (“the
arbitrator in his consideration of the case is but the agent of the Commission,
similar in character to that of a master in chancery or a referee in bankruptcy, so far
as the character of the functions performed by the arbitrator is concerned.”). In this
case, the arbitrator awarded claimant steelworker an award on his lung disease
claim, crediting claimant’s physician that the ailment was from shop dust. The
commission reversed, having recalled for testimony the employer’s physician.
That expert had studied x-rays and had testified at both levels (especially after
seeing a theretofore withheld x-ray) that claimant had advanced TB. The circuit
court, in an activist gesture, reversed the commission, remarking that the
commission could not reverse the arbitrator in such circumstances. The Supreme
Court reversed, stating that commission review is “sui generis,” and that (1) that
such review is de novo; and that (2) its decision was not, in any event, contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
See also Berry v. Indus. Comm’n, 459 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1984) (in case
where circuit court had insisted that the “arbitrator is best to judge credibility,”
court reverses, stating, it “is the peculiar province of the Industrial Commission to
determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the testimony, and to determine the
weight to be given to the evidence. Regardless of whether or not the Commission
hears testimony in addition to that heard by the arbitrator, it exercises original
jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator's findings.”) (court also noting
institutional expertise of commission).
439
Thanks to David Menchetti, Esq., Chicago, IL, who provided to the
Author his CLE presentation, The Commission Reverses the Arbitrator: Extra
Scrutiny? (on file with Author).
440
Cook v. Indus. Comm’n, 531 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
441
Id. (“While recognizing that the Commission is in no way bound by an
arbitrator’s decision, we note that the arbitrator’s decision is not without legal
effect. . . . . Further, we note that in performing its role as reviewer of the record,
the Commission is at a practical disadvantage as compared to the arbitrator. The
arbitrator, having heard the live testimony, is actually in a better position to
evaluate that evidence. . . .Accordingly, in cases where the Commission has
rejected the arbitrator’s factual findings without receiving any new evidence, we
apply an extra degree of scrutiny to the record in determining whether there is
sufficient support for the Commission’s decision.”).
438
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of decisions seemed to exercise such review, or at least to have
responded to Cook’s “extra degree of scrutiny” approach.442
In the early 1990s, however, the court retreated from the rule
and insisted that it had “repudiated” Cook.443 Still, within another
decade, in 2007, the court stated (perhaps ill-advisedly) that it “may
be time to reconsider” the Commission’s de novo power.444 In a
2009 case, however, the court insisted that such language was dicta,
and again admonished that Cook was repudiated.445
Iowa. The Commissioner under the Iowa Act is the final factfinder. “The commissioner as trier of fact,” one court explained, “has
the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the

Adams Truck Lines v. Indus. Comm’n, 550 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); Kress Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
443
Komatsu Dresser Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 601 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); Dillon v. Indus. Comm’n, 552 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
444
S&H Floor Covering, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 870
N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). In this case, the arbitrator ruled for the employer,
but on review the commission found for the employee. The circuit court affirmed,
as did the appeals court. The court, however, threw out a mischievous invitation:
442

[E]mployer argues we should review our precedent that the
Commission is not required to give deference to the arbitrator’s
findings of credibility. In the recent past, this court has been
presented with more than a few cases where the Commission has
made credibility findings contrary to those of the arbitrator. It
may very well be time to reconsider the Commission’s
prerogative to determine credibility regardless of the arbitrator’s
decision.
Id. at 827.
Hosteny v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 928 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009). In this case, the arbitrator found for claimant. The commission reversed
and the circuit and appellate courts court affirmed. Claimant appealed, arguing
that the court should “abandon the deferential standard of review . . . in favor of a
stricter standard when the Commission’s credibility findings are contrary to those
of the arbitrator.” The court, however, insisted that Cook “has since been
repudiated in almost every reported case that has cited it . . . .” The case, the court
admonished, “is a misstatement of the appropriate standard of review.
Accordingly, we decline to apply to this case the extra-degree-of-scrutiny
referenced in Cook.” Id. at 483.
445
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evidence . . . .” 446 He or she “may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision of a deputy commissioner or the commissioner may remand
the decision to the deputy commissioner for further proceedings.”447
According to one claimant’s attorney, “[t]he vast majority of
decisions are simply adopted by the Commissioner who adopts the
findings and rulings of the Deputy Commissioner.
Sometimes,
though, the Commissioner will appoint a Deputy Commissioner”448
to recommend a decision. A defense lawyer, on the other hand,
advised that the Commissioner “quite often” substitutes credibility
judgments.449
Two recent cases perhaps suggest that review of witness
credibility is a sensitive issue. In one case, the district court, on
appeal from the decision of the Commissioner, was held to have
inappropriately reassessed the latter’s credibility judgment.450 In
another, an “acting commissioner,” via the process noted above, was
held to have made his findings on legally insufficient evidence.451 In
that case, the district court, and a concurring judge of the appeals
court, utilized harsh language not commonly encountered in appellate
opinions.452 In any event, the current Commissioner posits that he
hews to the common law principle of deference to the Deputy
Commissioner on issues of credibility.453

446

Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa

1995).
447

IOWA CODE § 86.24 (2011).
Memorandum of Ryan Beattie, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Jan.
12, 2012) (on file with Author). For a case where the Commissioner referred the
review to a Deputy Commissioner, see Square D Co. v. Plagmann, 2011 Iowa App.
LEXIS 1475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).
449
Memorandum of Lee P. Hook, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on
file with Author).
450
Cedar Rapids Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 103
(Iowa 2011).
451
See Beef Products, Inc. v. Rizvic, 806 N.W. 2d 294 (Iowa Ct. App.
2011).
452
See id.
453
Bouska v. St. Luke’s Hospital, File Nos. 5022542 & 5022543
(Workers. Comp. App. March 23, 2009). Commissioner Godfrey stated:
448

While I performed a de novo review, I gave considerable
deference to findings of fact that are impacted by the credibility
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Kansas. The Kansas Board is the final fact-finder. The law
provides that the Board “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review
all decisions . . . and awards . . . of administrative law judges . . . .”454
This review “shall be upon questions of law and fact as presented and
shown by a transcript of the evidence and the proceedings as
presented, had and introduced before the administrative law
judge.”455 Of note is a 2009 amendment to the laws governing
appeals from administrative agencies to the court system. The
appellate courts are now to undertake a whole-record review, the
parameters of which are defined in the statute. Among other things,
the court must take into account “any determinations of veracity by
the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the
witness and the agency’s explanation of why the relevant evidence in
the record supports its material findings of fact.”456
In a 2011 case, a claimant whose award had been reversed by
the Board, on credibility grounds, asserted that it had done so
improperly under the new statute. The court, however, replied that
the scrutiny referred to in the new statute applied to its review of the
Board’s decision, not the Board’s review of the ALJ’s decision. The
court would not, as perhaps suggested by claimant, reweigh the
competing evidence. Still, under the amendment, “it may [be] the
better practice for the Board to give its reasons when disagreeing
with any credibility determinations of the ALJ. . . . Such practice is
findings, expressly or impliedly, made by the deputy who
presided at the hearing. The deputy who presided at the hearing
had the best opportunity to evaluate the demeanor of the persons
who testified at the hearing. The presiding deputy has the ability
to include the demeanor of a witness when weighing credibility
to find the true facts of the case. My ability to find the true facts
that are affected by witness demeanor and credibility cannot be
expected to be superior to that of the deputy who presided at the
hearing. If anything, my ability when reviewing a transcript is
likely inferior because I do not have the tool of witness demeanor
to use in my evaluation.
Id.
454

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-555(c) (West 2011).
Id.
456
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(d) (West 2011). See generally Redd v.
Kansas Truck Ctr., 239 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2010) (discussing substantial evidence
standard of review and how 2009 law changed standard).
455
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based on the Board’s contemplation that its decision will be subject
to judicial review with the amended standards” noted above.457
According to a veteran attorney, the Appeals Board does
make its own credibility determinations with a fair amount of
frequency. This is particularly so with “‘preliminary hearing
appeals’ (which are mostly limited to compensability issues) with
medical evidence (provider and hospital records come into evidence
without the testimony of the doctor at preliminary hearings) . . . .”458
In such cases “a Board member will independently weigh the
evidence and typically not feel constrained by the findings or
credibility determinations of the ALJ.”459
Mississippi.
Under the Mississippi Act, workers’
compensation cases are adjudicated before ALJs of the threemember, politically-appointed Workers’ Compensation Commission.
The Commission has considerable powers to reassess credibility and
the facts,460 and this has been said by some attorneys to occur with
some regularity. A Mississippi ALJ advised this Author that the
“Commission may accept or not accept the ALJ’s findings about
anything. This includes the assessment of the credibility of the
witness or claimant . . . . In most claims, the Commission will accept
most or all of the judge’s findings but may amend or reverse the
dollar amount of an award of permanent disability or the date of
maximum medical improvement or one such aspect of the claim – or
may find that the judge has misapplied the law to the facts.”461
457

Rausch v. Sear Roebuck & Co., 263 P.3d 194, 197 (Kan. Ct. App.
2011). In this case, the employer denied that the claimant had suffered any injury
while at work. After a period of modified duty, she was subject to termination for
cause. As she exited, she advised the employer that she would “make them pay.”
Id. at 198. The ALJ found that the circumstantial evidence proved an injury, but
the Board reversed, finding claimant’s testimony, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, incredible.
458

Memorandum of Kim Martens, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2012) (on
file with Author).
459
Id.
460
See Short v. Wilson Meat House, 36 So.3d 1247, 1251 (Miss. 2010)
(the “Commission is the fact-finder and the judge of the credibility of witnesses.”).
461
Memorandum of Hon. Linda Thompson, ALJ, to Author (Aug. 8,
2011) (on file with Author).
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The fact-finding process in Mississippi workers’
compensation has been a subject of interest recently, as a claimants’
attorney charged that the current Commissioners were biased against
injured workers. According to a study, “the commission’s three
members voted to reject administrative law judge decisions favoring
workers between 75 and 91 percent of the time.”462 The allegations
have led to a “PEER review” by a state legislative agency, the Joint
Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review.463
North Carolina. North Carolina is another state where the
Industrial Commission, the final fact-finder,464 is willing, on
occasion, to overthrow the Deputy Commissioner’s credibility
determinations on a “cold record.” Such overthrows include
changing fact-findings which have been made based on
considerations of witness demeanor. A source who spoke with the
Author anonymously believed that the Commission (as of 2009)
made substantial changes in fact-findings in about fifteen percent of
cases.465 A leader in the field, however, an attorney who represents

Joe Atkins, Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission Rulings
Under Review for Anti-worker Bias, FACING SOUTH[:] THE INSTITUTE FOR
SOUTHERN STUDIES, http://www.southernstudies.org/2011/01/mississippi-workerscompensation-commission-rulings-under-review-for-anti-worker-bias.html
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2011).
463
Id.
464
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (providing, inter alia, that “[i]f application is
made to the Commission within 15 days from the date when notice of the award
shall have been given, the full Commission shall review the award, and, if good
ground be shown therefor, reconsider the evidence . . . .”). See Johnson v. S.Tire
Sales & Serv., 599 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 2004). With regard to the North Carolina
system, see generally J. Randolph Ward, Primary Issues in Compensation
Litigation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 443 (1995) (note: possibly dated given recent
reforms).
465
A Charlotte, NC, lawyer, in a website posting, estimates that in 30% of
the cases the Industrial Commission will reverse on one ground or another. He
states, “The loser at the Deputy level will typically appeal to the Full Commission
in my experience. The defendants may do it sometimes to delay payment to you,
without any real expectation of winning. About 70% of the time the Full
Commission will affirm what the Deputy decided, and the rest of the time they may
modify the Deputy award or reverse most or all of it . . . .” Comments of Bob
Bollinger, Esq., Discussion Board at WorkersCompensationInsurance.com (Dec.
2007),
available
at
462
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injured workers, stated to the Author, “I know of no hard statistics on
this issue so it’s hard to say. The Court of Appeals has firmly
determined that the full commission has the power to determine
credibility issues based on the cold record and they do reverse every
now and then, but I would have to say it happens ‘rarely.’”466
Of note is the state supreme court’s tenacious rule (in effect
since 1998), that the Full Commission is not required to make
findings explaining why it was reversing the Deputy Commissioner’s
credibility findings concerning a claimant’s testimony regarding the
cause of the accident.467 This was the implication of a 1998
landmark case, in which the court clarified:
Whether the full Commission conducts a hearing or
reviews a cold record, [the statute] . . . places the
ultimate fact-finding function with the Commission –
not the hearing officer. It is the Commission that
ultimately determines credibility, whether from a cold
record or from live testimony. Consequently, in
reversing the deputy commissioner’s credibility
findings, the full Commission is not required to
demonstrate, as [one of our precedents] states, “that
sufficient consideration was paid to the fact that
credibility may be best judged by a first-hand observer
of the witness when that observation was the only
one.”468
According to another opinion:

http://www.workerscompensationinsurance.com/forum/showthread.php?43708Appeals-to-Full-Commission.
466

Memorandum of Leonard T. Jernigan, Jr., Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28,
2011) (on file with Author).
467
See Brown v. The Kroger Co., 610 S.E.2d 447, 453 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005) (“we also disagree with defendants’ contention that in cases in which
observation of the claimant’s actual physical behavior is a ‘crucial issue,’ the Full
Commission should acknowledge the hearing officer’s credibility findings and
offer a full explanation if it substitutes a different judgment for those findings.”).
468
Adams v. AVX Corp., 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (N.C. 1998).
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Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility
determinations” and “allowing [this Court] to review
the Commission’s explanation of those credibility
determinations would be inconsistent with our legal
system’s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to
explain why he or she believes one witness over
another or believes one piece of evidence is more
credible than another.469
In a 2004 case that followed this holding, the Deputy
Commissioner found as fact that an injured worker had not shown
good faith in pursuing work, and he denied a request for permanent
total disability.470 The Full Commission, however, found flatly to the
contrary, and continued the claimant on total disability. 471 On
appeal, the employer argued that the Commission had “erred by
failing to consider the Deputy Commissioner’s personal observations
that plaintiff was exaggerating any pain he was experiencing at the
hearing . . . .”472 The Court of Appeals was unmoved, citing the 1998
precedent.473
Furthermore, in a 2005 case that followed this holding, the
Deputy Commissioner had found claimant’s testimony about a fall at
home, said to have been a consequence of an at-work injury, to be
incredible.474 The Full Commission, however, found her credible and
awarded benefits.475 In the state supreme court, the employer argued
that “in cases in which observation of the claimant’s actual physical
behavior is a ‘crucial issue,’ the Full Commission should
acknowledge the hearing officer’s credibility findings and offer a full
explanation if it substitutes a different judgment for those

469

Arce v. Bassett Furniture Indus., No. COA10-1064, 2011 N.C. App.
LEXIS 699, *9-10 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011) ) (quoting Deese v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (N.C. 2000)).
470
Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 599 S.E.2d 508, 510-11 (N.C. 2004).
471
Id. at 511.
472
Id. at 515.
473
Id.
474
Brown v. Kroger Co., 610 S.E.2d 447, 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
475
Id. at 450.
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findings.”476 In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals
similarly relied upon the 1998 precedent quoted above.477
C. Jury Trial States
In five states, the parties may seek a jury trial (or a bench
trial, for that matter) even after the exhaustion of the administrative
adjudication scheme. In four of these states, Maryland, Ohio,
Vermont, and Washington, the trial court is the final fact-finder and
the arrangement obviously retains an element of its original form.
The case of Texas is discussed above – the Author has, exercising his
organizational discretion, categorized the state as maintaining
administrative finality. This is in light of the jurisdiction’s dramatic
1989 reform which gave the Texas Hearing Officer significant factfinding power, and which truncated the jury trial right.478
Maryland. Under the Maryland Act, the “decision of the
Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct; and . . . the party
challenging the decision has the burden of proof.”479 In addition,
“[The statute] . . . provide[s] . . . the prerogative of a trial de novo . . .
of any or all of the factual issues initially determined by the
Commission. . . . [T]he trial is de novo, but only on the questions of
fact submitted to the Commission by way of some evidence or by a
formal issue.” 480 The process can be gleaned from a 2011 case, in
which the claimant was the punter for the Washington Redskins
football team.481 The Maryland Commissioner granted benefits, but

476

Id. at 453.
Id.
478
See supra Section V(E).
479
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).
480
Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery Cnty. v. Spradlin, 867 A.2d 370, 384
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (quoting Gen. Motors v. Bark, 555 A.2d 542, 545 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1989) and MAURICE J. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION IN
MARYLAND 170-71(1970)) (Spradlin features an exhaustive description of trial
process).
481
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2011).
477
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the employer appealed to the county court and sought a jury trial.482
The jury, however, also found for the claimant.483
The Maryland scheme poses a special task for the lawyer, as
he or she must have expertise both in administrative proceedings
before the commissioners and trial skills as well. As discussed
above, relatively few contested cases unfold on appeal in a jury
trial.484
Ohio. Under the Ohio Act, contested cases are heard before
administrative agency officers before a jury trial would ever
unfold.485 A case is first heard by the District Hearing Officer
(DHO), with any appeal thereafter to a Staff Hearing Officer
(SHO).486 Then, with permission, a case will be reviewed by the
Industrial Commission.487 The review is de novo at each level.488
Any subsequent appeal is taken to a county trial court, which will
convene a jury or bench trial.489 At this level, factual determinations
may once again be made.490 A limitation exists: “The claimant or the
employer may appeal an order of the industrial commission . . . in
any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to
the extent of disability to the court of common pleas . . . . ”491
In a 2006 case, the state supreme court addressed the issue of
whether a party’s due process rights were violated by the trial court’s
mandate that all testimony at time of jury trial was to be by

482

Id. at 680.
Id.
484
See supra Section V(A).
485
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.511 (West 2011)
486
Id. § 4123.511 (D),(E).
487
Id. § 4123.511(E).
488
Comments of Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file
with Author).
489
Id. § 4123.512(A).
490
Id. § 4123.512(D).
491
Id. § 4123.512(A) (emphasis added). The entire process just described
may be gleaned in Luckett v. Ryan, 2011 Ohio App. No. 1-10-49, 2011 Ohio Ct.
App. LEXIS 2545, *2-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011 Jun. 20, 2011) (claimant was
unsuccessful through several levels, including jury trial, in expanding accepted
injury from scalp laceration to more involved orthopedic injuries).
483
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videotape.492 The claimant in that case unsuccessfully asserted that
“his right to a jury includes the right to present his own testimony
and that of his witnesses live and the right to have the jury see him as
the case is presented.”493 The court rejected this argument,
respecting the authority of the trial judge to manage his cases, and it
remarked that no constitutional right to a workers’ compensation jury
trial existed.494 The court did indicate that the “preferred practice”
was direct interface between the parties and the jury,495 but it was
unwilling to say that videotape was impermissible.496
A claimant’s attorney with a heavy caseload estimates that, of
the appeals he takes from the Industrial Commission to the trial court
(referred to as “512” appeals), not more than 10%, perhaps 5%, will
unfold in a jury trial.497 The other cases will settle on appeal; indeed,
the fact of an appeal and demand for a jury trial may work to
leverage settlement.498
Vermont. Under the Vermont Act, “either party may appeal
to the superior [trial] court of a county wherein a civil action between
the parties would be triable. Either party shall be entitled to a trial by
jury.”499 However, “[t]he jurisdiction of [the superior court] . . . shall

492

Arrington v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1004, 1006 (2006).
Id. at 1011.
494
Id.
495
Id. at 1014. The court added that, in so ruling:
493

[W]e are not blinded by the promise of technology and its integral
role in contemporary society. Questions as to the proper
integration of technology into law are complicated ones. In cases
in which technology permeates the courtroom, we must guard
against the suggestion that technology can be used for “so
arranging the world that we don’t have to experience it.”
Id. (quoting MAX FRISCH, HOMO FABER 178 (Michael Bullock trans., 1959)).
496
Id. at 1006.
497
Comments of Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file
with Author).
498
Id.
499
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 670 (West 2011).
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be limited to a review of questions of fact or questions of fact and
law certified to it by the commissioner . . . . ”500
As foreshadowed above, the jury trial is only reached after
administrative remedies have been exhausted.501 In this regard, the
final agency fact-finder is the Commissioner of the Department of
Labor.502 The Commissioner employs full-time hearing officers
(currently two) to undertake the hearing process.503 The hearing
officers consider the cases and prepare a proposed decision for the
Commissioner.504 The Commissioner does indeed possess the power
to change a hearing officer’s decision.505 However, in practice, if the
Commissioner were to have a question about the case, she would
likely ask the hearing officer to address the same, or return the
decision to be reheard and/or rewritten. According to the current
Director of the Workers’ Compensation & Safety Division, these
occasions are rare.506 “Fine-tuning” of decisions is much more
common.507 Most “hard” fact-findings of the hearing officer are not
questioned.508
According to the Director, about 30% to 40% of the
Commissioner adjudications are appealed to the superior court (that
is, the county court).509 The law, notably, supports a direct appeal to
the Vermont Supreme Court if only legal error is alleged.510 If the
losing party wants facts reassessed, an appeal must be prosecuted to
the superior court for trial.511 In a 2010 case, the supreme court
emphasized the meaning of such de novo review:

500

Id. tit. 21 § 671.
Id.
502
Id.
503
Id.
504
Id.
505
Id. tit. 21 § 671.
506
Comments of J. Stephen Monahan, Esq., Director of the Workers’
Compensation & Safety Division, to Author (Dec. 20, 2011) (on file with Author).
507
Id.
508
Id.
509
Id.
510
Id.
511
Roethke v. Jake’s Original Bar and Grill, 772 A.2d 492, 493 (Vt.
2001).
501
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The [trial] court’s review of the Commissioner’s
decision “involves a retrial de novo.” (Citation
omitted.) That means, as the trial court found, that
insurer is not limited to the arguments raised below,
and preservation — or lack thereof — is not at issue.
(Footnote omitted.) The doctrine of collateral estoppel
is similarly not relevant here because there has not yet
been a final judgment on the merits.512
Washington. Under the Washington Act, contested cases are
litigated before an Industrial Appeals Judge (IAJ), who issues a
proposed decision and order.513 Any appeal is prosecuted thereafter
to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA).514 An aggrieved
party may then seek review in the county (superior) court.515
The Act provides that in such appeals, “only such issues of
law or fact may be raised as were properly included in the notice of
appeal to the board, or in the complete record of the proceedings
before the board.” 516 In addition, the superior court proceeding
“shall be de novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or
testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the board
or included in the record filed by the board in the superior court . . . .
”517 The same statute provides, “In all [such] court proceedings . . .
the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and
the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.”518
Furthermore, the court is directed to “advise the jury of the exact
findings of the board on each material issue before the court.” 519

512

Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 371
(Vt. 2010) (quoting Farris v. Bryant Grinder Corp./Wausau Ins. Co., 869 A.2d 131,
135 (2005)).
513
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.52.104 (West 2010).
514
Id. § 51.52.106.
515
Id. § 51.52.110. This process can be seen unfolding in Puget Sound
Energy, Inc. v. Lee, 205 P.3d 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
516
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.52.115 (West 2010).
517
Id.
518
Id.
519
Id.
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The statute’s admonition that no further evidence is permitted
at trial has the most razor-like of teeth.520 “The Superior Court
appeal,” one veteran notes, “is nothing more than reading the record
to the judge or jury.”521 He further estimates that, of the BIIA
“hearings which conclude with a decision and order, [5-10%] go on
to the Superior Court. Of those 75% are tried to a jury.”522 Another
lawyer confirms that jury trials are not uncommon:
Cases proceeding to trial at Superior Court are not
rare. They are most frequent involving pension cases
and allowance of injury where the issue is
occupational disease. As a percentage of all cases
administratively adjudicated the number is probably
less than 1%. But at any given time in this County
there is usually at least one compensation case being
tried every week.523
A third lawyer notes the custom and practice of transcript
recitation:
It is . . . common . . . for a jury to be empanelled in
Superior Court. In Washington, the transcript adduced
at the Board . . . is read to the jury. No live testimony
is presented in Superior Court. (It is an incredibly
boring experience for a juror, I am sure!) Sometimes
we try cases to the Bench, but a jury trial is much more
common.524

520

See id.
Memorandum from Christopher Sharpe, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with Author).
522
Id.
523
Memorandum from Patrick H. LePley, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author).
524
Memorandum from Thomas L. Doran, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan.
9, 2012) (on file with Author).
521
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VII. NUANCES IN THE FACT-FINDING ANALYSIS
A. Wisconsin, Due Process, and the Credibility Consultation
Under the Wisconsin Act, the ALJ is not the final factfinder.
An aggrieved party may, in this regard, petition the Labor
& Industry Review Commission (LIRC) for review of the ALJ’s
decision and the “commission shall either affirm, reverse, set aside or
modify the findings or order in whole or in part, or direct the taking
of additional evidence.”526 Such review “shall be based on a review
of the evidence submitted.”527 “The hearing examiner,” one decision
explains, “may make initial determinations on witness credibility,
but these determinations are subject to the commission’s independent
review.”528
The Wisconsin process is remarkable for its significant nod
towards due process. In this regard, if the Commission has concerns
over the credibility of a witness, prior to its changing of a credibilitybased fact-finding, it must convene a “credibility conference” with
the ALJ who actually saw and heard the witness.529 Further, to
change such credibility determinations, the LIRC must set forth
reasons.530 According to the treatise writer Domer, the LIRC often
525

525

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18 (West 2011).
526
Id. § 102.18(3).
527
Id.
528
Hakes v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 523 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994).
529
See Shawley v. Indus. Comm’n, 114 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Wis. 1962)
530
See Braun v. Indus. Comm’n, 153 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Wis. 1967) (relying
on Shawley v. Indus. Comm’n, 114 N.W.2d at 876.). Interface between hearing
officer and Commission is perhaps a longstanding tradition. When Professor Dodd
studied the Wisconsin system, he noted that examiners sent to remote locations to
conduct hearings were
at periodic intervals given a week at the commission’s
headquarters in Madison to prepare reports on the cases he had
heard. When this was done the examiner sought out the
commissioners and, in a conference with him, presented the case
as it developed at the hearing and indicated what he thought the
order of the commission should be. If the commissioner
approved, the examiner was directed to draw the findings of fact
and the award or the dismissal.
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convenes credibility conferences, particularly when the ALJ has
flatly rejected the credibility of the claimant.531 In the end, however,
outright reversals of the ALJ on credibility grounds are estimated at
five percent “by anecdotal authority.”532
A leading precedent illustrating the Wisconsin process comes
from the 1972 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Dep’t of Industry.533 In that case, the hearing examiner had limited
a claimant’s benefits, having credited an expert who had apparently
been called by the employer.534 After a credibility conference, the
Commission modified the findings and, in a summary set of findings,
found the claimant totally disabled.535 When the case reached the
state supreme court, the employer asserted that its due process rights
had been violated because the Commission had not set forth its
reasons for rejecting the fact-findings of the examiner.536 The court
ultimately affirmed, but agreed in principle that merely setting forth
replacement fact-findings, without an explanation for the change,
would no longer be tolerated:
The parties to litigation, workmen’s compensation
claims included, are entitled to know, not only that the
department set aside the findings of an examiner but
why it did so – not only what independent findings the
department found proper, but on what basis and
evidence it made such findings. Particularly is this
true where credibility of witnesses is involved.
Fundamental fairness requires that administrative
agencies, as well as courts, set forth the reasons why a

DODD, supra note 53, at 258. He further noted, “In 99 cases out of a
hundred, the commission approved the examiner’s view of the case.” Id.
531
Memorandum from Thomas M. Domer, Esq. to Author (Nov. 16,
2011) (on file with Author). For a recent case reflecting that such a conference was
held, see Hall v. Sch. Dist. of St. Croix Falls, 778 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. Ct.
App.2009).
532
Id.
533
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus., 195 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1972).
534
Id. at 659.
535
Id. at 660.
536
Id. at 661.
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fact-finder’s findings are being set aside or reversed,
and spell out the basis for independent findings
substituted.537
The court stated, as a consequence:
[W]e do not expect to have again to search a record
either for the basis of independent findings as to
credibility of witnesses or the reasons for [the]
department setting aside an examiner’s findings as
“probable error.” Trial courts can be expected to
reverse department findings and remand for the
completion of the record whenever the department
rejects the findings of its examiner and makes its own
findings involving credibility of witnesses and fails to
accompany such reversal and making its own findings
with an opinion stating why it has rejected the facts
found by the examiner and why it has made its own
and differing findings of fact.538
In a 1994 case, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument
that more was required than a credibility conference and a statement
of reasons before the Commission could reassess fact-findings.539 In
that case, an employee asserted that she had injured her back and leg
at work.540 The hearing examiner awarded benefits, but the
Commission discredited the claimant’s testimony as riddled with
inconsistencies.541 On appeal, the claimant asserted that, for due
process to be afforded, “the record must disclose who consulted with
the hearing examiner, when the consultation was made and how the
consultation proceeded.”542 Further, the claimant contended that the
“commission should adopt a standardized procedure by which its
consultations are held. [She] argues that the adoption of standardized

537

Id. at 663.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d at 664.
539
Hakes, 523 N.W.2d at 157-58.
540
Id.at 156.
541
Id.
542
Id. at 157.
538
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procedures is warranted because the availability of compensation
benefits for injured workers is so important and because the effect of
a wrong decision has such dire consequences.”543 In response, the
court held that due process was already accorded by the existing
system, and the proposed undertaking “[sought] to delve into the
mental processes the commission used in making its determinations
of fact. [The court held that] [t]he law . . . [did] not require this.”544
That the appellate court may require a detailed Commission
adjudication is suggested by a 2011 case.545 There, the ALJ credited
the employer (a small businessman) when he testified that he
terminated (viz., refused to re-hire) claimant for incompetence and
not out of alleged retaliation for his having suffered a work injury,
missing work, and stating that he was going to have to undergo
another disabling surgery.546
The Commission reversed,
“determining that [claimant] was the credible party and that
[employer] had, in fact, refused to rehire [claimant] because of [his]
work-related injury . . . .”547 On employer’s appeal, the court
carefully parsed the Commission decision, compared it with the
record, and held that “the inadequacy of LIRC’s accompanying
memorandum opinion is the basis for our decision to set aside its
order. ‘Fundamental fairness’ requires that LIRC set forth the reasons
why the ALJ’s findings are being reversed and LIRC must ‘spell out
the basis for [its] independent findings.’”548
B. Judging Credibility of Expert Medical Witnesses
In a substantial evidence jurisdiction, deference to the factfinder usually extends to all credibility determinations, lay and
expert.549 This is certainly the rule in Pennsylvania, though the WCJ

543

Id.
Hakes, 523 N.W.2d at 158.
545
See Open Hearth Homes, LLC v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n,
No. 2010 AP 1225, Wis. Ct. App. Lexis 363, at *11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
546
Id. at *3-4.
547
Id. at *4-5.
548
Id. at *11.
549 See, e.g., Ullmann v. City of Tampa Parks Dep’t, 625 So. 2d 868, 873 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Tiburcio v. United Parcel Service, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub.
544
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must provide his or her reasons for crediting and discrediting the
critical evidence.550
In a jurisdiction where the commission, or even appellate
court, reserves the right to make its own findings, however, courts
recognize a dichotomy in this area. Many believe that the commonlaw rule about deference to the trial judge “applies more to lay
witnesses than expert medical witnesses. After all, (1) expert
witnesses have to base conclusions on evidence, and (2) medical
testimony comes down to persuasiveness more than credibility.”551
As established above, for example, the Commission in
Missouri is the final fact-finder, but a policy seems to prevail that it
will give great deference to the ALJ on issues of witness
credibility.552 Several lawyers report, however, that this deference is
usually afforded to the credibility of lay witnesses. The Commission
is less likely to accord deference to credibility determinations made
by the ALJ relative to experts testifying by deposition:
If there is one area where the commission has been
more activist than any other in credibility
determinations, it has been with weighing the opinions
of experts (who, in Missouri, almost universally
testify by deposition). The commission has been most
attentive to assuring that [a] proper foundation has
been laid for an expert’s opinion, and that the opinion
is based on un-contradicted evidence found in the
record. It tends to characterize its findings as
concerning the “persuasiveness” of the expert’s
opinions, and this commission’s awards are replete
with decisions saying a doctor was not persuasive in
one case, while finding the same expert persuasive in

LEXIS 1873, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Huntington v. State of
Wyoming, 163 P.3d 839, 843 (Wyo. 2007).
550 See infra Section IX(C)(2) (discussion of Pennsylvania doctrine).
551 Memorandum from Hon. David Wertheim, WCLJ (now retired) to Author
(Aug. 30, 2011) (on file with Author).
552 See supra Section VI(A).
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another, always including a careful recitation of the
basis of its determination.553
“The commission,” another attorney writes, “sees itself in the
same position to judge the testimony in depositions as is the
administrative law judge, so they have no qualms in reweighing that
evidence.”554
Of some irony is that Missouri appellate courts, which are
ostensibly undertaking substantial evidence/whole record review,555
may also be detected reassessing the credibility of experts.556 In a
2006 case, for example, the claimant alleged an ongoing disability
from myofascial pain afflicting his shoulders.557 The ALJ and
Commission rejected this assertion.558 The Court of Appeals
reversed, stating that the uncontradicted expert medical proofs
showed that he did suffer from the malady, and that the inferences
relied upon by ALJ and Commission were not sufficient.559 The
“ALJ simply lacked the expertise,” the court noted, to conclude that
claimant’s problems really had their genesis in non-work-related slip
553

Memorandum from Michael Korte, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with
Author).
To the same effect is Mr. Todd Werts, Esq.:
[I]t is “rare” . . . for the Commission to reverse an ALJ on the
credibility determination of a witness who testified in person. I
think the matter becomes a little more complicated with medical
testimony given by deposition . . . [I]t is not uncommon for the
Commission to disagree with an ALJ on the medical testimony.
Memorandum from Todd Werts, Esq., to Author (Dec. 2, 2011) (on file with
Author). The disagreement, however, often “is over which expert better supports
his or her opinion and may not necessarily be a credibility issue, so much as an
issue with the doctor’s logic or medical basis for his/her opinion.” Id.
554
Memorandum from Kip Kubin, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file
with Author).
555
See Vice v. Advantage Waste Servs., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 145 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009).
556
Memorandum from Michael Korte, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on
file with Author). This is a phenomenon long noted, also, by the Larson treatise.
See LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[3], [4].
557
Kuykendall v. Gates Corp., 207 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
558
Id. at 697.
559
See id. at 712.
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and fall incidents.560 According to the court, “[w]hile we ‘defer to
the Commission’s decisions regarding the weight given to witnesses’
testimony, and are bound by the Commission’s factual
determinations when the evidence supports either of two opposed
findings,’ . . . here there was no credible medical evidence opposing
Dr. Eaton’s findings.”561
This reasoning, notably, recalls the so-called “sit and squirm”
cases of the Social Security Disability cases.562 In the 1980s, a
number of federal court cases were filed indicating that the Social
Security Disability (SSD) ALJ could not discredit a claimant on the
issue of physical impairment in the face of uncontradicted medical
testimony. In the most illustrative case, the ALJ, in dismissing the
claim, stated:
At no time during the hearing was the claimant
observed to be suffering any physical or mental
discomfort, nor was physical pain or discomfort
evidenced by any facial grimaces or restlessness.
The medical evidence reveals that although the
claimant suffers some discomfort from her
impairments, they do not appear severe.563
This reasoning was found insufficient, in the face of
uncontradicted medical evidence, to support denial of the claim.564
560

Id. at 711.
Id. (citation omitted).
562
For use of this term, see Norris v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th
Cir. 1985).
563
Benson v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1981).
564
Id. One court provided a practical reason for the rule. See Wilson v.
Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984):
561

[T]he ALJ engaged in what had been condemned as “sit and
squirm” jurisprudence. In this approach, an ALJ who is not a
medical expert will subjectively arrive at an index of traits which
he expects the claimant to manifest at the hearing. If the
claimant falls short of the index, the claim is denied. . . . [T]his
approach . . . will not only result in unreliable conclusions when
observing claimants with honest intentions, but may encourage
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This phenomenon is, in any event, also one of the Tennessee
practice. There, contested cases are heard in the trial courts via bench
trials.565 Rather remarkably, the appellate courts still have the power
to assess credibility on appeal. In this latter regard, review of issues
of fact “is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by
a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the
preponderance of evidence is otherwise.”566 Tennessee courts
generally would not presume to change a trial judge’s credibility
judgment about a live witness, but without any hesitation they could
potentially change a judgment about expert testimony given by
deposition.567 A veteran specialist admonishes, “in particular, the
testimony of expert witnesses and other witnesses who testify by
deposition is routinely reweighed based upon the theory that the trial
judge is in no better position than the appellate court to evaluate the
testimony of a witness who testifies by deposition.”568
The language of the Tennessee appellate precedents bears out
the dichotomy.569 “Where the trial judge has seen and heard the
witnesses,” a recent opinion states, “especially if issues of credibility
and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable
deference must be accorded those circumstances on review . . . .”570
This is so “because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to
claimants to manufacture convincing observable manifestations
of pain, or, worse yet, discourage them from exercising the right
to appear before an [ALJ] for fear that they may not appear to the
unexpert eye to be as bad as they feel.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
565
See supra Section III (discussion of court administration in Tennessee).
566
Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc., No. M2009-01773-WC-R3-WC,
2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1020, at *5-6 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2010) (citing TENN. CODE ANN §
50-6-225(e)(2) (2008)). The court also said that “[w]here the issues involve expert
medical testimony and all the medical proof is documentary, as in this case, the
reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of
that testimony.” Id.
567
Memorandum from Cully Ward, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6,
2012) (on file with Author).
568
Memorandum from Tony Farmer, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6,
2012) (on file with Author).
569
See Binkley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. M2002-00278WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. Lexis 3 (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2003).
570
Id. at *2.
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observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to hear the in-court
testimony.”571 On the other hand, “When the issues involve expert
medical testimony that is contained in the record by deposition,
determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence
necessarily must be drawn from the contents of the depositions, and
the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions with regard to
those issues.”572
The Arizona appellate courts demonstrate a unique opinion on
the issue. There, the law requires that expert physicians must testify
live and not by deposition.573 This is an extraordinary rule among
states. On the issue of whether the WCJ benefits from having the
expert physically present in the courtroom, an Arizona ALJ states:
[This] is an issue that is often discussed in our judges’
meetings since we have gone to “telephone” testimony
of expert witnesses if the expert so requests . . . .
[I]n-person testimony is nice since you can also ask a
question or two if you need a clarification and also cut
through the stuff that is not relevant. The phone
allows that but doesn’t allow the lawyers to show
records that the doctor doesn’t have, which sometimes
impacts cross. Once I hear a doctor’s testimony, I
usually allow the telephone appearance as I have a
feel for his or her credibility . . . . [O]ne benefit to the
deposition approach is you have the transcript and can
review certain sections of detailed testimony on
complex medical issues with more time than you can
when you are taking notes in a hearing . . .. So in
general, when it is a first timer expert I like the live
testimony requirement of Arizona but when we allow
571

Id.
Pennewell v. Hamilton-Ryker, No. W2006-1046-WC-R3-WC, 2007
Tenn. LEXIS 795, at *8 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007) (reading claimant’s expert’s
deposition and concluding that he had speculated on cause, and holding that, as a
result, claimant had not met her burden of proof). But cf. U.S. Cas. Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1951) (opining that viewing live the
physician’s demeanor can impact a credibility determination).
573
Comments of Hon. Luann Haley to Author (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with
Author).
572
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telephone appearance, as we do now at the judge’s
discretion, deposition would be just as good . . . . 574
C. Live Versus Deposition Testimony
The issue of whether commissions and courts should accord
deference to credibility judgments based on deposition testimony has
been raised in a variety of contexts. Courts often indicate that the
policy surrounding deference due a trial judge on credibility
collapses when the judge has not actually seen and heard the
witnesses but has instead read deposition transcripts. This is a
regular trope of Tennessee appellate courts.575 The general thinking
is as follows:
Even when the subject matter of a case makes it likely
that credibility will affect the result, the evidence may
be presented in such a manner that demeanor evidence
is absent or is irrelevant to the determination of
credibility. This occurs when a case is presented on
stipulated facts, or on affidavits and depositions.
574

Id.
See, e.g., Davidson v. Bus. Pers. Solutions, No. E2010-02366-WC-R3WC, 2011 Tenn. Lexis 1213, at *9 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2011):
575

When credibility and weight to be given testimony are at issue,
considerable deference must be afforded the trial court when the
trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. . . . No such deference
is extended to a trial court's findings when reviewing
documentary evidence, such as depositions.
Id. The court in Orrick, an earlier decision, set forth the rule as quoted in
Davidson, and added:
We agree with the Panel that the trial court erred in adopting Dr.
Gaw’s 8% impairment rating for facial disfigurement. Our de
novo review of the depositions and other documentary medical
evidence leads us to the conclusion that the trial court erred in
crediting Dr. Gaw’s testimony over that of Dr. Jaffrey with
respect to the loss of supporting structure to the face.
Orrick v. Bestway Trucking, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tenn. 2006).
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Under these conditions, decision on the record by a
substitute is clearly proper, since the original decision
maker would have decided the case on the record
himself.576
A Montana judge posited, in this context, “deference makes
no logical sense where the Workers’ Compensation Court simply
reads the same deposition that we read. In that situation, we are in as
good a position to evaluate the medical testimony as the trial
judge.”577
On occasion, the rule may even be found in a jurisdiction
where the WCJ is the final fact-finder. Under the New Mexico Act,
for example, review of the WCJ’s findings is undertaken on a
substantial evidence/whole record basis.578 Still, in one case, the
court recently overthrew a WCJ fact-finding, stating, “[B]ecause the
medical causation evidence was presented by deposition, the WCJ
findings on causation are not entitled to the usual deference accorded
findings of fact.”579 Under the Connecticut Act, meanwhile, the
commissioners are well established as final fact-finders.580 Still,
limited authority seems to exist that on appeal deference to findings
should not follow when the commissioner has relied upon a reading
of depositions.581

Note, Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative
Hearing Officer, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1328 (1968).
577
Hanks v. Liberty N.W. Ins. Corp., 62 P.3d 710, 716 (Mont. 2002)
(Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
578
Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
579
Pinkerton v. Gibbs, No. 29,872, 2010 N.M. App. Lexis 410, at *5
(N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2010).
580
Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245 (Conn. 1915).
581
See, e.g., Biasetti v. City of Stamford, 1 A.3d 1231, 1237 n.5 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2010). In this case, claimant, who suffered from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), argued on appeal that the Compensation Review Board should
not have accorded deference to the commissioner’s crediting of the employer’s
medical expert, as he had testified by deposition. The court, in rejecting this
argument, distinguished a prior case by noting that here the commissioner had also
based his denial of claimant’s PTSD claim on rejection of his lay evidence.
576
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VIII. THE AUTOMATIC STAY ISSUE
Under the orthodox rule, a common, even natural, corollary
was that a request for review of the hearing officer’s decision
operated to automatically stay the effect of the decision or
recommended decision.582 After all, the hearing officer or referee
was an agent of the Board. To this day, notably, under the Indiana
Act, an appeal from a single member of the Board to the full board
does not, under the Act’s language, purport to stay the decision. The
law, indeed, does not reference any suspension of an obligation to
pay.583 Still, a preeminent Indiana defense lawyer comments, “An
appeal to the Full Worker’s Compensation Board is technically a
hearing de novo . . . . [T]here is no mention of a stay in the statute or
otherwise, but the practical effect would seem to be the equivalent of
a stay. No payment is made until the appeal process is complete.”584
Presently, many states, chiefly those abiding by the orthodox
rule of commission as fact-finder, provide for an automatic stay.585
This is, however, hardly an ironclad rule. For example, a request for
review or appeal in California586 and Washington587 does not result in
an automatic stay.
The issue of a stay on benefits pending review on appeal to
commission or court has always been an important one. The “public
policy behind the adoption of workers’ compensation acts,” is, after
all, “to provide necessary day-to-day financial support to an injured
worker and the worker’s dependents.”588 If the WCJ’s award is a
582

See DODD, supra note 53, at 394-395 (taking for granted that appeal
usually operated as a stay, thus causing delay in payment to injured workers, and
endorsing exceptions of California and Massachusetts).
583
See IND. CODE § 22-3-1-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
584
Memorandum from Robert A. Fanning, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Oct. 7, 2011) (on file with Author).
585
This is the rule, for example, in Arkansas. Memorandum from David
L. Schneider, Esq., to Mark Cowger (Oct. 7, 2011) (on file with Author). See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-711. This is also the rule under the Georgia Act. Memorandum
of Hon. David Imahara, ALJ, to Author (Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with Author).
586
CAL. LABOR CODE § 5910 (West 2012). See Ulrich v. Workmen’s
Compensation Appeals Board, 123 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (Cal. Ct. App.1975).
587
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 51.52.050(b) (West 2012).
588
Ex parte Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133, 1137
n.3 (Ala. 1998).
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paper tiger, deprived of any meaningful significance until some
remote review, this policy may be defeated. The earliest observers of
workers’ compensation systems recognized the phenomenon. Dodd,
for example, stated that it “clearly appears that the burden of the
delay occasioned by court review of a compensation award [and the
attendant stay on benefits] rests primarily on the claimant.”589 This
was true in the 1930s and it can be true today. In Utah, for example,
an appeal from ALJ to Appeals Board creates an automatic stay.
According to a claimant’s attorney:
The stay remains on appeals to the Court of Appeals
or Utah Supreme Court except in cases of permanent
total disability [PTD] . . . . In non-[PTD] claims,
benefits are never paid on appeal . . . . Since our
Motions For Review to the Commissioner were taking
three years (this is being fixed) by the time a case got
through the Utah Supreme Court, it was normally six
or seven years since the original claim was filed . . . .
[This is d]evastating to injured workers.590
The act of making the WCJ the final fact-finder in a
jurisdiction has not always been accompanied by a corresponding
setting-aside of the automatic stay. Indeed, in 1999 a WCRI
researcher reported that “[a]mong 22 of the 36 jurisdictions with an
administrative appellate forum an appeal stays the formal hearing
decision without qualification. In five jurisdictions, an appeal stays
part of the formal hearing decision.”591 Among these were
jurisdictions where the WCJ had been made the fact-finder. Under
the Minnesota Act, for example, “The decision from the formal
hearing and obligation to pay will be stayed pending the appeal (if
timely appealed) until a final determination is made by the Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court for the State
of Minnesota. Then the obligation to pay kicks in.”592 The states of
589
590

DODD, supra note 47, at 395.
Memorandum from Dawn Atkin, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Oct. 13,

2011).
591

BALLANTYNE, supra note 18, at 56.
Memorandum from Charlene K. Feenstra, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq.
(Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with Author).
592
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Colorado593 and Connecticut594 also seem to be in this category.
However, many states, like Connecticut, have provisions indicating
that non-disputed amounts are to be paid despite any appeal.595
It is odd that the law is so backward in jurisdictions where
reform is focused on expediting the potential delivery of benefits
through more immediate finality in adjudication. The National
Commission was certainly of the view that the stay should be
abolished, although it did not record this assertion as one of its
“essential recommendations.”596 The Report states as follows:
The decision of the hearing examiner could be
appealed to the appeals board, which could overrule
the hearing examiner on questions of fact and of law.
The decision of the hearing examiner, however,
should be presumed correct and the appeal should not
stay the examiner’s award.597
The availability of the stay is known to prompt liable
employers to prosecute appeals. This hard-to-resist act is often
undertaken regardless of the likelihood of ultimate appellate success.
Rather, the perverse motivation is delay, coupled with the sanguine
hope that the claimant will be leveraged to a more modest
compromise settlement.598 Whatever the intent, researchers have

593

§ 8-43-301(12) (2011).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-301 (2012).
595
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-301(d) (2012).
596
NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at
129 (Emphasis added).
597
Id.
598
See BALLANTYNE, supra note 425, at 73. According to these WCRI
researchers, workers’ attorneys alleged that the availability of automatic stay
“create[d] a perverse incentive for employers and insurers, who can use appeals . . .
to gain leverage during negotiations.” Id. This was also the assertion in Ex parte
Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133 (Ala. 1995) (claimant
alleging that employer took advantage of the posting of bond simply to leverage
him to settle: employer allegedly “intentionally discontinued the payments in hopes
that [he] would consent to a post-judgment settlement of his claim at terms far less
favorable” than those of the circuit court award.”).
594

COL. REV. STAT. ANN.
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often found that appeal is more likely given availability of an
automatic stay.599
IX. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN ASSIGNING THE FACT-FINDING
FUNCTION
In many states, reform-minded legislatures, motivated by a
desire to streamline dispute resolution, have equipped the WCJ with
final fact-finding power.600 While in some jurisdictions, the WCJ has
long been the final fact-finder, other states have had to undertake
fundamental institutional changes for WCJs to gain this status.601
Through a process of evolutionary convergence, the WCJ in the
present day, in about half of the states, is not master, but
chancellor.602
A number of issues are implicated by the WCJ ascension to
such extraordinary power.
It is worthy to inquire whether this
approach has in fact brought increased efficiency, accuracy, and other
benefits. Another issue is whether investing the WCJ with such
power creates concerns of its own – in particular, accountability.
A. Streamlining Adjudicatory Processes
“Efficiency” is often said to be a rationale for making the
judge in any system the final fact-finder.603 In a discussion of the
central panel movement, one commentator notes:
With respect to many issues, especially issues of fact, the
ALJ’s decision will reflect the result of an impartial evidentiary
hearing, so allowing the agency an opportunity to modify the ALJ’s
599

Id. (noting that one reason that many employer appeals were
prosecuted at the time was the effect of the automatic stay); DUNCAN S.
BALLANTYNE AND TELLES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN WISCONSIN:
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 72, 113 (Workers Compensation Research Institute
ed.,1992) (“Appeal to LIRC stays the judge’s decision, providing some incentive to
appeal when benefits have been awarded.”).
600
See supra Section V(F).
601
See supra Section V(G).
602
See supra Section I (quick reference table categorizing states).
603
See, e.g., Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing
Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 6
(1999).
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findings introduces an inefficiency, especially if the agency is
required to reevaluate some or all [of] the evidence previously
presented before the ALJ.604
This analysis applies in the workers’ compensation sphere.
Assuming that the WCJ is competent and impartial, it seems wasteful
and inefficient for a commission, upon the losing party’s appeal, to
re-examine the record and come up with its own factual
determinations. More importantly, the pendency of the appeal can be
wasteful for the parties, as both injured worker and employer,
waiting for the final decision on the facts to be issued, frequently
place their affairs on an indefinite hold.
When a workers’ compensation commission can reassess the
facts, and it is known for doing so, it is irresistible for counsel for the
losing side to recommend such an appeal.605 The universal resolve of
the losing party is to seek the proverbial “second bite of the apple.”606
Researchers, in interviewing system participants of various states,
including Michigan,607 Missouri,608 Oregon,609 and Virginia,610 over
recent decades invariably received such reports.

604

Id.
Comments of David Menchetti, Esq. to Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (on file
with Author) (indicating that with de novo review from Arbitrator to Commission
in Illinois, a lawyer’s instinct is to seek review); Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esq.,
Chicago, IL, to the Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (same). See also Malcom B. Parsons,
The Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law, 6 U. FLA. L. REV.
481, 518 (1953) (“[T]he sheer volume of appellate cases in Florida is greatest in
those procedural areas in which the substantial evidence rule has been so
formulated as to foster the greatest likelihood of upsetting administrative findings,
and that here the petitioners have usually not been individuals of limited means but
rather corporations engaged in the transportation or insurance businesses.”).
606
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL A. TELLES, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION IN MISSOURI: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 70 (Workers
Compensation Research Institute ed.,1993).
607
HUNT, supra note 268, at 43 (referring to both the policymakers’
frustrations that, as of 1985, a “five-year backlog of cases” existed at the Appeal
Board and the aggravating effect of de novo review which meant that “the loser at
the hearing level could get another chance on appeal.”).
608
BALLANTYNE, supra note 606, at 70.
609
See BALLANTYNE, supra note 398.
610
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL A. TELLES, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION IN VIRGINIA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 14 (Workers
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1994).
605
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WCRI researcher, Ballantyne, commenting on pre-reform
Georgia practice, stated:
A combination of factors account for the 46 percent
rate of appeals to the board. Insurers, attorneys, and
board officials state that de novo review encourages
appeals by permitting a “second bite of the apple”; an
appeal stays the judge’s decision; there is little cost to
appeal; and the outcomes suggest that there is a
reasonable chance (thirty three percent) that appeal
will result in a different outcome.611
Further, with the availability of de novo review, some lawyers
view the failure to seek such review as malpractice.612
This phenomenon strongly suggests that where the
commission lacks such power, and the WCJ is the final fact-finder,
the losing party will be less likely to entertain and accept a
recommendation for an appeal. This dynamic may, however, be
impacted if appeal results in an automatic stay.
In any event, in Pennsylvania, where the WCJ is the final
fact-finder, counsel for the losing party usually counsels the client
against an appeal when the loss has turned on a negative credibility
determination.613
This is because the law establishing the
Pennsylvania WCJ as the final fact-finder has been around for
decades, and the Pennsylvania Appeal Board is obedient to that rule
and ignores demands that credibility be reassessed.614 Appeal rates
from Pennsylvania WCJ awards are minimal and reversals on
credibility are unheard of.615 WCRI researcher Peter Barth made a
similar finding in his 1987 study of the Connecticut system:

611

BALLANTYNE, supra note 425, at 73.
Comments from Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file
with Author) (stating also that in light of the successive levels of de novo review in
Ohio, “If there’s denial on it, my staff knows to appeal.”).
613
Comments to the Author of Barbara E. Holmes, Esq. (April 16, 2012)
(on file with Author).
614
This statement is based on the Author’s experience.
615
The Author has been a Pennsylvania WCJ since 1993, and he has been
reversed by the Appeal Board on credibility grounds only once during that period.
612
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Few appeals are successful. . . . Many denials of
appeals have been based on the CRD’s [viz.,
Compensation Review Division’s] consistent position
that a commissioner’s conclusion cannot be reviewed
when it rests on the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. This view, perhaps in
conjunction with the low rate of success, largely
explains the small number of appeals to the CRD.616
Perhaps Georgia practice may be contrasted. There, the ALJ
of the Georgia Board is not the final fact-finder. 617 Upon the losing
party’s appeal, the three-member Board of the Appellate Division,
though not undertaking de novo review, may reassess credibility.618
According to the Chief ALJ, in a recent year, 800 final decisions
were issued and a full 689 were subject to an appeal to the Appellate
Division.619 (Most decisions were ultimately affirmed. Still, it is not
unheard of for the well-regarded Georgia Board to reassess the
facts.)620
The most prominent example of streamlining adjudication
through reform is, of course, the abolition of the Texas trial de novo
procedure.621 Investing the Hearing Officer’s decision with finality,
and restricting the availability of trial, eliminated the acute litigation
crisis in the Texas system.622
On that occasion, the writer had awarded benefits to a claimant, and the
Commonwealth Court, on the worker’s further appeal, restored the award.
616
PETER S. BARTH, supra note 22, at 24.
617
See supra Section VI(B).
618
See id. At the Appellate Division, the award of the ALJ must be
upheld if supported by the law, and by a preponderance of the evidence. GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-9-103 (2011).
619
Hon. Melodie Belcher, Chief ALJ, Remarks at the National
Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary College Comparative Law Panel
(Aug. 22, 2011).
620
See supra Section VI(B).
621
See supra Section V.
622
See supra Section V(F). As discussed above, eliminating the jury trial
de novo in Texas was intended to address a litigation crisis. See id. Some critics
have charged that the restrictions on attorney’s fees, when coupled with the
limitations on trial remedies, has unfairly leveraged injured workers. See id.
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Making the WCJ the final fact-finder should also streamline
dispute resolution by promoting voluntary settlement, compromise or
otherwise, as early as possible during the litigation. In general, of
course, if both sides to a contested case possess a reasonable belief,
or anxiety, that they may not prevail, they will likely be amenable to
the idea of settlement. If this risk of loss is one potentially to be dealt
by a first-level WCJ whose critical findings are final, the likelihood
of early willingness to consider voluntary settlement should be
enhanced.623 This is so as no “second bite of the apple” – that is,
commission reassessment of the facts – will be available to delay the
voluntary settlement decision. Under the Pennsylvania practice, this
assertion seems to be borne out. The parties are much more likely to
want to enter into a compromise settlement before the WCJ makes
his or her ruling than after the same – that is, while the losing side’s
likely fruitless appeal to the Board is pending.
The Author is not of the school that believes that every
workers’ compensation case should be compromise-settled, and too
many such settlements can and have subverted a workers’
compensation system.624 Still, many cases that are subject to a bona
fide dispute can and should be settled as soon as possible. Injecting
finality into the initial fact-finding and adjudication should promote
this goal.625

623

For a theoretical discussion of this phenomenon, see BALLANTYNE,
supra note 30, at 29-30. Among other things, the authors state:
Economic theory gives us a fundamental insight into the decision
to settle: The parties’ expectations about the outcome at formal
hearing determine their willingness to settle. Two forces seem to
be at work here. First, the higher expected cost of a formal
hearing, the more likely the settlement. Second, the greater the
disparity in the parties’ expectations, the more likely a formal
hearing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
624
See Torrey, supra note 157, at 443-44 (pointing out negatives in the
Pennsylvania C&R scheme).
625
It is important to remember, however, that many factors go into the
parties’ decision whether or not to settle and at what point to settle in the litigation
process.
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B. Advantages in Making the WCJ the Fact-Finder
The Florida and Arizona courts that ruled that the first-level
compensation judge should be the final arbiter of credibility did so, in
part, based on the reasoning that it was the judge, not some remote
board, that actually saw and heard the witnesses.626 Of course, this
preference finds its heritage in the common law, which generally
calls for deference to the fact-findings of the individual who heard
the witnesses and assessed their demeanor.627 This factor endures as
an additional benefit of investing the WCJ with final fact-finding
authority. Having the WCJ as final fact-finder should, in short,
enhance the accuracy of decision-making.628
To this Author, two values – efficiency and accuracy – are the
most powerful arguments for making the WCJ the final fact-finder.
Two further arguments, however, exist in favor of investing the judge
with this power. These are the values of independence in the judging
process and promoting transparency and fairness. The Author has
discussed the efficiency value above. The values of accuracy,
independence, and transparency are discussed below.
1. Finality and Accuracy in Decision-making
Courts reviewing workers’ compensation cases have endorsed the
common-law view629 that the credibility determinations of the first626

See supra Section V(D).
Timony, supra note 8, at 903. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S.
at 496 (indicating that an agency, though not bound by ALJ decision, should not
ignore the findings of fact and credibility determinations contained in initial federal
ALJ order).
628
See generally Rossi, supra note 603, at 6 (identifying accuracy as a
benefit of ALJ adjudicatory finality).
629
Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 872 (2nd Cir. 1949) (“Trial on oral
testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in open
court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent, distinctive, and most
valuable features of the common-law system . . . . For only in such a trial can the
trier of the facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses’ demeanor; and that
demeanor – absent, of course, when trial is by affidavit or deposition – is
recognized as an important clue to witness’ credibility.”).
For a tour de force treatment of the importance of demeanor evidence, see
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 903 (2000). The
author questioned the ability of the district court judge to reverse the credibility
627
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level hearing officer should be accorded deference, if not finality.
This is so because of the WCJ’s advantage of having seen and heard
the witnesses. To so venture in the workers’ compensation context
was unremarkable even in the 1930s.630
As a 1966 Arizona court declared, in holding that the WCJ
was the final fact-finder:
It is the referee who hears the testimony, observes the
demeanor of the petitioner, and is best able to judge
the reliability and credibility of the witnesses who
have testified at the hearing. Absent testimony before
them, the Industrial Commission in reviewing the
hearings before the referee, is in the same position as
an appellate court in that both the Commission and the
appellate court must evaluate the evidence from the
record presented.631

determinations of a federal magistrate. This is a “more dubious exception to the
modern trend of live testimony . . . ” He noted the Supreme Court’s comment that
a “district court’s reversal of those findings that are based upon the magistrate’s
observation of the witness’s demeanor ‘could well give rise to serious questions’ of
due process.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). See also Note,
Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative Hearing Officer, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1968).
630
See CAMPBELL, supra note 95, at 970 (1935) (“It is the most trite of all
observations that the impression received by one who has presided at the trial . . .
may be altogether different from that received by one from a mere perusal of a
transcript and a record of the trial . . . . [The] trial court. . . is thus in a better
position to pass upon the weight or sufficiency of the evidence.”).
631
Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602, 606 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966),
reversed, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967). The Court of Appeals’ decision was, after
reversal, ratified by the legislature, and the above declaration is now in the law.
See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1951) (indicating
that an agency should not ignore the findings of fact and credibility determinations
contained in an initial federal ALJ order).

164

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

Perhaps it was on this reasoning that the National
Commission, in its 1972 report, admonished that the “decision of the
hearing examiner. . . should be presumed correct . . . .632
Many further articulations of this benefit may be found in
court precedent. A leading New Mexico court opined, in this regard:
An appellate court does not observe the demeanor of
live witnesses, cannot see a shift of the eyes, sweat, a
squirm, a tear, a facial expression, or take notice of
other signs that may mean the difference between
truth and falsehood to the fact finder. Even an
inflection in the voice can make a difference in the
meaning. The sentence, “She never said she missed
him,” is susceptible of six different meanings,
depending on which word is emphasized.633
It is not only demeanor that supports the common-law view.
“A live witness, facing a possible attack on his credibility, serves two
significant purposes. First, the trier of fact can observe the witness’s
demeanor, and second, he can inspire the witness to testify truthfully
to ‘ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process.’”634 This may
be called the “deterrent effect” of live testimony, “as it may prevent
the dishonest witness from testifying untruthfully, and thus, increases
the acceptability of trial outcomes.”635
Of interest are the rulings of Pennsylvania courts. In this
regard, no constitutional mandate exists that the fact-finder must
personally see and hear the witness in every administrative law
case.636 However, in a workers’ compensation case, if a party seeks
NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, THE REPORT OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS108
(1972).
633
Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363, 366 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
634
Timony, supra note 8, at 918 (quotation omitted).
635
Id. at 933.
636
Peak v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Rev., 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1985).
In this case, the claimant contended that “an administrative decision based on . . . a
[transcript only] finding is arbitrary governmental action in violation of due process
. . . .” Id. at 1385 The claimant advanced “the proposition that the legislature can
constitutionally entrust an administrative power to find facts resolving conflicting
evidence on grounds of credibility only to the board or official who conducts the
632

THE
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cross-examination of a witness, he or she is entitled to have the WCJ
be present.
The judge may not oblige the parties to take
637
depositions.
Not all are, however, convinced that assessment of witness
credibility is dispositive of the issue of whether the ALJ should be
the final arbiter of credibility:
[One] study . . . raises questions about the principal
advantage of ALJs, often cited in support of their final
order authority in either limited or full form, the ALJ’s
presence during the witnesses’ testimony. While
intuition suggests that the person who hears the
witness testify is in a better position to judge
credibility, the results of cases reviewed on appeal in
North Carolina do not support it.
ALJ
recommendations (presumably based in part on
credibility determinations) are affirmed at about the
same rate as agency decisions, even when the key
issue is one of fact. This is consistent with research
that establishes that viewing the appearance and
demeanor of the witness does not improve the fact
finder’s ability to identify deception on the stand . . . .
Moreover, any advantage derived from hearing the
witness relates primarily to “adjudicative” facts of
who, what, when, and where. Demeanor evidence is
less likely to be persuasive when expert testimony is
at issue.638

hearing at which the record is made . . . .” Id. The court rejected this argument. If
the UCBR provides some level of reasons for its decision, thus accommodating
substantial evidence review, due process is afforded; no constitutional right exists
to have one’s property rights determined by a fact-finder who has actually seen and
heard the testimony. Indeed, such is not required by the federal Administrative
Procedures Act. In so ruling, the court limited the import of another precedent.
See Treon v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Rev., 453 A.2d 960 (Pa. 1982).
637
Otis Elevators v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harding), 651 A.2d 667
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). See TORREY, supra note 70, § 13:103.
638
Flanagan, supra note 16, at 1397 (citing, among other things, Gregory
L. Ogden, The Role of Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses
in Fact Finding: The Views of ALJs, 20 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1

166

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

These are thoughtful comments. And, of course, with regard
to expert medical testimony, many courts put them into practice.639
Further, other factors like plausibility, corroboration, consistency,
and lack of secondary motivations, all of which can be gained by a
cold record, can be critical to the final credibility determination.640
Still, it is difficult to conceptualize the increasingly remote
commission being in a better position than the WCJ to judge
credibility in workers’ compensation cases. Even those content with
appellate panel reassessments of credibility will allow as a fiction the
idea that an absent party can accurately judge lay witness credibility.
The superiority of judge finality is especially manifest in
workers’ compensation cases. The omnipresent issue is, after all, the
presence or absence of pain and impairment and the consequent
alleged inability to work. Determinations on these issues are, by
their very nature, dependent on direct interface with the injured
worker. Many, if not most, contested cases deal with subjective
factors that are resistant to determination from transcripts.
Further, under the Pennsylvania practice, and those of a
number of states,641 the WCJ actually encounters the claimant – and
on occasion other critical witnesses – in a series of hearings. The
WCJ gains a benefit from this process: the opportunity to see and
hear the witnesses on a number of occasions. The benefit accrues
because the witness’ testimony at an initial hearing may well be
coached, whereas at a subsequent meeting he or she may be more
natural. By the third and final hearing, an insincere witness may
have totally “forgotten the script” and the WCJ may then be
presented with a more truthful picture of the events in question. This
“re-evaluative,” live, fact-finding experience, cannot be replicated by
review of a cold record. The Author has defended this series of

(2000) (finding that state ALJs do not rely on demeanor evidence)) (citation
omitted).
639
See supra Section VII(B).
640
See generally John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION No. 3,
A.B.A.
Spring,
2007,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/abapubs/lrc/pdfs/kane.pdf.
641
BALLANTYNE, supra note 18, at 50 (identifying fifteen jurisdictions
“that typically hold multiple formal hearing sessions.”).
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hearings642 against the reasonable charge that, if not tightly
administered, the procedure can lead to delay and excessive attorney
costs. “The only gift the killer Time bestows,” however, “is to allow
us to see, on later viewings, what it was that we missed the first time
around.”643 The WCJ, in short, lives with his or her cases,644 and is
in the best position to find the facts.
2. Assuring Independence in Fact-Finding
“The banners of judicial dignity,” it has been said, are the
related principles of independence and impartiality. 645 These values
could be enhanced by making the WCJ the final fact-finder. If a
system removes the fact-finding task from a politically-appointed
commission, and places the responsibility with an independent,
professional judge, any inappropriate politics in the adjudication
process should be ameliorated.
In the workers’ compensation context, the traditional
independence concern has been that executive branch officials, lobby
groups, or individuals, will try to pressure commissions or judges to
make findings or legal conclusions in some particular way, to in turn
vindicate some internal or external goal. Such efforts deprive the
fact-finder of “decisional” independence,646 and certainly the
commission or ALJ that rolls over in the face of such pressure will
commit an ethical violation. The traditional impartiality concern,

642

TORREY, supra note 70, § 13:124.
GORE VIDAL, PALIMPSEST 578-79 (1995) (invoking Proust).
644
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
645
Symposium, Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial
Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 715
(1997) (“The independence of the judiciary ensures the rule of law, and ensures
that validly enacted laws are enforced and given their full scope. If judges
implement an agenda, pursuant to legislative or other lobbying, the result would be
“to substitute political will for the rule of law.”). See also John L. Gedid, ALJ
Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33 (2002).
646
See Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp.2d 722, 725 (E.D. Ark. 1999). In
this case, an Arkansas workers’ compensation ALJ was fired by the Commission,
and she alleged “that her exercise of quasi-judicial independence and impartiality,
as reflected in her written opinions, caused her to be discharged.” Id. According to
the federal court, “This case . . . plainly involves quasi-judicial ‘decisional
independence.’” Id. at 724-25.
643
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meanwhile, has been that a judge or commissioner will find facts one
way or the other because of politically-motivated factors or other
bias. Iowa system participants, for example, told a WCRI researcher
in 2004 “that the politically appointed appellate person (the division
commissioner) can influence the value of cases depending in the
leanings of the appointing governor.”647
Of course, no adjudicatory system can possess or maintain its
integrity without a commitment to the values of independence and
impartiality.648 A distinguished Colorado ALJ admonishes, “The
decisional independence of judges, including judges of the
administrative law judiciary, is the cornerstone of our constitutional
separation of powers….” “The administrative law judge’s obligation
to be decisionally independent,” he posits, “is the same as the
obligation of a judicial branch judge.”649 This is certainly the case in
workers’ compensation adjudication. To recall Larson’s admonition,
the commission “while deciding controverted claims . . . is as far
toward the judicial end of the spectrum as it is possible to go without
being an outright court.”650
Under many administrative structures, the commission is by
design a political entity.651 In theory, the commission knows that,
when sitting as fact-finder in a contested case, its political role is set
aside. It becomes an impartial fact-finder no less than the common
pleas court. Still, experience suggests that commissions can be

647

BALLANTYNE, supra note 374, at 92.
Judicial ethics codes invariably admonish that the ALJ is to preserve
judicial independence.
The Ethics Code of the Pennsylvania Workers’
Compensation Act, for example, mandates, in a hortatory tone, “A workers’
compensation judge shall . . . (13) Uphold the integrity and independence of the
workers’ compensation system.” 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2504(13).
649
Edwin L. Felter, Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary:
The Right and Wrong Kind, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 157, 162 (2008). See also
generally Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision
Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary,
25 J. NAT’L ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2005).
650
LARSON, supra note 1, § 79:90.
651
See, e.g., Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384
N.W.2d 728, 749 (Mich. 1986) (“Members of boards and commissions are
generally appointed by the Governor and sometimes by the Legislature. The
members are accountable only to the appointing authority . . . .”).
648
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subject to external pressures or, of their own accord, act politically in
the judging process.
The issue is a delicate one. In a renowned Michigan episode
of the 1980s, for example, civil service-protected referees, who had
been dismissed from their employment, sued for their jobs. They
alleged that it was unlawful, as injecting politics into the fact-finding
process, for the legislature to substitute in their place a “Board of
Magistrates,” who were subject to political appointment and timelimited terms. The court, in a bit of irony, held that it was in fact
unremarkable for someone in the position of judge to be subject to
political accountability. The court, indeed, found that the enhanced
fact-finding authority of the Magistrate, one of the innovations of the
1983 amendments, argued for further political accountability:
The legislative decision to constitute persons whose
decisions have that importance as members of a board
or commission who serve by gubernatorial
appointment for fixed terms for the purpose of
removing them from civil service and subjecting their
appointment and retention to the political process is
entirely consistent with constitutional principles that
contemplate that persons exercising certain kinds of
power shall or may be made politically accountable.
That
legislative
decision
making
workers’
compensation hearing officers more accountable in the
political process was made in conjunction with the
legislative decision to make their decisions more final
and
hence
more
important.652
In any event, a rare public example of a threat to
independence – admirably resisted – occurred in South Carolina.
There, pro-business reforms had failed to enact strict adherence to the
AMA Guides by the South Carolina commissioners.653 Instead, the
commissioners were not prohibited from considering other factors to

652

Id.
Governor says order did not change law on awarding disability
benefits,
RISK
AND
INSURANCE
ONLINE
(Nov.
6,
2007),
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=152421737.
653
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potentially increase an award.654 The Governor, however, in 2007
issued an order to the commissioners “in all contested cases to
strictly apply either [the] AMA Guides or any other accepted medical
treatise or authority in making their injury compensation
determinations . . . .”655 Many observers correctly viewed this
directive, Executive Order 2007-16, to constitute an assault on the
judicial independence of the commissioners.656
An attorney
representing claimants filed a federal court lawsuit over the order.657
And, in fact, the commissioners unanimously refused to comply with
the order, replying that “it will continue to apply the standards set
forth in the act, and that adjudications under the state comp system
will be conducted with ‘impartiality, independence and in accord
with law.’”658 A law professor, meanwhile, authored a deft criticism
in the journal of the South Carolina Bar.659 Ultimately, the Governor
abandoned his effort to leverage the commissioners to strictly apply

654

Id.
31-10 S.C. Reg. 4 (Oct. 26, 2007).
656
John Freeman, Ethics Watch: Executive Order 2007-16, 19 SOUTH
CAROLINA LAWYER 8 (November 2007).
657
Monaco v. South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, No.
6:07-cv-4150-GRA, 2008 WL 163059 (D.S.C. Jan. 15, 2008).
658
Id.
659
John Freeman, Ethics Watch: Executive Order 2007-16, 19 S.C.
LAWYER 8 (Nov. 2007):
655

[I]f the Order’s intent is to pressure or intimidate the
commissioners as judges hearing public legal disputes, then it is a
most disturbing document. People who are involved in the
administration of justice are not to be threatened. This is central
to having a nation that operates under a credible rule of law. . . .
If the Order’s intent was to pressure commissioners – that is,
judges – to change the law quietly on a case-by-case basis out of
fear for their jobs, it would represent conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice and would be highly improper if not
illegal. . . .
An attempt to change existing law by executive order puts the
commissioners in an untenable ethical position, for it asks them
to forsake their obligation to follow the law, which they are
sworn to do, and move in another direction, which for them is
unethical territory.
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the AMA Guides and he agreed that he did not have the authority to
do so.660
This South Carolina episode was a rare public exposition of
politics and the politically-appointed commission.
The more
common charge is that the proclivities of the commission members
have caused them to rule, upon appeal of the WCJ’s decision, in a
pre-conceived or otherwise biased manner.661 As noted above, for
example, members of the claimants’ bar insist that the Mississippi
Commission is biased in favor of the employers’ side.662 A similar
assertion was made by an Arkansas claimants’ attorney, who filed a
legal ethics complaint against two Arkansas Commission members,
claiming that they and other commission officials were “excessively
pro-employer and [were] trying to drive him out of workers comp
practice.”663
The superior design would also feature the final fact-finder
WCJ being invested with employment protections. Every judge can
and should be accountable in terms of ethics, skill, and
productivity.664 Still, via employment protections, he or she can
exercise the fact-finding function unconcerned about discharge or
discipline by a politically-motivated agency displeased with his or
her decisions.665

Id.
660

Governor drops move to require comp commission to accept new
standards,
RISK
AND
INSURANCE
ONLINE
(Aug.
26,
2008),http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=144386416 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2012); Governor Comes Around to Commission’s View, WORKERS’ COMP
NEWS
(Summer
2008),
http://www.scselfinsurers.com/newsletters/2008summer.pdf.
661
See discussion supra Section VI (preliminary comments).
662
Id.
663
Doug Smith & Max Brantley, Lawyer Files Ethics Complaint Against
Workers
Comp
Commission,
Arkansas
Times,
Apr.
7,
2005,
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/lawyer-files-ethics-complaint-against-workerscomp-commission/Content?oid=868487.
664
See infra Section IX(C)(1).
665
See generally Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark.
1999). In this case, an Arkansas ALJ was fired by the Commission, and she
alleged “that her exercise of quasi-judicial independence and impartiality, as
reflected in her written opinions, caused her to be discharged.” Id. at 724.
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The most familiar device is, as discussed above, the creation
of a “central panel” of executive branch judges that is independent of
the various agencies of state government and, hence, free of the
political pressures that may exist within the agency.666 As noted
above, workers’ compensation adjudicators have not typically been
included in a central panel.667 The states of Colorado, Michigan (a
recent development), Minnesota, and Wyoming are notable
exceptions.668
An approach in lieu of a central panel is erection of a
“firewall” in the state agency between administration and
adjudication.669 In a 1996 Pennsylvania reform, for example, the
legislature established within the Department of Labor & Industry an
“Office of Adjudication” that operates separately from the “Bureau
of Workers’ Compensation.”670 The latter is responsible for
enforcing the statute, providing oversight, and executing policy,
while the former is responsible for mediation and adjudication.
3. Promoting Transparency
The transparency of the workers’ compensation process, that
is, its “openness and comprehensibility,”671 is promoted by having
the WCJ as the fact-finder. Certainly this is so for the injured

666

Edwin L. Felter, Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403 (2001) (arguing for central panels, and enumerating things
the legislature can do to ensure ALJ independence); Julian Mann, III,
Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1639,
1641 (2001) (explaining that the North Carolina “Office of Administrative
Hearings is established to ensure that administrative decisions are made in a fair
and impartial manner to protect the due process rights of citizens who challenge
administrative action and to provide a source of independent administrative law
judges to conduct administrative hearings in contested cases . . . and thereby
prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the
administrative process.”).
667
See id.
668
See supra Section V(A).
669
See generally Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and
Maintenance of “Ethics Walls” in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2004).
670
See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501-2502.
671
MASHAW, supra note 24, at 90.
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workers and employers that are the parties to the contested case.672
For most people, it is counterintuitive to believe that someone
reading a cold transcript can do better at finding the facts than the
judge who sat through the testimony. “[P]ersonal contact between
fact finders and witnesses is deeply ingrained in the American legal
system,”673 but such contact is also an expectation in a society where
citizens take their rights seriously.
Adjudication based on live testimony of witnesses is also
important in engendering confidence in the public about adjudication.
“The function of a trial,” after all:
is not only to ensure the correct and just resolution of
a dispute, but to serve as a substitute for self-help so
that the government may maintain its monopoly on the
use of force. A trial serves this function best to the
extent it satisfies the expectations of the litigants
involved. Thus the appearance of scrupulous fairness
may be as important as fairness itself and a litigant
may consider a trial more fairly conducted where the
judge who hears the evidence also makes the
decision.674
The idea that a board or commission far removed, physically
and temporally, from the trial can overthrow the fact findings of the
same surely strikes the layman as strange. It is an unfair cliché to
posit that workers’ compensation proceedings are Kafkaesque.
However, if in so saying we mean that an individual may begin “to
see himself as an object, susceptible to infinite manipulation by ‘the
system,’”675 proceedings involving de novo review seem to fit the
bill.

672

See id.
Neil Fox, Telephonic Hearings in Welfare Appeals: How Much
Process is Due?, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 453 (1984) (rejecting idea that
telephone hearings are sufficient to protect due process, asserting that credibility
cannot be assessed over the phone).
674
Note, Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative
Hearing Officer, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1325-26 (1968).
675
MASHAW, supra note 24, at 91.
673
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C. The Challenge of Making the WCJ the Fact-Finder:
Accountability
A significant challenge, judge accountability, accompanies
investing a single individual with the extraordinary authority of final
fact-finding. A number of approaches to ensuring accountability
exist and have been discussed at length in the legal literature.676
1. Accountability via Hiring Assessment, Performance Evaluation,
and Ethical Codes
The traditional method of assuring judicial accountability is,
of course, the appeal.677 Many commentators, however, have
pointed out that in “mass justice” programs presided over by
administrative agency personnel, appellate review alone is not
sufficient to satisfy the accountability goal.678 The first additional

676
The Author, notably, is routinely subject to efforts at ensuring his
accountability. These include (1) the import of an aggrieved party’s appeal – or the
prospect of the same; (2) an initial employment interview to determine the potential
for impartiality and even temperament; (3) ongoing yearly performance
evaluations; (4) evaluation by the local bar association; (5) compliance with the
Pennsylvania Act’s requirements for continuing education in the field; and (6)
fidelity to the law’s ethical code.
677
Assuring accountability is addressed, of course, via diligent
employment by intra-agency and judicial review of the substantial evidence, whole
record, and “clearly erroneous” standards of review. See Rossi, supra note 603, at
12 (“properly applied, standards of review can restore the constitutional balance
that may be lost by the increasing trend towards ALJ final order authority.”).
LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6] et seq.) (identifying various formulations
applied in workers’ compensation statutes).
678
This assertion is a major proposition of the classic article by social
insurance scholar Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772
(1974). The article focuses on processes such as first-level examiner review of
SSDI and other claims, but the analysis transfers to the present context. Among
other things, Mashaw states that:

the elements of fairness or fair procedure normally associated
with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims
adjudications. Due process in the social welfare context therefore
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approach is to ensure at the outset that the potential judge is one of
high caliber. As Justice Frankfurter commented in precisely this
context, “The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any [appellate
review] standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and
the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its
work.”679
Toward this end, the potential judge must be of such a
personal disposition, that is, temperament, that he or she can be
trusted to treat the parties in an impartial manner. It is critical that a
candidate hired for a WCJ position can preside over contested case
proceedings in a professional manner that will instill in the parties a
feeling that they are being treated fairly.680 An individual invested
with final fact-finding power in cases that involve both sensitive
personal issues and large amounts of money must possess these
qualities.
Another approach is for the judge’s administrative superiors
to annually assess performance in a corporate-style employee
performance evaluation.681 Under the Pennsylvania Act, authority
requires redefinition to include management processes which will
tend to assure the accuracy of claims adjudications.
Id. at 775. Those attributes include “specific notice of adverse factual and legal
claims, opportunity to produce testimony and argue orally, opportunity to crossexamine adverse witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, [and] a decision based wholly
upon the evidentiary record compiled.” Id. See also Koch, supra note 3, at 284
(1994).
679
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Under
the Michigan reforms of 1985, the legislature sought to professionalize the process.
The Michigan Act provides for magistrates’ written exams, interviews of
magistrate candidates, and the criteria of evaluating the performance of magistrates.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.210; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.212. See generally
Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Mich.
1986).
680
See generally Koch, supra note 3, at 295 (“The way one approaches the
process of judging irrevocably affects the fairness and accuracy of the ultimate
determination . . . The selection process must be made sensitive to behavior and
personality factors . . . .”).
681
See Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence
by use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1053 (2002).
The Model State Administrative Procedures Act, notably, supplies the Office of
Administrative Hearings with the power “to establish standards and procedures for
the evaluation, training, promotion, and discipline of administrative law judges . . .”
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for such assessments was, as an example, added to the law as part of
1996 reforms which sought to fully professionalize the WCJ corps.682
Under this EPR process, judges are rated annually on the criteria of
job knowledge and skills, work results (which would cover such
things as the ability to be impartial), effective communication,
“initiative/problem solving,” interpersonal relations, and work
habits.683 The evaluation is recorded on a general-use state form, and
the judge’s administrative superior completes the form by reference
to an extensive document, “Performance Expectations: Workers’
Compensation Judge.”684 This form categorizes performance into
management of cases, conduct of hearing and ADR proceedings,
issuance of decisions, and compliance with continuing education
requirements.
Another type of WCJ evaluation are those by bar associations
and industry groups. These have been undertaken in Pennsylvania
and in Colorado (by the bar)685 and Montana (by industry),686 and
certainly others. In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the City of
Pittsburgh), the local bar developed a concern that a number of the
WCJs displayed significant deficits in terms of legal skills, work
ethic, and temperament. The bar maintained a liaison committee
through which lawyer complaints about judge performance could be
communicated to the chief judge, but this effort had not unfolded
with success.687 The bar felt that it had “no other outlet” to
communicate its dissatisfaction, and in 2008 it included the eight

Model State Admin. Proceedures Act § 4-301(4) (1981). See also McNeil, supra
note 101, at 539.
682
See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2501(h).
683
Pennsylvania WCJ Performance Evaluation (State Form) (completed
sample on file with Author).
684
“Performance Expectations” (on file with Author).
685
See CAROL A. TELLES & SHAWN E. FOX, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN
COLORADO: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 5-6 (1996) (noting that ALJ’s had
recently been rated by the bar on the following criteria: Judicial behavior; adequacy
of preparation; knowledge of the law; compliance with the rules of evidence and
procedure; and completeness and clarity of decisions).
686
See MONTANA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE 2010 JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF THE MONTANA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT (2010), available at
http://www.montanachamber.com/uploads/docs/Voting%20Review%202009/2010
%20Workers'%20Compensation%20Court%20Review.pdf.
687
This statement is made based on the Author’s personal knowledge.
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WCJ’s in its every-four-year Judicial Evaluation Survey.688 In the
end, roughly ninety lawyers (presumably the workers’ compensation
specialists) returned evaluations that rated the WCJs on the criteria of
impartiality, legal ability, diligence, and temperament.689
Pennsylvania Act amendments of 1996, meanwhile,
established a statutory Code of Ethics applicable to WCJs.690 Such
codes are common among state administrative law adjudicatory
schemes, and prior to this 1996 change, indeed, an administrativelyimposed ethical code was in place in Pennsylvania.691 Imposition of
and compliance with such codes are critical to ensure WCJ
accountability, particularly those with final fact-finding authority.692
2. Accountability via “Reasoned Decisions” and the Pennsylvania
Experience
A WCJ who is invested with final fact-finding power should
be required to set forth reasons for his or her credibility
determinations.693 As the social insurance scholar Jerry Mashaw

688

Comments of Christopher Wildfire, Esq., Pittsburgh, PA, to the Author
(Aug. 9, 2011).
689
ALLEGHENY COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2008 JUDICIAL SURVEY (on
file with the Author). The Author is unaware of how the Commonwealth may have
viewed and/or responded to these third-party evaluations.
690
See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2504.
691
DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E. GREENBERG, PA. WORKERS’
COMPENSATION: LAW & PRACTICE,
§ 1:57 (Lawyers Cooperative 1st ed. 2000) (noting that the 1996
amendment ultimately led to the early 2000 abolition of the 1994 Administrative
Code ethical provisions).
692
For the Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State ALJs, prepared by
the
NAALJ,
see
http://www.famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/Education/mcjcsalj.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011). See generally Felter, supra note 649; Krent & DuVall,
supra note 649; Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges:
Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary,
11 WID. J. PUB. L. 7 (2002).
693
See Stephen I. Richman, Reasoned Decisions In Workers’
Compensation Cases, 63 PA. BAR ASS’N QUARTERLY 32 (1992); Stephen I.
Richman, Struggle for Reason and Accountability: Current Concepts of Causation,
Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in Occupational Disease Claims, 90 DICK.
L. REV. 363 (1985-1986).
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asserts, the provision of reasons in an adjudication lends legitimacy
to decision-making; indeed, “the discourse of whyness and of reasongiving is more important [in administrative law] . . . than anywhere
else in American law.”694 And, indeed, several state workers’
compensation acts have codified the rule that the WCJ must provide
reasons for his or her decision. Among these states are Michigan695
and Nebraska.696
In the present day, due process is the animating force that
demands that administrative law adjudicators provide reasons for
their decisions. Still, in the workers’ compensation context the
preferred method of adjudication has always been to accompany the
award or denial with reasons. One of the original Connecticut
commissioners recommended, in 1915, a memorandum giving
reasons for the decision. He set forth this admonition, “however this
may violate the injunction of Lord Mansfield to decide without
giving reasons . . ..” “The memoranda,” he added, perhaps

694
Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 18 (2001).
A related method of assuring accountability is diligent employment by
intra-agency and judicial review of the substantial evidence, whole record, and
“clearly erroneous” standards of review. See Rossi supra note 603, at 12
(“properly applied, standards of review can restore the constitutional balance that
may be lost by the increasing trend towards ALJ final order authority.”). See
LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6] et seq. (identifying various formulations
applied in workers’ compensation statutes).
695
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.847 (providing that “the worker’s
compensation magistrate, in addition to a written order, shall file a concise written
opinion stating his or her reasoning for the order including any findings of fact and
conclusions of law.”).
696
Rule 11(A) of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court provides as
follows:

Reasoned Decisions. All parties are entitled to reasoned decisions
which contain findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
the whole record which clearly and concisely state and explain
the rationale for the decision so that all interested parties can
determine why and how a particular result was reached. The
judge shall specify the evidence upon which the judge relies. The
decision shall provide the basis for a meaningful appellate
review.
NEB. WORKERS’ COMP. CT. R. 11(A).
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optimistically, “may furnish interesting household literature which
will be read and possibly translated and often digested at leisure . . ..
These memoranda are the media also of a good deal of good advice,
often rather homiletic in its form of expression, to the parties whose
interests are concerned.”697
This proposition has been the subject of exhaustive review in
the Pennsylvania system, where throughout the 1970s and 1980s a
grave concern existed over cursory and unsatisfactory decision
making by many workers’ compensation referees. This concern went
directly to the reality that fact-finders had been invested with
considerable power and were not accountable for the decisions that
they were making. At least one lawyer, the indefatigable leader of
the reform effort, was of the view that some referees were abusing
their power, ignoring evidence and refusing to provide reasons for
their decisions.698
Under the resulting 1993 reform amendments, Section 422 of
the Act was altered to read as follows:
All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to
a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole
which clearly and concisely states and explains the
rationale for the decisions so that all can determine
why and how a particular result was reached. The
workers’ compensation judge shall specify the
evidence upon which the adjudicator relies in
conformity with this section. The adjudication shall
provide the basis for a meaningful appellate review.699
The foregoing language, notably, reflects the model statute
proposed in 1992 by the International Association of Industrial

697

BRADBURY, supra note 14, at 977-78 (remarks of Commissioner
George H. Beers).
698
Comments of Stephen I. Richman, Esq., to the Author (Aug. 25, 2011)
(on file with the Author). See also Stephen I. Richman, Reasoned Decisions In
Workers’ Compensation Cases, 63 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 32 (Jan. 1992).
699
77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834 (West 2011).
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Accident Boards and Commissions (IAIABC).700
Critics of the workers’ compensation system were unhappy
that the 1993 amendments did not lead to a regime of better factfinding and more rigorous review, and they called for further reform.
The 1996 amendments added an additional clause to Section 422:
When faced with conflicting evidence, the [WCJ] must
adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or
discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted
evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an
irrational reason; the [WCJ] must identify that
evidence and explain adequately the reasons for its
rejection.701
These amendments have made a difference in the
Pennsylvania practice. WCJs in Pennsylvania who do not abide by
the statute and fail to set forth reasons for their decisions will likely
receive a remand from the Appeal Board or Commonwealth Court.702
It is notable, however, that the state supreme court has not required
the Pennsylvania WCJ to set forth specific reasons for crediting or
discrediting a witness when he or she has actually observed the
individual’s demeanor. According to the Supreme Court, when the
WCJ actually views the witness, a simple, fairly conclusory
statement of credibility or non-credibility is sufficient. With regard
to expert depositions, however, and presumably depositions of
others, some articulation of the bases of the credibility determinations
must be set forth.703

700

Newsletter of American Bar Association, Tort & Insurance Practice
Section, Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability Law Committee 20
(Winter 1994).
701
77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834.
702
See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (UPS), 831 A.2d
784 (Pa Commw. Ct. 2003).
703
Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transport), 828 A.2d
1043 (Pa. 2003). The dissent believed that all credibility determinations should be
explained. Id. at 1055 (Newman, J., concurring and dissenting). For commentary,
see Corey Iannacone, Reasoned Decisions Under the Workers' Compensation Act,
14 WIDENER L.J. 691 (2005).
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X. CONCLUSION
A process of evolutionary convergence has resulted in a
major change in the role of the workers’ compensation judge. To
utilize the now familiar analogy, he or she effectively sits, in roughly
half the states, not as special master but chancellor.704 Of some irony
is that the Connecticut Supreme Court, writing in 1915, long ago
endorsed such a scheme. “If the Act permits each cause to be
appealed and tried de novo . . . its objects will be defeated, and more
delay, less certainty, and more expense will ensue to the claimant
than with the single trial of the old method.”705
The WCJ has ascended to such status in a number of large
states, including Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.706 Meanwhile, in many states where the commission
remains the fact-finder, the WCJ’s fact-findings are normally
accorded significant deference.707 These include such states as
Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, and Virginia. Even in a state like
Arkansas, where the Commission is said to reassess credibility with
some regularity, a justice has remarked upon the notable
professionalization and “upgraded” status of the judges who hear
workers’ compensation cases. “The ALJ,” he admonished, “is no
longer just an aide to the commission or a referee.”708
As submitted above, the Author is persuaded that the values
of efficiency, accuracy, independence of judging, and transparency
make this development a positive one. To so posit is neither bold nor
exotic. Chief Justice Hughes, in holding legitimate the Longshore
Act’s federal Deputy Commissioner as final fact-finder, admonished
in 1942, “To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose
of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact

704

See supra Section I (quick reference table categorizing states).
Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245, 248 (Conn. 1915) (ratifying
statutory scheme under which adjudication of single commissioner was final as to
the facts, without review of same on direct appeal to superior court).
706
See supra Sections V(D), V(E).
707
See supra Section VI(A).
708
Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 733 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ark. 1987).
705
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which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency especially assigned to that task . . . .”709
Of note is that while the Author has used the phrase “trend” in
this article, the gravitation seems to have subsided. The Author’s
research does not reveal a change to any major system since West
Virginia’s amendments in 1995.710 This phenomenon is likely to be
explained in part because of the coextensive relenting of the worst of
the cost and litigation crises that unfolded in the wake of postNational Commission reforms.711
It is a cliché to posit that with significant power comes great
responsibility. Still, the aphorism is applicable in this context. The
WCJ should be made the fact-finder, but an appropriate structure
must be in place to ensure accountability. “Every legal system,” after
all, “strives to meet the dual goals of efficiency and fairness. The
problem is, of course, that efficiency – quick and sure resolution of
claims and disputes – does not always serve the interests of
fairness.”712
The reader may recall, in this vein, the unique Pennsylvania
experience, where the WCJ in 1972 was made final fact-finder and at
once accorded broad civil service protections. These positive
developments took the politics out of judging, but a pattern of abuse
in many regions developed relative to the fact-finding process. This
pattern of abuse engendered public and lawyerly distrust of the

709

Crowell v. Benson, 52 S. Ct. 285, 291, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (U.S. 1942).
According to the Author’s research, Alaska did create, for the firsttime, intra-agency review in 2005.
711
See Barry Lipton & Karen Ayres, Workers’ Compensation Cost
Drivers Through the Years, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME
FROM? WHERE ARE WE GOING? 21 (R. Victor & L. Carrubba, eds., WCRI 2010)
(addressing costs and referring to 1985 to 1990 as the “Meltdown”; 1991 to 1994 as
“Reform”; and 1991 to 2001 as “The Cycle Bottoms Out”).
712
Emily Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers’ Compensation Reform:
A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Legislation, 98
W. VA. L. REV. 23, 161 (1995) (continuing on to posit that “[f]airness requires time
and resources which provide the litigants an opportunity to be heard on issues of
fact and law; fairness also requires attentiveness to maintaining equal access to
justice for all litigants.”).
710
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system.713 In response, an advocacy developed that would once
again restrict WCJ authority and invest intra-agency review with
enhanced power. As recounted above, this advocacy in the end
produced the requirement of reasoned decisions, an accountability
innovation with teeth that has improved adjudication in the state.
This innovation was and is entirely appropriate. The factfinding process is of immense, even pivotal, importance in the
process of adjudication. As an early treatise writer, who was also a
California workers’ compensation referee, posited, “the power to
hear and determine is the power to determine wrongly as well as
rightly.”714

713

See Stephen I. Richman, Struggle for Reason and Accountability:
Current Concepts of Causation, Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in
Occupational Disease Claims, 90 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1985-1986).
714
CAMPBELL, supra note 95, at 1365.
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XI. APPENDICES
A. Table 1: Title, Power, Process
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ADJUDICATORY POWER
FIFTY STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LHWCA (2012)
(“WC” = Workers’ Compensation)
~ David B. Torrey715
State
Title,
1st Lev.
Structure, Adjudication &
1st Level
H.O.
Appeal,
Hearing Officer
Final
with Judicial Standard of
(H.O.)
FactReview
Finder?
of Fact-Findings Reference
(Note: All appellate courts
review for error of law)
Alabama
Trial Judge of the Yes
WC cases litigated in civil court;
County Circuit
appeal to Court of Civil Appeals
Court
and then, with permission, to
state supreme court, where
review is substantial evidence.
See Ex parte Hayes, 70 So. 3d
1211 (Ala. 2011).
Alaska
WC Board of
Yes
WC cases litigated before WC
Dept. of Labor &
Board. Since 2005, decisions of
Workforce
the Board appealed to the Alaska
WC Appeals Commission (Board
Development716
remains final fact-finder); judicial
review in Alaska Supreme Court,
where review is substantial
evidence. Lewis-Walunga v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 249
P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011).
Arizona
ALJ of the
Yes
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
Industrial
with right to an essential
Commission
reconsideration before same
ALJ;717 direct appeal to Court of
Appeals (no intra-agency
Workers’ Compensation Judge, Pennsylvania Department of Labor &
Industry, Pittsburgh, PA. Contact: dtorrey@pa.gov.
716
Alaska: Two members of a quasi-judicial hearing panel of the Alaska
WC Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed benefits claim.
717
Arizona: For a description of this process, authored by the Chief ALJ,
see p.8, Indus. Comm’n of Arizona, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.ica.state.az.us/Commissioners/Forms/2009AnnualReport.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2011).
715
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Arkansas

ALJ of the WC
Commission

No

California

WCJ of the WC
Appeals Board

No

Colorado

ALJ of Office of
Administrative
Courts

Yes

Connecticut

Commissioner of
the WC
Commission

Yes

185

review); appeal thereafter to state
supreme court. Court of Appeals
shows deference to Industrial
Commission fact-findings.
Stewart v. Indus. Comm’n, 2011
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 756
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
with appeal to full WC
Commission, which undertakes
de novo review and is final factfinder; judicial review in Court of
Appeals and thereafter, with
permission, in state supreme
court. Review is substantial
evidence. Hudak-Lee v. Baxter
County Reg'l Hosp. & Risk
Mgmt. Res., 2011 Ark. LEXIS 31
(Ark. 2011).
WC cases litigated before WCJ,
with appeal to the WC Appeals
Board, which may reweigh the
evidence. Appeal thereafter is to
Court of Appeals and, thereafter,
with permission, to state supreme
court. Review is “substantial
evidence in light of the entire
record.” County of Kern v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd., 200 Cal. App. 4th 509 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before a
“central panel” ALJ, with appeal
to the Industrial Claims Appeals
Office (ICAP or “panel”), which
undertakes substantial evidence
review. Appeal thereafter is to
the Colorado Court of Appeals
and then state supreme court.
Review is substantial evidence.
Hire Quest, LLC v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Office, 2011 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1522 (Colo. Ct. App.
2011).
WC cases litigated before a single
Commissioner, with appeal to the
Compensation Review Board of
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Delaware

Industrial
Accident Board
or, upon consent,
hearing officer
(all of Dept. of
Labor, OWC)

Yes

Florida

Judge of Comp’n
Claims (JCC),
Office of JCC’s,
Florida Division
of Administrative
Hearings

Yes

Georgia

ALJ of the Legal
Division, Board
of WC

No

718

32-1

the WC Commission; no
reweighing of the evidence.
Appeal thereafter is to the Court
of Appeals (note: state supreme
court may hear such appeal via
transfer). Review for “clearly
erroneous” findings. Brymer v.
Town of Clinton, 31 A.3d 353
(Conn. 2011).718
WC cases litigated before Board
or its hearing officer; judicial
review in Superior Court and
thereafter in state supreme court.
Review is substantial evidence.
Robbins v. Helmark Steel, 2011
Del. LEXIS 527 (Del. 2011).
WC cases litigated before JCC,
with appeal to 1st Dist. Ct.
Appeals (special jurisdiction over
WC cases), with appeal thereafter
to state supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. Wintz v.
Goodwill, 898 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).719
WC cases litigated before an
ALJ, with appeal to a threemember Board (the Appellate
Division); in their judicial
capacity, the three members of
the Board function as an
appellate review panel, which
hears and reviews cases when a
party files an appeal from an
award of an ALJ; appeal
thereafter to Superior Court,

Connecticut: Brymer v. Town of Clinton, 31 A.3d 353, 359 (Conn.
2011) (a “factual finding is clearly erroneous only in cases in which the record
contains no evidence to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.”).
719
Florida: Wintz v. Goodwill, 898 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (the “standard of review in worker’s compensation cases is whether
competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is
possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments
rejected below.”).
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Hawaii

Hearings Officer
of the Director of
the Disability
Compensation
Division, Dept. of
Labor

No

Idaho

Referee or
Commissioner of
the Industrial
Commission

No721

Illinois

Arbitrator of the
WC Commission

No

720

187

then to state supreme court.
Review is “any evidence.”
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
v. City of Atlanta, 713 S.E.2d
706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).720
WC cases litigated before
Hearings Officer, appeal to Labor
& Industrial Relations Appeals
Board (LIRAB); judicial review
thereafter in Intermediate Court
of Appeals, and then in state
supreme court. Review for
“clearly erroneous” findings.
Alkire-Clemen v. Castle Med.
Ctr., 2010 Haw. App. LEXIS 32
(Haw. Ct. App. 2010).
WC cases litigated before the
Industrial Commission or its
referee; full Commission may
grant reconsideration and alter
findings; appeal thereafter to
Idaho Supreme Court, which
undertakes substantial evidence
review. Fife v. Home Depot,
Inc., 260 P.3d 1180 (Idaho
2011).
WC cases litigated before an
Arbitrator of the Commission;
review thereafter by Commission,
which has “original jurisdiction”
and is not bound by credibility
determinations of arbitrator;
appeal thereafter to district court,
then to appellate court (which has
a “Workers’ Compensation
Commission Division”), and then

Georgia: Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. City of Atlanta, 713 S.E.2d
706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (“In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the
State Board of Workers Compensation must be affirmed by a superior court and by
the Court of Appeals when supported by any evidence in the administrative record.
Erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on
erroneous theories of law, however, are subject to the de novo standard of review.”)
721
Idaho: As a party may appeal directly from a referee’s decision to the
Idaho Supreme Court, in some circumstances the first level fact-finder may be the
final fact-finder.
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Indiana

“Single Hearing
Member” of
Workers’
Compensation
Board

No

Iowa

Deputy
Commissioner,
Division of WC,
“Workforce
Development”
Dept.

No

Kansas

ALJ of the
Division of WC,
Dept. of Labor

No

32-1

to state supreme court.
Review is for whether findings of
fact are “against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” Jacobo
v. Ill. Workers' Comp.
Comm'n, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS
1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).722
WC cases litigated before a single
member of the WC Board; appeal
thereafter to full board, which
generally does not take further
evidence. Judicial review
thereafter in Court of Appeals
(supreme court may take case by
transfer). Review is substantial
evidence. Ind. Spine Group, PC
v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 959
N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2011).
WC cases litigated before the
Deputy Commissioner; any party
aggrieved by a decision of
Deputy Commissioner may
appeal to the Commissioner, who
“may affirm, modify, or reverse
the decision of a deputy
commissioner or the
commissioner may remand . . . .”
Appeal thereafter to District
Court, and then to Supreme
Court; these two courts undertake
substantial evidence review. Bell
Bros. Heating & Air
Conditioning v. Gwinn, 779
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2010).
WC cases litigated before an
ALJ. Appeal de novo to WC
Appeals Board, which reviews
the record made by the ALJ.
Appeal thereafter, based on
substantial evidence, to Kansas
Court of Appeals, and thereafter

Illinois: Jacobo v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm'n, 959 N.E.2d 772 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (“The Commission’s determination on a question of fact will not be
disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For a
finding of fact to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite
conclusion must be clearly apparent.”).
722
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Kentucky

ALJ of the Dept.
of Workers’
Claims

Yes

Louisiana

WCJ of the
Office of WC,
Workforce
Commission

Yes

Maine

Hearing Officer
of the WC Board

Yes

723

189

to state supreme court. Bryant v.
Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc.,
257 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2011).723
WC cases litigated before an ALJ
of the Commission; appeal
thereafter is to WC Board, which
undertakes review for whether
decision of ALJ is “clearly
erroneous,” or whether ALJ has
otherwise been arbitrary and
capricious; appeal thereafter to
Court of Appeals and then to
state supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. Abel
Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348
S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011).724
WC cases litigated before a WCJ
of the Office of WC; appeal to
Court of Appeals and then to
state supreme court. Review is
for whether the fact-findings are
in manifest error or clearly
wrong. Poissenot v. St. Bernard
Parish Sheriff's Office, 56 So. 3d
170 (La. 2011).
WC cases litigated before a
hearing officer of the WC Board.
Full board review may be
acquired of the decision of
hearing officer if the decision
involves an issue that is of
significance to the operation of

Kansas: Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 257 P.3d 255 (Kan.
2011) (“An appellate court's review of questions of fact in a workers compensation
appeal is limited to whether, when reviewing the record as a whole, the Board's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, which is a question of
law.”).
724
Kentucky: Abel Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011)
(“Legal errors would include whether the ALJ . . . made a clearly erroneous finding
of fact, rendered an arbitrary or capricious decision, or committed an abuse of
discretion. A party who appeals a finding that favors the party with the burden of
proof must show that no substantial evidence supported the finding, i.e., that the
finding was unreasonable under the evidence. Evidence that would have supported
but not compelled a different decision is an inadequate basis for reversal on
appeal.”)
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Maryland

Commissioner of
the WC
Commission

No

Massachusetts

Administrative
Judge (AJ) of the
Dept. of
Industrial
Accidents, Labor
and Workforce
Development

Yes

725

32-1

the workers’ compensation
system. Potential appeal
thereafter is to the state supreme
court, which is not obliged to
accept such appeal. Doucette v.
Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., 21
A.3d 99 (Me. 2011).725
WC cases litigated before a single
Commissioner of the
Commission. Appeal thereafter to
trial court (county circuit court),
where trial (including jury trial)
de novo is possible; under statute,
“the decision of the Commission
is presumed to be prima facie
correct.” Review is substantial
evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Holmes, 7 A.3d 13 (Md. 2010).
WC cases litigated before the
Division of Dispute Resolution.
If no agreement is reached at
Conciliation, AJ convenes an
informal conference and
thereafter issues a temporary
order; either party may thereafter
appeal and request a formal de
novo hearing with the AJ; appeal
thereafter to Reviewing Board,
made up of six Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs). Two panels
of three ALJs function as
appellate body of the DIA; appeal
thereafter to state supreme court.
Review of fact-findings is under
the “arbitrary and capricious”
test. DiFronzo's Case, 945
N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 2011).726

Maine: Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., 21 A.3d 99 (Me.
2011) (“For purposes of a workers’ compensation hearing, a hearing officer’s
decision, in the absence of fraud, on all questions of fact is final. Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 39-A, § 322(3) . . . .”).
726
Massachusetts: DiFronzo's Case, 945 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 2011) (“The
court may thus reverse or modify a decision of the board when … it is based upon
an error of law or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law . . . . The court accordingly considers whether the decision
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Michigan

Magistrate, WC
Board of
Magistrates,
Michigan
Administrative
Hearing System

Yes

Minnesota

Compensation
Judge of the WC
Division, Dept. of
Administrative
Hearings

Yes

Mississippi

ALJ of the
Workers’
Compensation
Commission

No

Missouri

ALJ of the
Division of WC,
Dept. of Labor

No

191

WC cases litigated before a
Magistrate; appeal thereafter to
the Michigan Compensation
Appellate Commission,727 and
then to the Michigan Court of
Appeals and state supreme court.
Review is “any competent
evidence.” Bennett v. Mackinac
Bridge Auth., 808 N.W.2d 471
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
WC cases litigated before a
compensation judge. Appeal
thereafter to a special Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals,
and supreme court thereafter.
Review is whether findings are
“manifestly contrary to the
evidence or unless the evidence
clearly requires reasonable minds
to adopt a contrary conclusion.”
Falls v. Coca Cola Enters., 726
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 2007).
WC cases litigated before ALJ of
the Commission. Appeal
thereafter to Commission, and
then to Circuit Court and state
supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence, which is
equated with review for arbitrary
and capricious findings. Gregg v.
Natchez Trace Elec. Power
Ass’n, 64 So. 3d 473 (Miss.
2011).
WC cases litigated before an ALJ
of the Division. Appeal
thereafter to the Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission,
and then to Court of Appeals and
state supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. Hampton v.

is factually warranted and not arbitrary or capricious, in the sense of having
adequate evidentiary and factual support and disclosing reasoned decision
making.”).
727
Michigan: Effective August 1, 2011, the Workers' Compensation
Appellate Commission became the Michigan Compensation Appellate
Commission.
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Montana

WCJ of the
Workers’
Compensation
Court

Yes

Nebraska

Trial Judge of the
Workers’
Compensation
Court (WCC)

Yes

Nevada

Hearing Officer
of the Department
of Administration

No

728
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Big Boy Steel Erection, 121
S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).728
WC cases litigated before the WC
Court (one judge). A direct
appeal thereafter may be taken to
the Montana Supreme Court,
which exercises substantial
evidence review. Wright v. Ace
Am. Ins. Co., 2011 Mont. LEXIS
45 (Mont. 2011).729
WC cases litigated before a single
trial judge of the seven-member
WCC, with appeal on substantial
evidence review to three-member
review panel of the WCC.
Appeal thereafter to Court of
Appeals and/or to state supreme
court. Review: findings of trial
judge have “the effect of a jury
verdict and will not be disturbed
unless clearly wrong.” Straub v.
City of Scottsbluff, 784 N.W.2d
886 (Neb. 2010).
WC cases litigated before a
Hearing Officer. Appeal
thereafter de novo to the Appeals
Officer, who is the final factfinder. Judicial review follows in

Missouri: Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo.
2003) (“A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains
sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether
the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence…. Whether the
award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining
the evidence in the context of the whole record. An award that is contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent
and substantial evidence.”).
729
Montana: Wright v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2011).
(“In reviewing the Montana Workers’ Compensation Court’s [WCC’s] factual
findings . . . the supreme court confines its review to determining whether
substantial credible evidence supports the findings actually made by the [WCC] . . .
Because the supreme court is in as good a position as the . . . [WCC] to assess
testimony presented . . . by way of deposition, it reviews deposition testimony de
novo. However, even [in this situation], it is ultimately restricted to determining
whether substantial credible evidence supports the [WCC’s] findings.”).
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New
Hampshire

Hearing Officer
of the
Commissioner

No

New Jersey

Judge of
Compensation,
Division of WC,
Dept. of Labor &
Workforce
Development

Yes

New Mexico

WCJ, WC
Administration

Yes

730
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the district court and then in state
supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. Vredenburg
v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084
(Nev. 2008).
WC cases litigated before a
hearing officer; de novo review
thereafter before Compensation
Appeal Board (CAB), which
hears evidence. Judicial review
thereafter in state supreme court.
Review is “whether the findings
are supported by competent
evidence in the record.” Appeal
of S. N.H. Health Sys., Inc., 2011
N.H. LEXIS 96 (2011).730
WC cases litigated before JWC;
judicial review in Superior Court
and thereafter in state supreme
court. Review is “sufficient
credible evidence.” Sager v.
O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862
A.2d 1119 (N.J. 2004).731
WC cases litigated before the
WCJ. Appeal thereafter to Court
of Appeals, and then by
permission to state supreme
court. Review is substantial
evidence on the “whole record.”

New Hampshire: Appeal of S. N.H. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 N.H.
LEXIS 96 (2011) (“The Supreme Court . . . will overturn a [WC] Board’s decision
only for errors of law, or if the Court is satisfied by a clear preponderance of the
evidence before it that the decision is unjust or unreasonable. The Board's factual
findings are prima facie lawful and reasonable . . . . In reviewing the Board's
findings, the Court’s task is not to determine whether it would have found
differently than did the Board, or to reweigh the evidence, but rather to determine
whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record . . . .”).
731
New Jersey: Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 A.2d 1119 (N.J.
2004) (“Whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on
sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a
whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to
judge of their credibility and, in the case of agency review, with due regard also to
the agency’s expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor.”).
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New York

Workers’
Compensation
Law Judge of the
WCB

No

North
Carolina

Deputy
Commissioner
of the Industrial
Commission

No

North Dakota

ALJ of the Office
of Administrative
Hearings

No

732
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Ortiz v. Overland Express, 237
P.3d 707 (N.M. 2010).732
WC cases litigated before WCLJ.
Appeal thereafter to Board, and
then to Appellate Division of
Supreme Court (trial court).
Review thereafter, on substantial
evidence basis, in New York
Court of Appeals. Matter of
Conyers v. Van Rensselaer
Manor, 914 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2011).
WC cases litigated before the
Deputy Commissioner. Appeal
thereafter to the Full
Commission, which is the final
fact-finder. Judicial review in
Court of Appeals and, thereafter,
in state supreme court. Review is
“any competent evidence.”
Mauldin v. A.C. Corp., 719
S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
who makes a recommendation to
Workforce Safety & Insurance
(WSI) on whether WSI’s decision
is correct; WSI conducts review
“to ensure that the facts and the
law support the decision” and
issues final order; appeal
thereafter to district court, and
then to state supreme court.

New Mexico: Ortiz v. Overland Express, 237 P.3d 707 (N.M.
2010) (“The . . . Supreme Court reviews factual findings of the [WC] judge under a
whole record standard of review. A whole record standard of review mandates that
the . . . court reviews both favorable and unfavorable evidence to determine
whether there is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to
support the conclusions reached by the fact finder. The purpose of findings of fact
is to set out the ultimate facts of the case, and they must be read together and the
conclusions of law flow therefrom. To determine whether a challenged finding is
supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the agency decision, but may not view favorable evidence
with total disregard to contravening evidence. To warrant reversal, the supreme
court must be persuaded that it cannot conscientiously say that the evidence
supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole
record furnishes.”).
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Ohio

District Hearing
Officer (DHO) of
the Industrial
Commission733

No

Oklahoma

Trial Judge of the
Workers’
Compensation
Court

Yes

Oregon

ALJ of the
Hearing Division
of the Board

No

Review is “whether a reasoning
mind reasonably could have
determined that the factual
conclusions reached were proved
by the weight of the evidence
from the entire record.” Landrum
v. Workforce Safety & Ins.
Fund, 798 N.W.2d 669 (N.D.
2011).
WC cases litigated before DHO,
with appeal to Staff Hearing
Officer (SHO), and then, with
permission, to Industrial
Commission. Appeal available
thereafter to trial court, which
will convene jury or bench trial;
at this level, facts may be found
again. Appeal thereafter to Court
of Appeals and state supreme
court; said courts will not
“disturb the decision of the
common pleas court … unless
that decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.”
Coleman v. City of
Hamilton, 2011 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3920 Ct. (Ohio Ct. App.
2011).
WC cases litigated before a single
judge; awards are final unless
appealed to a panel of three WC
Court judges, or directly to the
Supreme Court; an order of the
three-judge panel may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Review, since 2010, is under the
“clear weight of the evidence”
standard. HAC, Inc. v. Box, 245
P.3d 609 (Okla. 2010).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
with appeal to the Board, which
can make new or additional
findings; judicial review in Court

Ohio: The decision of the “Staff Hearing Officer” (SHO) of the
Industrial Commission, however, can be final as to the fact-findings if the
Commission denied review.
733
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Pennsylvania

WCJ of the Dept.
of Labor &
Industry, Office
of WC
Adjudication

Yes

Rhode Island

Trial Judge of the
Workers’
Compensation
Court

Yes734

South
Carolina

Commissioner of
the Industrial
Commission

No

734
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of Appeals, then to state supreme
court. Review is substantial
evidence. Dynea USA, Inc. v.
Fairbanks (In re Comp. of
Fairbanks), 250 P.3d 389 (Or. Ct.
App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before WCJ;
appeal thereafter to WC Appeal
Board, which reviews for
substantial evidence and error of
law. Appeal thereafter to
Commonwealth Court and then,
with permission, to state supreme
court. Review is substantial
evidence. City of Philadelphia v.
WCAB (Kriebel), 29 A.3d 762
(Pa. 2011).
WC cases litigated before trial
judge of the WCC, with appeal
on “clearly erroneous” standard
to Appellate Division of WCC.
Judicial review in state supreme
court. Review is “legally
competent evidence.” McGloin
v. Trammellcrow Servs., 987
A.2d 881 (R.I. 2010).
WC cases litigated before a single
commissioner; appeal thereafter
to a panel of three
commissioners, then to a panel of
six commissioners (“Full
Commission”); for injuries after
2007, judicial review is to Court
of Appeals, and then state
supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. Johnson v.
BMW Mfg. Corp., LLC, 2011

Rhode Island: Appellate Division may be able to reassess credibility if
it first finds that trial judge has made findings of fact that are “clearly erroneous.”
The Supreme Court does not exercise such review. McGloin v. Trammellcrow
Servs., 987 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2010) (“The Supreme Court's review on certiorari is
limited to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.
The … Court does not weigh the evidence, but rather reviews the record to
determine whether legally competent evidence supports the findings . . . .”).
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South
Dakota

ALJ of the
Department of
Labor

No

Tennessee

Trial Judge
of the Circuit
Court

No

Texas

Hearing Officer
of the WC
Commission

No

735
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S.C. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594
(S.C. Ct. App. 2011).735
WC cases litigated before an ALJ
with appeal to the Secretary of
the state DOL; judicial review in
circuit court and then state
supreme court, which undertakes
“clearly erroneous” review and
reserves the right to reweigh
credibility, particularly when the
evidence is documentary in
nature, including testimony by
deposition. McQuay v. Fischer
Furniture, 808 N.W.2d 107 (S.D.
2011).736
WC cases litigated before a trial
judge of the circuit court; appeal
to state supreme court, including
the Special WC Appeals Panel;
credibility can be reassessed on
appeal: “The standard of review
of issues of fact is de novo upon
the record of the trial court
accompanied by a presumption of
correctness of the findings, unless
the preponderance of evidence is
otherwise.” Griffin v. Walker Die
Casting, Inc., et al., 2010 Tenn.
LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. Sp. WC App.
Panel at Nashville 2010).
WC cases litigated before hearing
officer after mandatory benefit
review conference, with appeal to

South Carolina: Johnson v. BMW Mfg. Corp., LLC, 2011 S.C. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 594 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Substantial evidence is not a mere
scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but
is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify
its action.”).
736
South Dakota: McQuay v. Fischer Furniture, 808 N.W.2d 107 (S.D.
2011) (“We review an agency’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard . . . . However, when ‘an agency makes factual determinations on the basis
of documentary evidence, such as depositions or medical records,’ our review is de
novo.”) (quoting, among other things, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-36).
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Utah

ALJ of the Utah
Labor
Commission,
Adjudication
Division

No

Vermont

Hearing Officer,
Vermont
Department of
Labor (for the
Commissioner)

No

737

32-1

Appeals Panel. On basic issues
of compensability and eligibility,
appeal de novo to district (trial)
court for bench or jury trial; in
such cases, trial court is final
fact-finder. On collateral issues,
court undertakes substantial
evidence review. Appeal
thereafter to Court of Appeals,
and then to state supreme court.
Review of a jury verdict is “legal
sufficiency.” Transcon. Ins. Co.
v. Crump, 274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex.
App. 2008), reversed on other
grounds, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.
2010).737
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
with appeal to Utah Labor
Commission Appeals Board;
judicial review thereafter in Court
of Appeals, and then in state
supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence in light of
the whole record. Carradine v.
Labor Comm'n, 258 P.3d 636
(Utah Ct. App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before
Commissioner, though hearing
officer makes record for
Commissioner, Department of
Labor, who is the initial factfinder. Appeal de novo to trial
court on certified issues, which
may include factual issues.

Texas: Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App. 2008),
reversed on other grounds, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2010) (“In a legal sufficiency
review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge
every reasonable inference that supports the verdict . . . . We must credit evidence
that supports the judgment if reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not . . . . If the evidence falls within the
zone of reasonable disagreement, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the
fact finder . . . . Unless there is no favorable evidence, or if the contrary evidence
renders supporting evidence incompetent or conclusively establishes the opposite,
we must affirm . . . . ‘The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether
the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the
verdict under review.’”).
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Master or Chancellor?

Virginia

Deputy
Commissioner of
the WC
Commission

No

Washington

Industrial
Appeals Judge
(IAJ), of the Bd.
of Indus. Ins.
Appeals (BIIA)

No

West Virginia

ALJ of the Office
of Judges,

Yes

738
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Appeals on legal issues only are
prosecuted directly to supreme
court. Appeal beyond jury trial is
to state supreme court. Review
from Commissioner is (this
writer’s interpretation) any
evidence. Colson v. Town of
Randolph, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 130
(Vt. 2011).738 Review from jury
trial is whether the evidence
taken in the most favorable light
for the prevailing party fairly and
reasonably tends to support the
verdict. Rae v. Green Mountain
Boys Camp, 175 A.2d 800 (Vt.
1961).
WC cases litigated before Deputy
Commissioner, with appeal to
Full Commission; judicial review
thereafter in the Court of Appeals
and the state supreme court.
Review is whether findings are
“plainly wrong or without
credible evidence.” Gilbane v.
Guzman, 717 S.E.2d 433 (Va. Ct.
App. 2011).
WC cases litigated before IAJ
(who issues a proposed D&O),
with appeal to BIIA. Appeal
thereafter to superior court (trial
court), which may involve a jury
trial. Judicial review to Court of
Appeals, then to state supreme
court. Review is substantial
evidence. Rogers v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 210 P.2d 355
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
with recourse thereafter to Board

Vermont: Colson v. Town of Randolph, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 130 (Vt.
2011) (“[the] appellate court is bound by the Commissioner’s findings so long as
they are supported by the evidence. The appellate court will affirm if the
Commissioner’s conclusions are rationally derived from the findings and based on
a correct interpretation of the law. It will overrule only if no evidentiary support
exists for the findings or if the decision is based on evidence so slight as to be an
irrational basis for the result reached.”).
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Insurance
Commission

Wisconsin

ALJ of the WC
Div., Dept. of
Workforce
Development

No

Wyoming

Hearing
Examiner of the
Office of
Administrative
Hearings

Yes

District of
Columbia

ALJ of the D.C.
Dept. of
Employment
Services (DES)

Yes

LHWCA

ALJ of the US
Department of
Labor, Office of
ALJ’s (OALJ)

Yes

32-1

of Review, which is essentially
appellate review. Appeal, with
permission, to state supreme
court. Review is whether
findings are “clearly wrong.”
Casdorph v. W. Va. Office Ins.
Comm'r, 690 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va.
2009).739
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
with appeal to the Labor &
Industry Review Commission.
Judicial Review in the circuit
court, with appeal thereafter to
Court of Appeals and then to
state supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. DeBoer
Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 804
N.W.2d 658 (Wis. 2011).
WC cases are litigated before
Hearing Examiner, then judicial
review in District Court; appeal
to state supreme court. Review is
substantial evidence. McCallPresse v. State (In re Worker's
Comp. Claim of McCallPresse), 247 P.3d 505 (Wyo.
2011).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
appeal to Compensation Review
Bd. (CRB), DC DES; judicial
review in D.C. Court of Appeals.
Review is substantial evidence.
Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep't of
Empl. Servs., 10 A.3d 619 (D.C.
2010).
WC cases litigated before ALJ,
appeal to Benefits Review Board;
judicial review in U.S. Court of
Appeals and then to U.S.
Supreme Court. Review is

739
West Virginia: Casdorph v. W. Va. Office Ins. Comm'r, 690 S.E.2d
102 (W.Va. 2009) (“decision of the board may be reversed or modified by the
supreme court . . . only if the decision is [inter alia] . . . so clearly wrong based
upon the evidentiary record that even when all inferences are resolved in favor of
the board’s findings, reasoning and conclusions, there is insufficient support to
sustain the decision.”).
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substantial evidence based on the
whole record. P&O Ports Tex.,
Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 446 Fed.
Appx. 724 (5th Cir. 2011).740

B. Table 2: Law Regarding Stay and Selected Authorities
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ADJUDICATORY POWER
FIFTY STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LHWCA (2012)
(“WC” = Workers’ Compensation)
State

Title,
1st
Level
Hearing
Officer

Alabama

Trial judge
of the
County
Circuit
Court

Alaska

WC Board
of Dept. of
Labor &
Workforce
Develop.741
ALJ of the

Arizona

740

1st
Lev.
H.O.
FactFinder
?
Yes

Stay on
Appeal
to
Comm’n
or Ct?

Selected
Statute(s)

Illustrative
Case

No

ALA. CODE
§ 25-581(1),
§ 25-5-81(2)
(LexisNexis
2012).

Yes

No

Yes

No742

ALASKA
STAT.
§ 23.30.128
(LexisNexis
2012).
ARIZ. REV.

DeShazo Crane
Co., LLC v.
Harris, 2009
Ala. Civ. App.
LEXIS 489
(Ala. Civ. App.
2009).
Pietro v.
Unocal Corp.,
233 P.3d 604
(Alaska 2010).
Vandever v.

LHWCA: P&O Ports Tex., Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 446 Fed. Appx. 724
(5th Cir. 2011) (“court reviews the decisions of the . . . (BRB) for errors of law and
applies the same substantial evidence standard that governs the BRB’s review of
the . . . (ALJ)’s . . . factual findings. The findings of the ALJ must be accepted
unless they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole or unless they are irrational. Substantial evidence . . . considered as a whole
is a strict and limiting standard of review. Substantial evidence is evidence that
provides a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”)
741
Alaska: Two members of a quasi-judicial hearing panel of the Alaska
WC Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed benefits claim.
742
Arizona: An automatic stay does apply upon a party’s request for
reconsideration; no stay on further appeal to Court of Appeals.
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Industrial
Comm’n

Arkansas

ALJ of the
WC
Comm’n

No

Yes

California

WCJ of the
WC
Appeals
Board

No

No

Colorado

ALJ of
Office of
Admin.
Courts

Yes

Yes

Connecticut

Comm’r
of the WC
Comm’n

Yes

Yes

Delaware

Industrial
Accident
Board or,
upon
consent,
hearing
officer (all
of Dept. of
Labor,
OWC)
Judge of
Comp.
Claims
(JCC),
Office of
JCC’s,

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Florida

STAT.
§ 23-942,
§ 23-943
(2012).
ARK.
CODE
§ 11-9205,
§ 11-9711
(LexisN
exis
2012).
LAB. CODE
§ 5310,
§ 5315
(LexisNexis
2012).

COLO. REV.
STAT.
§ 8-43301(8)
(2012).
CONN. GEN.
STAT.
§ 31-298,
§ 31-280b
LexisNexis
(2011).
19 DEL.
CODE ANN.
§ 2301A
§ 2301B
(LexisNexis
2012).

FLA. STAT.
ANN.
§ 440.271,
§ 440.33,
§ 440.45
(LexisNexis
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Indus.
Comm’n, 714
P.2d 866 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1985).
Wilson v.
Cargill, Inc.,
873 S.W.2d
171 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1994).

Coast Framing,
Inc. v. WCAB
(Palacio), 2005
Cal. Wrk.
Comp. LEXIS
293 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005).
Wecker v. TBL
Excavating,
908 P.2d 1186
(Colo. Ct. App.
1995).
Healey v.
Hawkeye
Construction, 4
A.3d 858
(Conn. App. Ct.
2010).
Steppi v. Conti
Elec., Inc., 991
A.2d 19 (Del.
2010).

James W.
Windham
Builders, Inc. v.
Van Overloop,
951 So. 2d 40
(Fla. Dist. Ct.

Spring 2012

Georgia

Master or Chancellor?

Florida
Division of
Admin.
Hearings
ALJ of the
Legal
Division,
Board of
WC

No

Yes

Hearings
Officer of
the
Director of
the
Disability
Comp.
Division,
Dept. of
Labor
Referee or
Comm’r of
the
Industrial
Comm’n

No

No

No

Yes

Illinois

Arbitrator
of the WC
Comm’n

No

No

Indiana

“Single
Hearing
Member”
of
Workers’
Comp.
Board

No

Yes

Iowa

Deputy
Comm’r,
Division of

No

Yes

Hawaii

Idaho

203

2012).

App. 2007).

GA. CODE
ANN.
§ 34-9-47,
§ 34-9-48,
§ 34-9-103
(LexisNexis
2011).
HAW. REV.
STAT.
§ 386-87
(LexisNexis
2012).

Georgia
Mountain
Excavation,
Inc. v. Dobbins,
710 S.E.2d 205
(Ga. Ct. App.
2011).
Freedle v. City
and County of
Honolulu, 2007
Haw. App.
LEXIS 602
(Haw. Ct. App.
2007).

IDAHO CODE
ANN.
§ 72-506(1),
§ 72-717
(LexisNexis
2012).
820 ILL.
COMP. STAT.
ANN.
§ 305/19 (e),
§ 305/19 (f)
(LexisNexis
2012).

Stewart v. Sun
Valley Co., 94
P.3d 686 (Idaho
2004).

IND.
CODE
§ 22-3-1-3
(LexisNexis
2012).
IND. ADMIN.
CODE
§ 1-1-15.
IOWA CODE
§ 86.2,
§ 86.24,

R&D Thiel v.
Illinois
Workers’
Comp.
Comm’n
(Robledo), 923
N.E.2d 870
(App. Ct.
Illinois 2010).
AG One Co-Op
v. Scott, 914
N.E.2d 860
(Ind. Ct. App.
2009).

Beef Prod., Inc.
v. Rizvic, 806
N.W.2d 294
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WC,
Workforce
Devel.
ALJ of the
Division of
WC,
Department
of Labor

Kansas

No

No

Kentucky

ALJ of the
Department
of
Workers’
Claims

Yes

Yes

Louisiana

WCJ of the
Office of
WC,
Workforce
Comm’n

Yes

Yes

Maine

Hearing
Officer of
the WC
Board

Yes743

No

Maryland

Comm’r
of the WC
Comm’n

No

No

Mass.

Admin.
Judge (AJ)
of the
Department
of

Yes

No

743

§ 86.26
(LexisNexis
2011).
KAN. STAT.
ANN.
§ 44-555c,
§ 44-556
(LexisNexis
2011).
KY. REV.
STAT.
§ 342.215,
§ 342.275,
§ 342.285,
§ 342.290
(LexisNexis
2012).
LA. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1291(c),
§ 23:1310.1,
§ 23:1310.50

(LexisNexis
2012).
ME. REV.
STAT. ANN.
tit. 39-A,
§ 152,
§ 318,
§ 320,
§ 322(3)
(LexisNexis
2011).
LABOR &
EMPL.
§ 9-745(b),
(c)
(LexisNexis
2012).
MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch.
152,
§ 11C
MASS. GEN.
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(Iowa Ct. App.
2011).
Rausch v. Sears
Roebuck &
Co., 263 P.3d
194 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2011).
Jefferson
County Pub.
Sch. v.
Stephens, 208
S.W.3d 862
(Ky. 2006).

Chaisson v.
Philip Servs.
Corp., 917 So.
2d 514 (La. Ct.
App. 2005).
Higgins v. H.P
Hood, Inc., 926
A.2d 1176 (Me.
2007).

Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Bark,
555 A.2d 542
(Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989).
Murphy v.
Comm’r, 612
N.E.2d 1149
(Mass. 1993).

Maine: If Hearing Officer makes a special request, review by the Full
Board may be undertaken. See 39-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 320.
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Master or Chancellor?

Industrial
Accidents,
Labor and
Workforce
Devel.
Michigan

Magistrate,
WC Board
of
Magistrates

Yes

No

Minnesota

Comp.
Judge of
the WC
Division,
Department
of Admin.
Hearings
ALJ of the
Workers’
Comp.
Comm’n

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Missouri

ALJ of the
Division of
WC,
Department
of Labor

No

Yes

Montana

WCJ of the
Workers’
Comp. Ct.

Yes

No

Nebraska

Trial Judge
of the
Workers’
Comp.
Court
(WCC)

Yes

No

Mississippi

LAWS ch.
30A,
§ 14(7) (c),
(g)
(LexisNexis
2012).
MICH.
COMP.
LAWS SERV.
§ 418.206,
§ 418.861a
(LexisNexis
2012).
MINN. STAT.
§ 176.421
(LexisNexis
2012).

MISS. CODE
ANN.
§ 71-3-85,
§ 71-3-51
(LexisNexis
2012).
MO. REV.
STAT.
§ 287.495
(LexisNexis
2012).

MONT.
CODE ANN.
§ 39-712901
§ 39-712904
(LexisNexis
2011).
NEB. REV.
STAT.
§ 48-152,
§ 48-156,
§ 48-177,
§ 48-178,
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Mudel v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 614
N.W.2d 607
(Mich. 2000).

Stately v. Red
Lake Builders
et al., 2010 MN
Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 99
(Minn. WC Ct.
App. 2010).
Short v. Wilson
Meat House, 36
So. 3d 1247
(Miss. 2010).

Vice v.
Advantage
Waste Servs.,
Inc., 298
S.W.3d 145
(Mo. Ct. App.
2009).
Michalak v.
Liberty Nw.
Ins. Corp., 175
P.3d 893
(Mont. 2008).

Al-Saddi v.
Tecumseh
Poultry, 2010
NE Wrk.
Comp. LEXIS
1232 (Neb.
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Nevada

Hearing
Officer of
the
Department
of Admin.

No

No

New
Hampshire

Hearing
Officer of
the
Comm’r

No

No

New Jersey

Judge of
Comp.,
Division of
WC,
Department
of Labor &
Workforce
Devel.
WCJ, WC
Admin.

Yes

No

Yes

No

New York

Workers’
Comp.
Law Judge
of the
WCB

No

No

North
Carolina

Deputy
Comm’r
of the
Industrial
Comm’n

No

Yes

New
Mexico

32-1

§ 48-179,
§ 48-18
(LexisNexis
2012).
NEV. REV.
STAT.
§ 616C.315,
§ 616C.330,
§ 616C.340,
§ 616C.370
(LexisNexis
2012).
N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 281-A:42b, § 281A:42-a,
§ 281-A:43
(LexisNexis
2012).
N.J. STAT.
ANN.
§ 34:15-49
(LexisNexis
2012).

WCC 2010).

N.M. STAT.
ANN.
§ 52-5-2,
§ 52-5-8
(LexisNexis
2012).
N.Y.
WORKERS’
COMP.
§ 140,
§ 142, § 150
(LexisNexis
2012).
N.C. GEN.
STAT.
§ 97-85,
§ 97-86
(LexisNexis
2012).

Ortiz v. Estate
of Baros, 237
P.3d 707 (N.M.
2010).

Vredenburg v.
Sedgwick CMS
and Flamingo
HiltonLaughlin, 188
P.3d 1084
(Nev. 2008).
Appeal of
Carnahan, 993
A.2d 224 (N.H.
2010).

Sager v. O.A.
Peterson
Constr. Co.,
862 A.2d 1119
(N.J. 2004).

Jones v. N.Y.
State. Dept.
Corr., 825
N.Y.S.2d 316
(N.Y. App.
Div. 2006).
Johnson v. S.
Tire Sales &
Serv., 599
S.E.2d 508
(N.C. 2004).
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North
Dakota

ALJ of the
Office of
Admin.
Hearings

No

No

N.D. CENT.
CODE.
§ 28-32-46
(LexisNexis
2012).

Ohio

District
Hearing
Officer
(DHO) of
the
Industrial
Comm’n744
Trial
Judge of
the
Workers’
Comp. Ct.

No

No

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 4123.512
(LexisNexis
2012).

Yes

No

85 OKLA.
STAT.
§ 340
(LexisNexis
2012).

ALJ of the
Hearing
Division of
the Board

No

Yes

OR. REV.
STAT.

Oklahoma

Oregon

§ 656.295(5),
§ 656.295(6)

Penna.

WCJ of the
Dept. of
Labor &
Industry
Office of
Adj’n

Yes

No

Rhode
Island

Trial Judge
of the

Yes

No

(LexisNexis
2009).
Section
423(a) of the
WC Act,
77 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 853,
Section
423(c) of the
WC Act,
77 PA. STAT.
ANN.
§ 854.2
(West
2011).
R.I. GEN
LAWS
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Rojas v.
Workforce
Safety and Ins.
and Holland
Enterprises,
Inc., 703
N.W.2d 299
(N.D. 2005).
Luckett v.
Ryan, 2011
Ohio App.
LEXIS 2545
(Ohio Ct. App.
2011).
Dunkin v.
Instaff
Personnel
(American
Home Ass.),
164 P.3d 1057
(Okla. 2007).
Pietrzykowski
v. Albertsons,
Inc., 157 P.3d
1268 (Or. Ct.
App. 2007).
Kasper v.
WCAB (Perloff
Brothers, Inc.),
769 A.2d 1243
(Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2001).

Diocese of
Providence v.

Ohio: The decision of the “Staff Hearing Officer” (SHO) of the
Industrial Commission, however, can be final as to the fact-findings if the
Commission denies review.
744
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Workers’
Comp. Ct.

South
Carolina

Comm’r of
the
Industrial
Comm’n

No

Yes

South
Dakota

ALJ of the
Department
of Labor

No

No

Tennessee

Trial Judge
of the
County
Circuit
Court

No

No

Texas

Hearing
Officer of
the Dept. of
Insurance,
DWC

No

No

Utah

ALJ of the
Utah Labor
Comm’n,
Adj’n Div.

No

Yes

Vermont

Hearing
Officer,
Vermont
Department
of Labor

No

No

§ 28-3528(a),
§ 28-3528(b)
(Lexis Nexis
2012).
S.C. CODE
ANN.
§ 42-320(C)
(LexisNexis
2011).
S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS
§ 62-7-19
(LexisNexis
2011).
TENN. CODE
ANN.
§ 50-6-203,
§ 50-6-236
(LexisNexis
2012).

TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN.
§ 410.165,
§ 410.168,
§ 410.203,
§ 410.304
(LexisNexis
2012).
UTAH CODE
ANN.
§ 34A-2801,
§ 34A-1-303
(LexisNexis
2012).
21 VT.
STAT. ANN.
§ 670, § 671
(LexisNexis
2012).
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Vaz, 679 A.2d
879 (R.I. 1996).

Hargrove v.
Titan Textile
Co., 599 S.E.2d
604 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2004).
Vollmer v.
Wal-Mart
Store, Inc., 729
N.W.2d 377
(S.D. 2007).
Griffin v.
Walker Die
Casting, Inc., et
al., 2010 Tenn.
LEXIS 1020
(Tenn. Sp. WC
App. Panel at
Nashville
2010).
State Office of
Risk Mgmt. v.
Trujillo, 267
S.W.3d 349
(Tex. App.
2008).

Carter v. Labor
Comm’n
Appeals Bd.,
153 P.3d 763
(Utah Ct. App.
2006).
Estate of
George v. Vt.
League of
Cities and
Towns, 993
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Master or Chancellor?

(for the
Comm’r)
Deputy
Comm’r,
WC
Comm’n

Virginia

No

Yes

VA. CODE
ANN.
§ 65.2-201,
§ 65.2-203
(LexisNexis
2012).

Industrial
Appeals
Judge
(IAJ), of
the Bd. of
Indus. Ins.
Appeals
(BIIA)
ALJ of the
Office of
Judges,
Insurance
Comm’n

No

No

Yes

No

Wisconsin

ALJ of the
WC Div.,
Dept. of
Workforce
Devel.

No

Yes

WASH. REV.
CODE
§ 51.52.104,
§ 51.52.106,
§ 51.52.110,
§ 51.52.115
(LexisNexis
2012).
W. VA.
CODE
§ 23-5-12,
§ 23-5-15
(LexisNexis
2011).
WIS. STAT.
§ 102.18,
§ 102.23
(LexisNexis
2012).

Wyoming

Hearing
Examiner
of the
Office of
Admin.
Hearings
ALJ of the
D.C. Dept.
of
Employm’t
Services
(DES)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Washington

West
Virginia

District of
Col.745

WYO. STAT.
ANN.
§ 27-14-601,
§ 27-14-614
(LexisNexis
2012).
D.C. CODE
§ 321521.01
(LexisNexis
2012).

209

A.2d 367 (Vt.
2010).
Karban v.
Universal Fiber
Sys., LLC,
2010 Va. App.
LEXIS 274
(Va. Ct. App.
2010).
Chunyk &
Conley/Quad C
v. Williams,
2008 Wash.
App. LEXIS
1595 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2008).
Fenton Art
Glass Co. v. W.
Va. Office of
Ins. Comm’r,
664 S.E.2d 761
(W. Va. 2008).
Luetkens v.
Wis. Dept. of
Corr., 2010 WI
Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 117
(Wis. LIRC
2010).
Herrera v.
State, 236 P.3d
277 (Wyo.
2010).

Washington
Metro. Area
Transit Auth. v.
DC DES
(Browne), 926
A.2d 140 (D.C.
2007).

District of Columbia: Law referenced is “DC Workers’ Compensation
Act of 1979, as amended, D.C. CODE § 32-1501 et. seq. (private sector).” Law
regarding review was amended in 2004.
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LHWCA

ALJ of the
US
Department
of Labor,
Office of
ALJ’s
(OALJ)

Yes

No

33 U.S.C.
§ 921
(2012).
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Bath Iron
Works v.
Fields, 599
F.3d 47 (1st Cir.
2010).

